RUSSIA AND ASIA

Problems of Contemporary Area Studies and International Relations*

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I

THE educated American of the middle nineteenth century who took an inventory of his knowledge of the world found himself much more poorly informed on Asia than on Europe. The reason for this is manifest. America's relations with Asia were fragmented and peripheral, trade alone being a major concern. Interaction with Europe proceeded on an entirely different plane: For the New World, Europe was an inexhaustible source of population increase and personal contacts, of monies for economic growth, and of technological, artistic, and educational inspiration.

Reflecting the compartmentalized and loose connections with Asia, American studies of this great continent were haphazard and limited in scope. America's comprehensive and intense relations with Europe, on the other hand, resulted in a comprehensive and intense interest in practically all aspects of European life. This interest went well below the surface of contemporary affairs. The educated nineteenth-century American was expected to know the historical roots of Europe's development: the era of enlightenment, the Renaissance, the Middle Ages, and finally, the civilizations of Palestine, Greece, and Rome, the acclaimed foundations of Europe's institutional and cultural greatness.

The world of 1950 differs profoundly from the world of 1850. All major areas of the globe have undergone radical internal transformations; simultaneously they have changed in their external relations to each other and to the United States. To say that the United States has suddenly risen to a

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position of global leadership in the field of economics, diplomacy, and military strength is but one way of drawing attention to this country's vastly intensified contacts with Europe and with the rest of the world.

The new relations between the United States and Western Europe, Asia, and Africa—and in certain respects also Latin America—present an obvious challenge to our traditional way of studying these areas. The challenge is even greater in the case of the Soviet Union. Despite the many iron curtains separating the United States from the core of the Soviet world (and in varying degrees also from its outlying bastions), the presence and the activities of the U.S.S.R. affect nearly all, if not all, aspects of American life. The interplay of ideas is no less passionate because today it is openly hostile; it goes far beyond radio broadcasts. In the economic and political spheres the Soviet government is as merciless at home in eradicating all manner of Western institutions, as the proponents of Soviet society outside its borders are eager to paralyze and disintegrate the institutional order of the West and other non-Soviet areas. The great concentration of Russia's manpower in heavy industry and in the army, because of a presumably unavoidable new world conflagration, affects the military, technological, and political decisions of America to an extraordinary degree. It is a sad but undeniable truth that the international relations between the Soviet-controlled world and the non-Soviet world constitute the most important single fact in the present global situation.

II

The consequences of this fact for the social sciences are manifest. If new types of societies have arisen in the modern world, and if these new societies are bound together by new types of international relations, then their rational and orderly analysis requires new concepts and methods of investigation. To be sure, practically all new concepts have their roots in the past; and while voicing the need for new frames (and sub-frames) of reference, I am fully aware of the historical connections between whatever new concepts we may develop and previously held ideas—some

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elaborated, some incipient, and some residual categories of obsolete systems of thought.

We claim to defend the values of the West, and of Western civilization and society. How far has modern social science gone in clarifying these concepts, which are basic for our entire contemporary life? Similarly we mention the "East," "Asia," the "Orient," indicating our belief in a cohesive Oriental reality, although we may see no common denominator beyond the accidents of geography and certain affinities in art and religion.

Considering the importance of the issues involved, such a view is highly unsatisfactory. What we urgently need is a meaningful institutional concept of the Orient. Such a concept, besides leading to decisive insights into the character of the East and the West, may even clarify the character of the Soviet system of power and social control.

The systematic campaign of the leading Soviet ideologists, headed by Stalin himself, against the concept of Oriental society as a specific structural and operational system re-emphasizes the desirability of investigating this concept, which is rooted in the thought of such pioneer institutional analysts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as Adam Smith, Malthus, Richard Jones, James and John Stuart Mill, and—closely approaching them in this respect—Marx and Engels.

III

The great Eastern civilizations of the Old World—and also the higher agrarian civilizations of pre-Columbian America—differed profoundly from the ancient and mediaeval developments in the West: In the first two mentioned areas governmental execution of certain vital functions of agriculture (primarily large-scale management of irrigation and defense against floods) involved a coordinated and autocratic system of social, political, and economic control. The semi-managerial states of Oriental society (or "hydraulic society" as I prefer to call it) differ operationally also from the mercantilistic governments of absolutistic Europe whose representatives encouraged and regulated rather than managed what they considered

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the crucial spheres of contemporary economic life. Extending the range of Miliukov's formula beyond its original Russian realm, we may say that the Oriental state was "stronger than society," that is, stronger than the society's total nongovernmental forces.

On the managerial plane a much greater similarity exists between Oriental despotism and the U.S.S.R. In both cases autocratic governments perform essential economic tasks. But the Soviet state goes far beyond its Eastern predecessor. The technical difference between the predominantly agrarian Orient and the increasingly industrialized Russian society is easily recognized; the difference in the range of managerial operation becomes apparent as soon as we comprehend the institutional meaning of Russia's first Five-Year Plan.

During the first decade of Bolshevik rule the Soviet state established managerial dominance over one decisive sector of the country's economy: its large-scale industry. In this vital branch it surpassed the corresponding ambitions of the governments of all hydraulic societies. Even the most active Oriental despotisms, while eager to handle the "heavy waterworks," left the greater part of production proper in the hands of private cultivators. During the second decade of Soviet power the state enlarged the scope of its management until it established its integrated direction over all major productive and circulatory activities both in industry and agriculture. Thus a system of total operational control was created, which is indeed without precedent in the history of mankind.

IV

The concept of Oriental society permits us to define the institutional pattern of the great Eastern civilizations and to recognize basic relations between Asiatic despotism and Soviet society. But the concept will be productive only to the extent that the search for structure is combined with an investigation of process. Its analytic potential will be exhausted only if our inter- and multi-area approach is not merely institutional and typological, but dynamic and historical as well.

The heuristic potential of the concept of Oriental society

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ıay be tested, among other things, by examining briefly certain ey aspects in the historical and structural relations between wo focal world areas of today: Russia and Asia.

Whatever may have been the influence of Russia on Asia efore 1917—and this influence was by no means negligible—t is for this period that the reverse process, because of its ffect on Russia's institutional history, requires special conideration.

European Russia never had a political economy of the \siatic, hydraulic type; and a crude economic approach could herefore dismiss the problem of relationship before submitting the area to a broader comparative test. However, a perinent historical parallel warns us against a hasty negative lecision. During the later period of Byzantine history, governnent-controlled heavy water-works were practically non-exstent in the shrunken territories of the Eastern Roman Emıire. Nevertheless, this empire maintained its centralized bueaucratic despotism for more than eight hundred years after he Arabs had deprived it of all its important hydraulic provnces.

The Byzantine development and many analogous instances ıuggest that Oriental society, like feudal Europe and modern industrial society, is a very complex tissue, including centers of high institutional density and a variety of marginal and submarginal border zones. Was Russian society marginally Oriental before the Mongol conquest and during the so-called Kievan period? Or did it shift from a submarginal to a marginal Oriental position under the impact of Mongol domination?

V

If these questions are valid, then scholars familiar with the character of Oriental institutions should have an essential contribution to make. However, the Orientologist who is challenged to investigate the Asiatic potential of Russian society is drawn into a new field of empirical research. He must therefore proceed cautiously and in close cooperation with Russian area specialists.

As stated above, the society of pre-Mongol Russia lacked the

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productive peculiarities of Oriental despotism altogether; an its acquisitive fiscal methods were Oriental only in the rang of the government claim: they were not implemented by th coercive devices of a strong autocratic state. Thus Orient trends were by no means absent in pre-Mongol Russia. Bu these trends were too weak to make early Russia marginall Oriental.

Russia crossed the institutional watershed when, under Mon gol rule, from the middle of the thirteenth century to the en of the fifteenth century, it was part of a marginal Oriental em pire. It was during this lengthy period of the Mongol Yok —a period which, for a number of reasons, has been slighte by most investigators—that the coercive and acquisitive tech niques of Eastern statecraft were vigorously imposed, makin possible the consolidation of an Orientally autocratic and bu reaucratic system of government and society.

The struggle between bureaucratic and proprietary interest was by no means confined to Russia. But nowhere in Centra or Western Europe did an absolutistic state succeed in gainin control over the major portion of all land and in making pos session of large estates depend upon full-time, life-long, an unconditional government service. The Muscovite autocrat were able to achieve all this. State-attached "serving men constituted a ruling class with primary bureaucratic an secondary proprietary interests, radically unlike the nobilit of Mediaeval and post-Mediaeval Europe, but strikingly sim ilar to corresponding strata in certain periods of Asiatic his tory, such as Chou China, Mogul India, and Osman Turkey

VI

How did the dominantly, if marginally, Oriental Russian state approach the problem of industrialization which becam urgent under and after Peter the Great? It has been frequently asserted that, during this formative period, Russia's large-scal industry was primarily based on commandeered serf labor forced labor; and this statement appears to be correct. Another aspect of the matter, however, the extent of government man agement, has not been so clearly defined. Taking Russia'

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ighteenth-century large-scale industry in its entirety and con-idering heavy as well as light industry, one may say with a igh degree of certainty that this industry was not only based n forced labor, but that it was also predominantly managed—ot just supported or regulated, but managed—by the Tsarist ›ureaucracy.

VII

In the marginal Oriental despotisms of Byzantium and Os-nan Turkey, the representatives of the state "apparatus" main-ained their dominant position and protected their vested in-erests, despite the considerable development of private prop-·rty both in land and capital. Did the officeholders of the Russian autocracy proceed similarly from 1762 to 1917—that s, over a period in which large private property in land was ·ully established and in which there appeared an ever-increas-ng number of capitalistic private enterprises?

It is my considered opinion—an opinion which I submit to he area specialists for critical examination—that, after the Emancipation, the Tsarist state and its bureaucracy, far from ›eing forced into a secondary position, succeeded in modern-ızing and maintaining its dominant place in Russian society. The Tsarist bureaucracy withheld from the landed nobility a large portion of the redemption money promised in the Emancipation settlement; and the same group, which effec-tively protected its bureaucratic interest, made little effort to prevent the rapid decline of its proprietary land-owning wing. According to the official statistics, which have been carefully interpreted by such experts as Geroid T. Robinson, the nobility lost about one-third of all its post-Emancipation land from the 'seventies to 1905 and more than forty per cent by 1914. At the same time, the acquisitive power of the bureaucracy over the villages remained unshaken. During the last decades of the nineteenth century the Russian government, by direct or in-direct taxes, seems to have taken from the peasants practically the whole of their agricultural produce proper—almost fifty per cent of the entire peasant income.

In a country rich in industrial raw materials and labor power, any encouragement of private initiative was bound to

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show spectacular results. The Tsarist bureaucracy, historicall unprepared to assume over-all managerial leadership, encour aged private capital to operate in practically all branches o the country's changing economy. The proprietary and entre preneurial upsurge was paralleled by a burst of creative energ in many intellectual fields and by the growth of legal institu tions providing the individual with elementary means of pro tection against the autocratic "monster."

But the hegemony of the state apparatus continued to re strict the position of the Russian bourgeoisie. The native capi talists had to share their influence with foreign capitalist whose investments, in turn, were guaranteed and channelled b special agencies of the Tsarist government.

The bureaucratic methods of economic control were as mani fold as they were effective. At the beginning of the twentieth century the greater part of the Russian railroad system wa managed by the government. In addition, and different from Western European conditions, the Tsarist state "apparatus" exerted direct fiscal control over the very substantial monopoly industries which constituted almost thirty per cent of the country's light industry. It also exerted considerable influence over the non-monopoly light industry, a third of which de pended on government-guaranteed foreign investments. In the core of heavy industry, mining, the state-directed foreign funds reached seventy per cent of all capital in 1900 and no less than ninety per cent on the eve of World War I.

These facts indicate the strategic financial position of the Tsarist regime in the Russian economy of the early twentieth century. The Soviet academician Lyashchenko expresses only a generally held opinion when he says that the organization of the Russian banking system "differed materially from the bank system of the Western capitalist countries. . . . The state bank was the central bank of the entire Russian credit system," and the director of the credit department of the treasury "controlled the entire finance apparatus of the country."

It is interesting that the official Soviet ideology which, following Lenin's concept of finance capital and industrial monopoly, stresses the crucial importance of credit control in the economic, social, and political developments of the West

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has failed to apply this key thesis to its own historical background: pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia. If Lenin and his adherents had been consistent, they would have pointed out that the Tsarist apparatus and its representatives were the dominant force in Russia's growing industrial order.

Lenin's interpretation of the role of modern finance capital is open to argument. But many social scientists who do not accept Lenin's (and Hilferding's) theory agree that credit control is a significant index of the power structure in modern economy. Evaluating the relation between bureaucratic and (private) proprietary forces in Russian society during the decades prior to the Bolshevik revolution, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Russian government and its bureaucratic representatives continued to be "stronger than society," and that even at the beginning of the twentieth century Russian capitalism was still under the shadow of a quasi-Asiatic government machine. Lenin in 1905 bluntly called Russian capitalism "Asiatic."

These facts explain the relative weakness of Russia's modern industrial middle classes—and for that matter also the lack of a strong and democratic labor movement. They also give a specific "Asiatic" meaning to the alarmed statement made by the aging Lenin (in the winter of 1922) that the new Soviet state apparatus was nothing but the old apparatus painted over afresh.

VIII

In stressing the genetic and structural relation between traditional Russia and Oriental despotism, I do not mean to imply that an *apparatchik* society of the Soviet type may arise only within the orbit or at the periphery of the Oriental world. Unfortunately there is no absolute historical guarantee against the emergence of such a society in the West or in any other area of the globe. But in the West the dice are not loaded as they were in semi-(or quasi-) Asiatic Russia. In the West the historical situation is open. It offers all anti-totalitarian forces of society the opportunity to make a genuine institutional choice.

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Another lesson of an essentially theoretical nature may be derived from the historical data brought to light by a comparative inter-and multi-area analysis of Russia and Asia. The total managerial *apparatchik* society of the U.S.S.R., although not identical with the agrarian and semi-managerial bureaucratic societies of the Orient, is definitely related to these societies. If we restrict our observations to Western experience, then Stalin is correct in claiming that the Soviet state has no historical precedent. If, however, we draw upon the total institutional experience of mankind, then we are scientifically justified in claiming the genetic and structural affinity of the new Russian system of power to the semi-managerial autocracies of Oriental despotism.[1] Then we also have no difficulty in understanding the frantic efforts of the Soviet ideologists to destroy the theory of Oriental society (or "Asiatic society" or the "Asiatic mode of production"), a theory which is based on the empirically proved existence of an economically functional state and a bureaucracy as a ruling class.

[1] A student of contemporary Russia, who, however tentatively, grants the validity of this claim, is methodologically bound to ask whether knowledge of the basic features of Oriental society is imperative for the analysis of the U.S.S.R. The question has an institutional as well as a genetic aspect; and each requires a separate answer.

Soviet society as an institutional phenomenon may, of course, be approached exclusively on the basis of Western experience and with purely Western criteria. But it soon becomes apparent that the traditional Western concepts are inadequate. They have to be modified or replaced by categories which take into account the peculiarities of a functional (managerial) state and the autocratic rule of the masters of such a state. Investigation of these phenomena may be greatly aided by comparison with related conditions; and in this respect the institutions of Asia are infinitely more suggestive than those of Western antiquity, feudalism, or absolutism.

Thus knowledge of Oriental society is an effective supplementary, though not a necessary, research tool for the analysis of the character of Soviet society. For the study of the genesis of this society it is essential. Whether or not we assume that until 1917 the Tsarist bureaucracy maintained a quasi- (or "semi-") Oriental hegemony over Russian society, the impact of Asia upon Russia's political, economic, and social development is too fully documented to be disregarded by serious scholarship; and the quality and dimension of the Asiatic impact can obviously be determined only by an analyst familiar with the institutional conditions that prevail in the centers and along the marginal and submarginal periphery of Oriental society.

As indicated above, the genetic analysis of the Soviet Union has fateful implications for the entire non-Soviet part of the globe. Did the Russian *apparatchik* society originate under circumstances similar to those of the West? Or was the growth of this society strongly—and perhaps decisively—encouraged by a peculiar "Asiatic" background that existed in Russia, but that was entirely, or almost entirely, absent in the property-based countries of the modern industrial world? This question cannot even be properly posed, and still less can it be properly answered, without a full knowledge of the character, the morphological shades, and the historical influence of Oriental society.

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IX

Endeavoring to define the institutional heritage of modern Russia, I have so far discussed only Asia's institutional impact on Russia. Turning to the contemporary scene, Russia's impact on Asia assumes outstanding significance. After 1917, Russia became a closed society, much more tightly closed than the semi-open or open societies of the West and more tightly closed even than the Oriental societies of Asia which are today in various stages of dissolution and transformation. Whoever seeks to define the relations between the Soviet Union and a given foreign country must inspect both the basically new pattern of all Soviet relations with the non-Soviet world and the institutional vulnerability of the particular non-Soviet state under observation.

Soviet relations with other nations proceed on many levels. Some resemble at least externally the relations existing between non-Soviet countries (commercial intercourse, for example). Others are strikingly modified (diplomatic relations, for example). And still others are entirely new in content and largely new also in operational techniques (the spread of Soviet ideas fostered by a carefully integrated system of ideological engineering and the promotion of activities favorable to the interests of the U.S.S.R. through well-organized groups of Communists and their overt and covert aides and allies). An attempt to study the relations between the U.S.S.R. and any larger or smaller country from the compartmentalized standpoint of traditional diplomatic or economic relations is therefore doomed to failure. It can yield only a deficient and distorted picture of the real state of affairs.

To mention but one instance: It is difficult to imagine anything less revealing than the frequently heard account of the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany in the critical years before Hitler came to power. From 1931 to 1933 the Russian Politburo influenced Germany's inner development decisively, and it did so through the medium of a large and disciplined group of Germans who were ready to carry out directives emanating from the Comintern—that is, in the last analysis, from the leaders of the Russian state.

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Of course, powerful nations have always used the internal conflicts of other nations to influence their domestic and foreign policy. But in the case of pre-Hitler Germany, the Soviet Union employed this time-honored device with unique effectiveness, because it could exploit to the limit Germany's social and political weaknessses and tensions. On the diplomatic and military level, the Kremlin encouraged the anti-Versailles aspirations of German nationalism, while, through the medium of the Comintern, it involved the German Communist Party in a fratricidal struggle against the Social Democrats, who were attacked as "Social Fascists," the "main enemy," and the "main support" of the bourgeoisie. This multiple policy was eminently successful in paralyzing the anti-Fascist energies of the German labor movement, in paving Hitler's road to victory, and in preparing the anti-Versailles war which —after a series of complex developments—was unleashed in 1939 through the Russo-German pact, the triumphant continuation of the Kremlin's earlier German policy.

By necessity I am oversimplifying a very intricate process. But I feel justified in asserting that the birth of Hitler Germany will never be satisfactorily explained unless the relations between Weimar Germany and the U.S.S.R. (including Russia's Comintern policy prior to Hitler's victory) are approached through an adequate type of area and inter-area study.

X

Events similar in importance to those preceding Hitler's rise to power occurred in the Far East during the years just prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. The establishment of a united front by the Nationalist (Kuo-min-tang) Government and the Chinese Communists initiated Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. And the form in which, under the conditions of the united front, the Chinese conducted their war of resistance immensely facilitated the Communist penetration of rural China—a penetration which proved essential for the last phase of the Chinese civil war and the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek on the continent.

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How did the united front between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist government come into being? It is one of the standard legends of contemporary history that the Chinese Communists under the impact of Japanese aggression discovered the need for a broad "national" united front, that they made their first all-out offer in 1935 "in the heat of civil war," and that their new policy was determined, as a frequently quoted author writes, "by the will of the Chinese people." Actually this offer was first proclaimed, not in the heat of the Chinese civil war, but in the heat of a conference hall in Moscow. The Chinese Communists changed their political line not in response to the will of the Chinese people but in accordance with the directives of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, that is, in the last analysis, by the will of the Russian government.

To be sure, there was no lack of sharp and early anti-Japanese pronunciamentos by the Chinese Communists; but until 1935, the Communist fight against Japan was subordinated to the fight against Chiang Kai-shek. The occupation of Manchuria (China's potential Ruhr) in 1931, did not lead to the demand for an all inclusive anti-Japanese United Front. During the early 'thirties, the U.S.S.R. pursued a policy which in Germany aimed at securing an anti-Versailles government and in East Asia tried to conciliate Japan. It was only in the year 1934—when the Soviet regime became convinced that, instead of turning westward, Hitler threatened the U.S.S.R., when the Soviet efforts to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan failed completely, and when a Russo-Japanese war seemed highly probable—that a militantly hostile attitude toward Germany and toward Japan became the outstanding feature of Russia's international strategy. In 1935 a United Front policy that had received its first test in France was proclaimed as a new global strategy. Now the German Communists began to criticize as sectarian their previous attitudes toward the Social Democrats and Hitler—attitudes which had been determined in Moscow and not in Berlin. Now the Chinese Communist Party suddenly discovered the sectarian errors they had committed in the first years of Japanese aggression.

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The Chinese speakers, who greeted the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in its opening session, still stuck naively to the old anti-Kuo-min-tang line. It was only on August 2, the day when Dimitrov solemnly announced the new United Front policy, that the political attitude of the Chinese Communist Party was radically reshaped. On August 7, Wang Ming, speaking for the Chinese delegation, made his dramatic appeal for a Chinese United Front, stretching out his hand not only to all genuinely anti-Japanese elements within the Nationalist government but also to the heretofore particularly hated members of Chiang Kai-shek's secret police, the Blue Shirts. And so unexpected was the change-over that even after Dimitrov and Wang Ming had laid down the new line, several Chinese speakers—obviously using manuscripts prepared before the second of August—continued to appeal for an uncompromising struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and his "fascist" regime.

XI

Russia's China policy from 1935-37, as expressed in Soviet relations to the Chiang Kai-shek government on the one hand and to the Chinese Communists on the other, provides the institutional analyst with material for a singularly rewarding case study. The conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact in the late fall of 1936 evidently confirmed the Russian Politburo's conviction that a Kuo-min-tang–Communist coalition ready to go to war against Japan was urgently needed. The arrest of Chiang Kai-shek by the Manchurian Nationalist general, Chang Hsüeh-liang, in December 1936 enabled the Kremlin to demonstrate to the Nanking government beyond the possibility of doubt the sincerity of its desire for a *de facto* alliance against Japan. The American White Book on China reports a conversation held in 1945, in which Molotov proudly takes credit for Russia's role in the freeing of Chiang Kai-shek. Molotov claimed that "due to the political and moral support of the Soviet government, Chiang had been allowed to return to the seat of his government."

In the light of Russia's grand strategy, the temporary and tactical transformation of the Chinese Communist Party into

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"agrarian reformers" becomes spectacularly meaningful. As early as 1936 Mao Tse-tung offered to modify the Communist attitude on the land question and other vital issues. But the new policy was not immediately or unconditionally put into operation; it became the decisive price for the "national" United Front and open resistance against Japan. Said Mao Tse-tung in August 1936, "If and when the formation of a United Front with Nanking is realized, that problem [the new agrarian policy] can be easily settled." Only on September 22, 1937, that is, after the Nanking government had taken up arms against the Japanese, did the Chinese Communists officially initiate their "reform" policy. Later Mao Tse-tung clearly defined the strategic purpose of this conciliatory step. Was the concession wrong? No. "The concession [was] right; it precipitated the Kuo-min-tang's participation in the anti-Japanese war."

XII

I am tracing these destiny-ridden inter-area developments, not to portray the Chinese Communists as helpless agents and pitiful victims of a Soviet policy which one-sidedly benefited the U.S.S.R. without profiting the Chinese Communist movement. The actual relations between the non-Russian Communist parties and the Soviet government are far more complicated than that. In my opinion, Communist China emerged after World War II not as a Soviet vassal, but as a supervised and guided junior partner in a colossal Eurasian Communist Axis.

But however we may evaluate the present position of the Chinese Communists, we certainly must remember that it was through their subordination to the Moscow directives that Mao Tse-tung and his followers learned to exhaust, technically and organizationally, the opportunities offered by the national and international conditions in the Far East during the fateful 'thirties and 'forties. No doubt the great majority of the Chinese people is being forced into submission by an increasingly coercive *apparatchik* society. But the masters of the new Chinese apparatus of political and economic control, who in many ways depend on the masters of the Russian totali-

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tarian heartland, have under Moscow's direction achieved a colossal victory, a victory hardly conceivable in political, ideological, and technical isolation.

XIII

The underlying problems have far-reaching ramifications. I trust that sooner or later they will be investigated fully and systematically. At this time I should like to conclude with a few suggestions which are offered not as dogmatic certainties, but as working hypotheses that have been subjected to a preliminary testing.

1) The relations between any non-Russian sub-area of the Communist-controlled world and the U.S.S.R. must be studied within a frame of reference that takes into account the institutional background of the area in question, the specific conditions attending the rise of the Communist regime under inquiry, and the basic character and needs of its incipient or fully developed *apparatchik* society. References to political Titoism are apt to be misleading, if they are put forth as substitutes for an institutional investigation of the special sub-area and the general Kremlin-inspired patterns of power, privilege, and vested interest. Compartmentalized studies of the Chinese Communists are as deficient as are vague statements regarding their "ideological" ties to an undefined Soviet society. A junior member of the new super-axis is no vassal, although the U.S.S.R. may in time succeed in reducing it to that status. Conflicts and tensions between Communist sub-areas and the Soviet heartland are frequently severe—the history of Communism abounds with genuine and grim conflicts —but Titoism is only one among several forms of disagreement.

The possible conflicts between the strongest and the weaker members of a totalitarian axis present problems of a peculiar kind. The fascist Axis was a much less homogeneous institutional, ideological, and operational phenomenon than is the present Eurasian Communist Axis. This being so, it is all the more necessary to remember that, despite great frictions and even outright acts of betrayal, Mussolini eventually dropped

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his neutrality to fight on the side of Hitler with whose regime Fascist Italy was connected by vital ties of institutional similarity and socio-political interests.

2) Turning from the Soviet-controlled part of the globe to the non-Soviet world and to the structural and operational relations between these two gigantic super-areas, we are again faced with the danger of over-compartmentalizing. What is the actual weight of any individual technological, economic, military, or ideological factor in the societal whole to which it belongs, and how is it related to analogous factors that, although of the same kind, appear in profoundly different institutional settings?

Chingis Khan's economic potential was crude and inferior: the Mongols probably never produced as many calories as did the great agrarian society of China; and his tribesmen lacked the great walls, fortified cities, and war machines of their Chinese neighbors. But only an ostrich-strategist can console himself by stressing aspects of subsistence economies, when the relative total strengths of antagonistic power economies are at issue. A grand strategy aimed at containing Chingis Khan's expansion potential had to consider many factors besides the number of calories produced and the extent of individual technological achievement.

3) Analysis of the institutional stability of the present-day international situation is bound to disclose a variety of conflicts, cold-war fronts, and methods of coercion and aggression that cannot be understood by invoking obsolete criteria of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Machiavelli was struck by the relative openness of feudal France, which made it easy to approach dissatisfied elements of the French nobility and to play them against their government. He was equally struck by the political inaccessibility of the greatest near-by representative of Oriental despotism: Osman Turkey. Even if an outside force could find sympathetic friends among the Turkish subjects (Machiavelli was not yet familiar with the term "Fifth Columnists"), the nature of Turkey's centralized autocracy all but prevented such friends from engaging in any effective action against the hated regime.

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XIV

Translating this historical experience into the language of modern area research, I suggest that susceptibility to foreign penetration and staying power under the impact of a new type of crisis—involving new pressures, new attractions, and new patterns of deceit—be given priority over problems that twenty or fifty years ago would have been considered relevant and even primary fields of inquiry. This is of crucial importance not only for studies of pre-Communist and Communist China, and for the adjacent areas of Southeast Asia and Japan, but also for India and Africa, for the various sub-areas of Western Europe, for Latin America, and even for our United States.

Examining Point Four of President Truman's international program, it is obvious that even America is neither rich enough nor secure enough to spend its resources abroad indiscriminately and without considering the topography of the global conflict and the to-be-expected political earthquakes and conflagrations. For the time being, only a politically focussed and integrated aid to economically under-developed areas can be responsibly recommended. The same holds true for our future area and inter-area studies: Only a focussed approach that is fully aware of the existing institutional, socio-economic, political, and ideological conflicts and to-be-expected convulsions can respond appropriately to the realities of the world situation.

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AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

By QUINCY WRIGHT

I BELIEVE that much historical data can be assembled to support the following propositions:

(1) The trend of power politics is toward a bipolar world, and such a world tends toward increasing rivalry, suspicion, and tension between the two leading states, making them develop into garrison states in a continuous relationship of cold or hot war.[1]

(2) A state actively preparing for war in time of peace tends to become over-centralized, intolerant, and aggressive; to encourage other states to gang up against it; and, when war eventuates, to win the first battles but to lose the war.[2]

(3) Absolutisms tend to expand their authority into all fields, to externalize aggressive impulses, to subordinate welfare to power, to subordinate individual initiative and scientific investigation to the ruling ideology, and to commit aggressive acts because of internal pressures and miscalculation of moral forces.[3]

(4) Democracies tend to be fluctuating in policy, slow in

1 Q. Wright, *A Study of War,* Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1942, pp. 382, 763, 816; Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, eds., *Compass of the World,* New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. 55 ff.; W. F. Ogburn, ed., *Technology and International Relations,* Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. 189-92. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations,* New York, Knopf, 1948, pp. 270 ff.; Q. Wright, "Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization," *Yale Law Journal,* Vol. LV, No. 5 (August 1946), pp. 882 ff., and Harold D. Lasswell, "The Interrelations of World Organization and Society," *loc. cit.,* pp. 889 ff.; William T. R. Fox, *The Super-Powers,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1944, p. 99; Q. Wright, ed., *A Foreign Policy for the United States,* Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947, pp. 12 ff.; De Witt C. Poole, "Balance of Power," *Life,* XXIII (Sept. 22, 1947), pp. 76 ff.

Increase of tension (rivalry among the powers), of rigidity (garrison character of each power), and of polarization (reduction in number of powers and orientation about two poles) reciprocally augment one another, all reaching a maximum, periodically at the crises of global wars and secularly at the transitions from systems of power politics to universal states. The above writers emphasize the possibility of mitigating the tendency toward such maximizations by rational action introducing complications.

2 Wright, *A Study of War,* pp. 398, 1311 ff., and tables pp. 641 ff.

3 *Ibid.,* pp. 847 ff., 959 ff., 1007 ff., 1312; Walter Lippmann, *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1937, pp. 89 ff.

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defensive preparation, and hesitant in making internationa commitments for long-run objectives, and to become involve in war through encouraging aggression by others through thei own passivity.[4]

No attempt will be made to assemble the data supporting these propositions, but assuming they are in a measure correct they confirm the belief generally held today that the tendency of the contemporary world is not favorable to the purposes and principles accepted by most states in such instruments a the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Atlantic Charter, the United Na tions Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Humar Rights. It is clear that if these purposes are to be realized, in telligent efforts must be made to modify the natural trend of events. The continuance of cold war until it becomes hot war should no longer be treated as an assumption but as a problem.

The most effective direction of such effort may be suggested by two additional propositions which I state equally categorically.

(5) Governments make war, and governments are human institutions which act, not like physical forces, but in accordance with the values they believe in, with the reports, especially on the power and intentions of other governments, which they believe to be true, and by the methods which they believe most suitable to realize the values they believe in under the conditions which they believe to exist. These beliefs determine policy even though the values are inconsistent with one another, the reports erroneous, and the methods ineffective. Errors may, however, be corrected by new information, those concerning conditions and means more easily than those concerning values.[5]

(6) The problem of preventing war is, therefore, a problem of information no less than of physical power. The two are closely interrelated because changes in the power relations of rival states influence the beliefs and intentions of the governments, and changes in the beliefs and intentions of a government induce it or its rival to take action altering power rela-

[4] Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 839 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 1115 ff.; Q. Wright, "Methods in the Study of War," *World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 2 (January 1949), p. 252; note 8 below.

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tions. Yet war is not inevitable so long as new information may convince the potential belligerents that postponement or abandonment of hostilities will serve their interests.[6]

A great deal has been written about both Russian and American objectives and methods as manifested in the postwar world. No such examination will be attempted here, but we will assume that the Soviet Union is guided, as are all states and their governments, by a desire to continue to exist and to maintain its accepted value system, and that its strategy and methods may be expected to conform to Russian tradition and communist ideology. Consequently, Soviet policy is likely to be guided by (1) the defense and security of the Soviet government and state, (2) traditional Russian positive aims, developed from experience toward this end, (3) communist expectations and values, anticipating the eventual triumph of communism throughout the world, and interpreting progress toward that goal and helpful strategy in terms of dialetical materialism, and (4) the utilization of absolutistic methods of centralized decision-making and reliance upon force, fear, and propaganda to gain whatever consent may be necessary.

We may assume that the people and government of the United States (1) also want security for their state, government, and constitution and believe (2) that the traditional policy of autonomy for the Western hemisphere and development of international law coupled with the newer allegiance to the United Nations can contribute to these ends, and (3) that the system of democratic values including individual freedom, national self-determination, rising standards of living, and international cooperation is likely to win in an atmosphere of free discussion and will, as it increases in acceptance, maintain international peace and security. It may also be assumed that they (4) prefer democratic methods of decentralized decision-making, deliberation in popularly elected bodies, and the subordination of politics to legal procedures for preventing violence and protecting individual rights.

With these general assumptions in mind, what should be American policy toward Russia? We may assume that policies

[6] Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 1223-24, 1233-34, 1236-39.

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either of "preventive war" or of withdrawal and isolation need not be considered because it is unlikely that American opinion could be brought to favor aggression and because the conditions of the world make it impossible to ignore the vulnerability of American territory, institutions, and ideas to attack from the other side of the world.

We will give only subordinate consideration to policies designed to strengthen the world order because the differences at the two sides of the iron curtain as to the kind of world order which is desirable are at the moment too great to be bridged. We can assume that the United States will continue to support the United Nations and to seek to strengthen it. The Soviet Union, however, has made it clear that it will not consent to such strengthening, much less to superseding the United Nations by a world government, except indeed through expansion of the Soviet System to embrace the world. The United States will not accept that form of world order, nor will it resort to war to compel the Soviet Union to accept the kind of world order it prefers. The problem of developing the world order is important, and careful thought should be given to stabilizing the equilibrium of power, to interpreting and applying the Charter in practice, to developing the Charter by supplementary agreement or amendment, and even to superseding the Charter by a more effective world constitution which does not sacrifice human freedom and national cultures. These problems are not, however, immediately relevant to United States–Soviet relations. Improvement of those relations is, at least in the short run, a condition for strengthening the world order. Only in a very long run can efforts to strengthen the world order improve United States–Soviet relations.

Other policies which have been discussed for dealing with the cold war can be grouped under four heads which respectively emphasize (I) the power position of the United States, (II) the strengthening of American democracy, (III) conciliation with Russia, and (IV) the containment of Russia within its present geographical sphere. These policies are not presented as alternatives. Under different circumstances the policy-maker may emphasize one or the others, and may well have

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all these and others in mind in dealing with each situation as it arises. The public, with its love for simple ideas and simpler slogans, is less likely to do so. Public opinion may become so wedded to one aspect of policy that it will reject or forget the others. Such insistence may deprive foreign policy of desirable flexibility and drive policy-makers into fatal positions. The arguments for and against each of these aspects of policy will, however, be considered one after the other with some indication of the circumstances which render each more or less applicable.

I. Power Position

Those who wish to concentrate attention on the power position of the United States assume that if war should come, the United States wants to make certain that it will win, and they assume that the factors which contribute to winning wars can be classified as (1) armaments in being; (2) industrial, economic, and scientific potential for making armaments; (3) national morale; and (4) allies. All of these are of course to be measured relatively to those of the potential enemy.[7] The object, therefore, is to gain relative superiority in these factors over Russia. The following specific policies to this end have therefore been urged.

1. To assure armaments in being, this school of thought demands an adequate program of armament building including bases and atomic weapons; an active military training program and efficient strategic planning combining all services; security measures to preserve secrecy in respect to advanced types of armament, especially atomic weapons, vigorous prosecutions for espionage, and vigorous measures to assure loyalty of public servants. Critics of this policy point out that armament building encourages similar activity in the potential enemy and that armament races produce high tensions which may eventuate in war. The larger armaments become, the more each rival attributes aggressive intentions to the other.

[7] Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men,* New York, Simon and Schuster, 1949; Bernard Brodie, "What Is the Outlook Now?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (*B.A.S.*), Vol. V, No. 10 (October 1949), p. 268; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Strategy for Two Atomic Worlds," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 28 (April 1950), pp. 386 ff.; Raymond Aron, "The Atomic Bomb and Europe," *B.A.S.,* Vol. VI, No. 4 (April 1950), pp. 110 ff.

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A general atmosphere of international suspicion therefore develops. Furthermore, security measures to maintain secrecy, espionage prosecutions, and loyalty purges contribute to this international suspicion and also create suspicion among people and officials within the nation. Mutual good will, which is a necessary condition of democracy and international peace, becomes impossible.

2. To assure superiority in economic potential, advocates of this policy usually urge embargoes upon trade to Russia and its satellites in articles which might provide any material useful for their military preparations, oppose any economic aid for the upbuilding of these countries, and favor extension of economic aid for the upbuilding of non-communist countries. Critics of this policy point out that refusal to allow trade to the other side of the iron curtain plays into the Soviet policy of keeping its people ignorant of the economic development of the West, irritates them by creating a sense of economic discrimination, and prevents them from developing higher standards of living which might weaken their allegiance to communism. Furthermore, this policy, especially when extended to preventing non-communist nations of Europe and Asia from trading in the Soviet orbit, militates against the success of the policy of rehabilitating the economies of these non-communist peoples who have in the past benefited through trade in the Soviet orbit.

3. Some advocates of the general policy of power politics urge a continuous program of information and propaganda by radio and other means across the iron curtain, the elimination of communism from government and education in the United States, and the propaganda of loyalty to American institutions and of democratic ideology as a major domestic policy. Critics of this policy point out that transnational propaganda, especially if official, is certain to encourage counter-propaganda and a jamming of radio reception, thus actually making the barrier between the two halves of the world less penetrable. Furthermore, domestic policies against communism send the communist movement underground and tend to suppress the principles of free thought and free discussion which are necessary for democracy and progress.

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4. Finally, the advocates of this policy generally urge alliance with democratically inclined countries which appear to be reasonably resolute in resisting communism. They often favor use of the United Nations only as an instrument of national policy, especially to make manifest the relative weakness of Soviet voting power on most issues and are ready to by-pass it whenever the use of regional or other organizations seems more convenient. The critics of this policy point out that limited alliances such as the North Atlantic Pact or a North Atlantic Federation tend to intensify the cold war, to make countries not included in these agreements less secure, and to weaken the United Nations as an agency of universal discussion and conciliation.

A careful weighing of the arguments for and against concentrating upon the power position of America vis-à-vis that of Russia suggests that this policy is better for the short run than for the long run. If the danger of attack is believed to be imminent, there may be little freedom of choice in taking some of these measures; but the estimate of that danger depends on, at best, dubious information of Soviet intentions, appraisal of which will be determined by the general picture of the situation in the mind of the appraiser. That picture is likely to be so distorted by oversimplification, repressed impulses, professional habits, wishful thinking, traditional values or other aspects of the personality or culture, that it has little resemblance to reality.[8] Insofar as that policy is successful in building a superior power position for the United States it might deter the Soviets from immediate attack; but mounting tensions, and a possible belief that its long-run advantages are declining, might eventually induce the United States to start a preventive war. Such a long-run deterioration of the relative power position of the United States is possible because these policies call for an abandonment of basic theses of freedom and democracy which have been the sources of American

[8] Gestalt psychologists have emphasized the divergence between the "life space" or subjective picture of the total situation in each human mind and the "foreign hull" or situation as it really is. The latter has no influence on human motives and behavior except as it influences the former. See Kurt Lewin, *Principles of Topological Psychology*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, chap. viii on "The Psychological Worlds and the Physical World."

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strength while Soviet advantages in population growth, industrialization, and centralized control may increase.

II. Democracy

The policy of concentrating attention on the fuller realization of American democracy in order to convince people, both within and without the Soviet orbit, of American sincerity in maintaining these values and particularly to convince them that the Marxist thesis of the inevitability of democratic collapse and universal communism is false, is very different from that just discussed.[9] In many respects, the two policies appear contradictory. The policy of democracy has, in fact, gained considerable international acceptance in such documents as the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter. Advocates of this policy believe that in manifesting the meaning of these ideals in behavior, Americans can assure their spread throughout the world. They believe that in a free competition of ideas, those of democracy will triumph over those of communism. They, however, fail to show how such free competition can be assured.

Among the ingredients of the general theory of American democracy, the following have been given prominence and in fact they correspond roughly to President Roosevelt's four freedoms: (1) peace and internationalism, (2) equality of trade, of opportunity, and of status, (3) freedom of communication and of association, and (4) freedom of thought and religion.

1. Some advocates of this policy urge reduction of armaments and of the influence of the military in the government in order to assure the world that America has no aggressive intentions. Some also urge abandonment of special alliances, and primary utilization of the United Nations as an instrument of international adjustment. They consider this essential to

[9] John Foster Dulles, "Thoughts on Soviet Policy and What to Do About It," *Life*, Vol. XX (June 3 and 10, 1946), pp. 112 ff. and 118 ff. (abridged in *Reader's Digest*, Vol. 49, August 1946, pp. 1-22); *War or Peace*, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. 253 ff. See also Robert E. Cushman, "Freedom Versus Security," *B.A.S.*, Vol. V. No. 3 (March 1949), pp. 69 ff.; E. U. Condon, "Reflections on Government," *B.A.S.*, Vol. V. Nos. 6-7 (June-July 1949), pp. 179 ff.

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give reality to the policy, often stated by the President, of making the development of the United Nations the first foreign policy of the United States. Critics of these policies point out that their pursuit might weaken the present power position of the United States and encourage Soviet aggressions. Furthermore, they might hamper common action by the defenders of democracy throughout the world and contribute to Soviet utilization of the United Nations for its purposes through use of the veto and temporary withdrawals. The suggestion is made that the United Nations cannot be strengthened unless there is a sincere desire among all its principal members to strengthen it and to work together within it.

2. Some of those who wish to put democratic principles first urge general agreements equalizing trading conditions with all parts of the world, utilization of the specialized agencies of the United Nations to promote general welfare, and utilization of American surpluses to build up the welfare of all countries, thus applying the Marshall Plan and the Point Four program universally as instruments of general welfare rather than of anti-Soviet strategy. Some also urge development of the Universal Human Rights program of the United Nations concurrently with an improvement of the working of democracy internally through domestic policies assuring civil liberties, economic welfare, and equality of opportunities for Americans of every race and occupation. Critics of these policies fear that equal trading arrangements would assist Soviet military preparation, that contribution of American surpluses to all would have a similar effect, and that the program of human rights, whether international or domestic, would exacerbate historic dissensions and further divide the world and the nation.

3. Advocates of the policy of democracy usually give particular emphasis to the importance of free communication and discussion and their promotion through the United Nations and UNESCO. As a contribution they suggest an abandonment of insistence upon secrecy in science and technology, a reduction of security investigations and prosecutions, and a positive program encouraging natural and social science in an atmosphere of freedom. Critics of this policy fear that efforts to gain general

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consent to principles of free communication will produce more irritation than freedom. The reduction of security activities and prosecutions, they fear, would seriously weaken the power political position of the United States.

4. Advocates of the policy of democracy frequently hold that communism as an idea ought not to be barred from education or discussion, that the concept of the free market place for the competition of ideas should apply to it as well as to other ideas and religions, and that associations should also be permitted among communists so long as they are not actually engaging in illegal acts. Critics of this idea believe that communism, being in principle opposed to freedom, should not be given the opportunity to use freedom in order to destroy freedom. They believe that there must be some limitation to principles of freedom of thought and association if those principles are to survive.

A careful weighing of these arguments for and against policies concentrating upon American conceptions of democracy suggests that they are better for the long run than for the short run. If the propaganda of democracy were successful in weakening the belief of communists that they will eventually take over the world through the collapse of capitalism because of its "internal contradictions," the Soviet government might be more willing to assume great risks in an effort to destroy capitalism by war. Confidence in their long-run triumph without war may be an important deterrent to Soviet military aggression. Furthermore, if the long-run effects of democracy are, as its advocates claim, to increase the wealth, develop the science, and sustain the morale of the state, whereas the long-run effects of communism are the reverse, the policy of promoting democracy might, if in a measure successful, convince the Soviet government that time is running against it and consequently might induce it to attack while it had short-run advantages flowing from superior military preparation and readiness. In proportion as emphasis upon democracy tended to weaken American military strength in the short run, this danger would be exaggerated.

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III. Conciliation

Concentration of attention upon a policy of conciliation has had advocates of diverse points of view[10] and is urged by the terms of the United Nations Charter. Article 1 of this instrument makes (1) international peace and security the first purpose of the United Nations, and Article 33 requires that parties "first of all" seek a solution by "negotiation" or "other peaceful means of their own choice." The Charter specifies among other purposes: (2) the development of economic and social welfare, (3) the maintenance of fundamental human rights, and (4) international cooperation to achieve these and any other objectives which the peoples of the world share.

1. Advocates of the policy of conciliation often urge that the United States seize every opportunity to reach agreement with the Soviet Union by top-level or other negotiation on territorial spheres and on limitation of armaments. It has been proposed that the Western group renounce interest in all or some of the areas now dominated by the Soviet government if that government will renounce interest in areas now in the democratic orbit and that both agree to the neutralization of buffer areas such as Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea, perhaps even including Western Europe and South Asia. An expansion of the band of uncommitted states between the United States and the Soviet Union has been urged by some while others favor a sharper definition of the boundary dividing a bipolar world. Territorial agreements, it is hoped, may make possible common consent to limitation of military bases, offensive weapons, and military budgets. Some suggest that security

[10] Henry Wallace, *Toward World Peace,* New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Conquest of the United States by Germany," *B.A.S.,* Vol. VI, No. 1 (January 1950), pp. 21 ff., "The H-Bomb and After," *B.A.S.,* Vol. VI, No. 3 (March 1950), pp. 76 ff., and "On Negotiating with the Russians," *B.A.S.,* Vol. VI, No. 5 (May 1950), pp. 143 ff.; Leo Szilard, "Shall We Face the Facts?" *B.A.S.,* Vol. V, No. 10 (October 1949), pp. 269 ff. and "Can We Have International Control of Atomic Energy?" *B.A.S.,* Vol. VI, No. 1 (January 1950), pp. 9 ff.; Senator Brien McMahon, address in U. S. Senate, Feb. 2, 1950, printed in *B.A.S.,* Vol. VI, No. 3 (March 1950), pp. 80 ff.; Q. Wright, "Political Science and World Stabilization," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 44 (March 1950), pp. 1 ff.; John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics,* Vol. II, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157 ff.; American Friends Service Committee, *American-Russian Relations, Some Constructive Considerations,* Philadelphia, July, 1949.

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arrangements supplementing the Charter be made universal and open to the Soviets. Various projects of universal federation and of supplementary treaties providing for decisive political votes in the Assembly rather than the Security Council thus moderating the influence of the veto, have also been proposed.

Critics of such conciliatory proposals fear that neutralization agreements would not be observed. The Soviet government would so integrate any sphere accorded it that no state within it could get out, while states in the neutral or the democratic sphere would always be free to enter the Soviet sphere. Even if the Soviet government observed a renunciation of territorial interest in respect to military action, no agreement could prevent communist propaganda in the democratic zone unless the democracies abandoned their basic principle of freedom of information. Any territorial agreement would, therefore, constitute a new base for Soviet expansion, a strengthening of the communist conception of a bipolar world of communism and capitalism, and a weakening of the democratic conception of universal human rights and national cultural self-determination. Critics of conciliation also fear that any agreed limitation of either atomic or conventional armaments would be unreliable unless accompanied by a system of international inspection and control more comprehensive than the Soviet government will accept. The critics, therefore, fear that anxiety to make territorial or armament agreements with the Soviets would result in agreements which sacrifice basic democratic principles and are insufficiently guaranteed, thus improving the power-political position of the Soviets. Finally, the critics doubt whether the Soviet government would participate in security agreements modifying the veto in the United Nations. If they did not, general agreements or federations of the kind proposed might be interpreted by them as encirclement or preparedness for attack, thus resulting, not in conciliation, but in a worsening of the cold war. It is pointed out that a top-level conference or other public effort to achieve agreement might make the situation much worse if no agreement were reached.

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2. In the economic field, advocates of conciliation often rge agreements for mutual removal of trade barriers and for xtension of financial and technical aid for economic welfare hroughout the world, utilizing, so far as possible, general intrumentalities under the United Nations. Large-scale finan-ial and technical aid for Soviet reconstruction has been urged. Senator Brien McMahon has proposed that the funds for such aid be obtained by large-scale general reduction of military budgets and has expressed the hope that this might make possible an adequate arrangement for international control of atomic energy and limitation of conventional armaments.

Critics of these proposals point out that the Soviet government has not joined the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and is unlikely to enter into economic agreements except in so far as it feels certain that they will improve its relative power position. The Soviet government, it is feared, would use any financial or technical aid to strengthen its power position and could not be induced by such aid to moderate its program of world conquest through Russian military power and communist propaganda.

3. Advocates of conciliation believe that in the field of freeing communication, it may be possible to achieve a balance between the freedom of the press, radio, and other instruments of communication urged by the democracies and the responsibility of the governments to prevent seditious libel and war-mongering urged by the Soviets. They are also hopeful that agreements on international exchanges of information and personnel in science and the arts may be achieved. Critics doubt whether agreement is possible between the principles of freedom and censorship or between the principles of exchange of information and the iron curtain. They fear that efforts to make such agreements will result in stalemate, frustration, an increase of aggressive tendencies, and a worsening of the cold war.

4. The advocates of international conciliation, like the advocates of universal democracy, often believe there should be a toleration of communism in the United States subject to general provisions of law, that there should be efforts to agree with the Soviet Union in the United Nations rather than to win voting victories against it, that efforts to reach agreement on peace

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with Austria, Germany, Japan, and Korea, on atomic energy control, on admission of all eligible states to the United Nations, and on other concrete problems should continue in spite of disappointments. They also urge every effort within the United States to develop a spirit of internationalism and conciliation. The critics of these policies insist that the Soviet government will not reciprocate, that even if agreements are made it will not keep them, and that communists within the United States would use freedom to destroy freedom. They insist that concentration upon the effort to reach agreement within the United Nations is likely to result in appeasement in the sense either of disregarding the American power position in the world or of selling out smaller states, and that efforts to reach agreement on political issues outside the United Nations would be even more dangerous to the strength and solidarity of the Western powers. Furthermore, exclusive attention to the spirit of internationalism and conciliation within the United States will, they fear, develop an unrealistic sentiment militating against proper preparedness and suitable policies of security.

A weighing of these arguments suggests that while a spirit of conciliation is essential for ameliorating the cold war, exclusive concentration on conciliation may, under present circumstances, result in appeasement through sacrificing the bargaining position of the United States by over-anxiety to reach agreement. Or, alternatively, it may result in stalemate, frustration, and augmentation of aggressive sentiments.

IV. Containment

Concentration of attention upon a policy of containment prescribed in the summer of 1947 in an anonymous article in *Foreign Affairs* has apparently actually characterized American foreign policy toward Russia since that time.[11] This policy rests on the assumption that the Soviet government will seek to expand its territory and influence wherever practical

[11] "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 25 (July 1947), pp. 566 ff. The article has been attributed to George F. Kennan, who also contributed an article to *Reader's Digest,* Vol. 26 (March 1950), pp. 1 ff., entitled "Is War with Russia Inevitable?"

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nd that it will utilize both communist propaganda and Rus-
ian military power to this end. The policy of containing Soviet
›ower and influence in its present boundaries includes: (1)
naintenance of adequate armaments and utilization of the
Jnited Nations as an instrument of general security; (2) the
Truman Doctrine and the Point Four program strengthening
ıon-communist countries threatened by communist infiltration
›r attack; (3) the Marshall Plan and utilization of trade con-
rols to strengthen and organize Western Europe and to pre-
ent trade useful for military preparation getting behind the
ron curtain; and (4) the North Atlantic Pact and the pro-
gram of military aid to the parties to this pact for building
he military power of the Western European states sufficiently
o defend themselves from possible Soviet attack. These policies
were reasserted by President Truman in his inaugural address
›f January 20, 1949.

1. The armament building program of the United States
ıas not been excessive and its utilization solely for defense has
›een emphasized. At the same time the atomic energy pro-
gram including H-bomb development has gone ahead, and
:very effort has been made through FBI investigations and
›rosecutions to preserve secrecy. The United Nations has
›een utilized effectively to deal with a number of controversies
n Europe and Asia and it has also been used to manifest the
weak political position of the Soviet Union and the general re-
,ection of its ideas by world public opinion. Some critics of this
›olicy believe that a preparedness program aimed solely at
defense is unrealistic, that it is impossible to defend so long a
line as the perimeter of the Soviet-controlled area, and that
defensive preparation without offensive preparation creates
a "Maginot line mentality" assuring defeat. Defense in final
analysis means, they insist, capacity to win a war if one should
come and to make this capacity so manifest that potential ag-
gressors would be deterred. Thus "containment", if realistic, is
no different from maintenance of a superior power position,
and is subject to the criticisms of that policy. It contributes to
the arms race and to building up garrison states, which destroy
the principles of democracy. These critics also believe this
policy implies utilization of the United Nations only as an

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instrument of American policy and ideals, thus tending t destroy its impartiality and its capacity to serve as a genera instrument of conciliation for the maintenance of internationa peace and security.

2. The policy of containment has involved a vigorous prop aganda of democracy, especially to counteract communis propaganda in territories where it has taken hold, and vigorou efforts to reduce the influence of communism in the Unite States and in Western Europe. Critics of these policies believ that emphasis on ideology tends to widen the gap between th two halves of the world, to support the anti-democratic con cept of a bipolar world, to stimulate a witch-hunting cam paign against communism in the United States and an inquisi torial policy endangering civil liberties and democracy, t drive communism underground, and to displace internal con flicts upon the external scapegoat provided by the Soviet Union

3. Advocates of the policy of containment believe that i is necessary to prevent direct war potential getting behind th iron curtain and to utilize both American trade controls an the program of aid to Western Europe for this purpose. Alon with this negative aspect of preventing economic aid to th Soviet Zone, the positive aspect of aiding non-communist coun tries economically has been developed in Western Europe the Near East, and the Far East. Critics of these policies fea that these aspects of policy are inconsistent. Western Europ needs trade with the East to revive and the countries in th Soviet orbit will be further pressed to accept the dominatio of the Kremlin if they are not permitted to trade with th West. Furthermore, the discrimination implied by this polic is odious and further augments the Soviet vindictivenes against the West and the intensity of the cold war. Finally aid to peoples threatened by communism may actually mea support for unpopular governments.

4. The containment policy has developed the North At lantic Alliance but with insistence that this alliance is solel for defense. The critics of the policy, however, point out tha an alliance good for defense can also be used for aggressio and that the result has been to increase the anxieties of th Soviet Union and to augment its efforts to unite its own bloc.

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Consideration of these arguments suggests that insofar as he policy of containment differs from that of developing a uperior power position for the United States vis-à-vis the ;oviet Union, it tends toward the idea of passive defense, like hat of Jefferson's gunboats or the French Maginot line. But n the dynamic conditions of the modern world, defense must ›e active and based upon a continuous comparison of power ›osition in all its aspects. "Containment" may tend to produce ı mentality of security behind the atom bomb, or now that he Russians have it, behind the hydrogen bomb, while revolu- ion, difficulties over succession, or gradual administrative or ,cientific deterioration within the Soviet Union is hopefully ınd wishfully awaited.

It must be confessed that none of the policies discussed seems ɔntirely satisfactory. They should not, as already noted, be con- ;idered alternatives, but aspects of a single policy. The short- run necessity of maintaining a favorable power position against Russia must be balanced by the long-run desirability of sus- ıaining and advancing democracy, human freedom, and peace. The necessity that there always be some compulsion in political affairs, and particularly that Soviet expansion be prevented by suitable force, must be balanced against the desirability of maximizing consent through a general spirit of conciliation in international as well as in national politics. In the short run, the negative policy of containment must be balanced against the positive policy of sustaining an adequate position in power politics. In the long run, the desire for realizing the American national traditions of democracy, constitutionalism, civil liber- ties, and national self-determination must be balanced against the international requirement in a shrinking world for the organization of peace and the development of the spirit of mu- tual toleration among widely different cultures, ideologies, economies, and polities. Only with such toleration will condi- tions be favorable for conciliation of controversies and cooper- ation for common ends.

Such a conclusion is but to emphasize that no simple formula for international relations is possible. The main considerations must always be kept in mind by policy-makers and the public. The action appropriate at a particular moment is always con-

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tingent not only upon the existing state of domestic opinion but also upon the conditions in the outside world. Perhaps in our relations with Russia, the most important point is to avoid dogmatism and inflexibility and to be prepared to seize every opportunity presented by new developments.

We must keep our powder dry, but we must avoid utterance or action which would increase Soviet anxieties. We should seek to strengthen the United Nations by developing its capacity to make decisions and to back them with force, as rapidly as that can be done without destroying its universality. We should seek to increase international trade, to eliminate commercial discriminations, and to assist programs which will contribute to human welfare and higher levels of living everywhere. We should also strengthen democratic ideas and respect for human rights and assist the capacity of democracies to defend themselves. While these general aims must be qualified by an avoidance of acts which would strengthen the relative power position of potential enemies, the latter danger can easily be exaggerated. The pacifying influence of trade and prosperity may do more to relieve aggressive ideas and intentions than the availability of war materials (which can be mined, grown, or made behind the iron curtain) will contribute to strengthening such ideas and intentions. "Defense without provocation" and "conciliation without appeasement" may be slogans, capable of popular acceptance, which avoid the danger of imposing a dangerous inflexibility upon the government.

Eventually peace depends on political intentions more than upon the distribution of materials. The danger of ambitious intentions becomes less as the date of realization is pushed into the future. A world of diverse ideologies and policies may be peaceful if peoples and policy-makers are ready to postpone achievement of their goals to times and circumstances in which the cost will not be excessive. The excessive cost of atomic war may tend to encourage a more careful scrutiny of these circumstances and a greater willingness, even by fanatical leaders, to postpone the day of judgment.

Efforts by the democracies to ameliorate bad economic conditions in the underdeveloped sections of the world, to eliminate

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iscriminations in democratic countries, and to spread infor-
nation about the actual conditions in areas ruled by democracy
nd by communism may reduce the gap, even in communist
hinking, between the stereotype of the present and that of the
uture vaguely promised by communist eschatology. Such a
eduction may moderate any inclination even of the most dy-
ıamic communists to force a judgment of history in which
ıell-bombs are risked for the uncertain hope of achieving
ı somewhat dubious communist heaven. It may encourage them
o wait patiently in the expectation that history will unroll
ıs Marx said it would. It is perhaps dangerous to assume that
:ommunists operate as mechanical forces, pressing for their
;oals unless contained by material barriers, and incapable of
nfluence by this kind of consideration. Even in dealing with
:ommunists, we may find that knowledge about the intentions
)f their leaders and about the behavior of political groups is
nore useful than knowledge about rivers and fires.

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NATIONALIZATION AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

By SEYMOUR J. RUBIN

THE United States is at present creditor to the world. Sinc the war more than $25 billion has been put into variou foreign aid programs. Government loans, military assistance ECA assistance have combined in a great assault on worl problems. Yet, great as has been the government-to-governmen assistance extended by the United States, and substantial as ha been aid given by such organs of American policy as the Ex port-Import Bank not only to foreign governments but to pri vate business, it is not only conceded but argued by governmen officials as well as private business that a job remains to b done which cannot be done in this way. For the doing of tha job, private enterprise and private capital investment ar needed. In testimony on various aspects of the Point IV pro gram over the course of the last year, this necessity has beer stressed no less by government than by business witnesses.

This article proceeds on the assumption that these generally accepted views are correct. But it does not require extremely acute observation to realize that not all of these statements o this general view mean exactly the same thing. The line a which government assistance—to foreign governments or t private enterprise—ceases or should cease is far from clearly defined. The relation between general policy and specific ac tion is often debatable. To what extent, for example, are govern ment-to-government loans by the Export-Import Bank in aic of or in derogation of the proper and pre-eminent role of pri vate investment in the field of foreign economic development? At various times in the past years, officers of the United States Government, from the President down, have emphasized and reiterated the need to expand American private investment in foreign countries. Yet, in July 1948, the United States reached an agreement with Yugoslavia calling for a payment of some

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$17,000,000 by the latter country in payment, principally, of the claims of American nationals arising out of the nationalization by Yugoslavia of the private investments of those American nationals; and in September 1949, the Export-Import Bank announced that it had lent $20,000,000 to Yugoslavia.

Clearly, the logic of the loan lies in political as much as in economic policy, and the collection by the United States of $17,000,000 from a country to which it shortly thereafter lends $20,000,000 is at most an apparent and not a real inconsistency. But the coincidence of certain items invites analysis of the relation of government assistance and private foreign investment; the agreed importance of private foreign investment; the postwar threat to private foreign investment through nationalization; the assistance accorded by the United States to its investors in the making of a nationalization settlement with Yugoslavia and by the United States to Yugoslavia—and other countires—in the making of government-to-government loans. An attempt to contribute to such an analysis will be made in the pages which follow through examination of two basic postwar problems: (1) the expropriation and nationalization by certain countries of private foreign investments, and the role of government in obtaining adequate compensation settlements on behalf of investors; and (2) the making of private foreign investments, and the role of government in increasing, facilitating, or guaranteeing the flow of international private investment capital.

I

Expropriation of private property is an ancient practice. It was argued in Greek times that liberation of the Spartan slaves in 370 B.C. was theft of private property. France paid compensation in connection with abolition of slavery in its colonies. Expropriation by a gentler name—eminent domain—is practiced by every government, including our own, in "condemning" land or buildings in order to build dams, roads, and the like. And expropriation or confiscation of private property has been the subject of innumerable cases in national courts and before international tribunals.

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It has been only since World War I, however, that expropri ations reached the stature of major national policies. Previous ly, expropriation was, by and large, directed against individua properties rather than classes of properties. Property was ex propriated in order to build a railway or construct a govern ment office, generally not because private ownership, in whol or in part, was inconsistent with prevalent political mores Since no point of principle was involved, international dis putes arising out of the pre-1917 expropriations could be and often were settled by conciliation, arbitration, or some simila procedure. But the Mexican and Russian Revolutions, in giv ing rise to a new type of expropriation, created a new type o international problem. In the post-1917 expropriations, na- tionalization of industries was a point of national policy and expropriation was not a conceded exception to recognized rights of private property. Entirely new problems were raised. The post–World War II expropriations, or nationalizations, are attended by even more complicated and difficult problems.

Where a note of the Mexican Ambassador to the United States stated, in 1938, that "On the one hand, there are weighed the claims of justice and the improvement of a whole people, and, on the other hand, the purely pecuniary interests of some individuals," the preamble to the Roumanian nationalization law of June 11, 1948 stated that "The nationalization . . . con- solidates our economic and political independence, and forti- fies the forces in their struggle against the attempts at inter- ference in our internal matters and rape of our independence carried on by the Anglo-American imperialists." Just as the agrarian and petroleum expropriations in Mexico were dif- ferent in their significance from the expropriation of a right of way for a railroad, so the recent Eastern European national- izations of most foreign holdings carry a new significance and a new range of problems.

Certain aspects of these problems are important:

a) When a government nationalizes an industry, a segment of the national economy, or "all foreign holdings," it creates a much larger problem, obviously, than when it merely takes over an individual property. The difference is more than one

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of degree, particularly since payment for an industry becomes an important aspect of national policy.

b) The pre–World War I expropriations generally were the act of a government founded on and believing in the institution of private property; nationalization is characteristic of partially or completely socialistic states. Even where the act of nationalization is not a hostile act based on "sabotage by foreign capitalistic imperialists," the views toward private property and its rights of the expropriators and the expropriatees may be far enough apart to cause more difficulties than would arise out of a dispute in which fundamentals were agreed and in which argument was confined to the measure of compensation. The possibility of amicable solutions on the basis of recognized principles is very small in cases in which, as in Roumania, the nationalization is avowedly based on hostility toward the foreign owners.

c) Before the 1920's, foreign exchange controls and inconvertible currencies were not commonplaces of international economics. Present conditions are different. If the problem of provision of foreign exchange is not now handled in connection with the compensation negotiations, the compensation arrangements, under present circumstances, are likely to be no remedy at all. For example: War damage claims are handled, in the satellite treaties of peace, by payment of two-thirds of the amount of the damage in *local currency*. Whatever might have been said of the merits of local currency payments as a means of compensation at the time the treaties were negotiated, the remedy of local currency compensation, insofar as Eastern Europe is concerned, is in fact now wholly illusory. Particularly is this true since the theory of the treaties is repair to possessions of United Nations nationals; the repair theory has little relation to reality when, as in the satellites, the properties have already been nationalized. Whether his claim arises under the treaties or under usual tenets of international law, a claimant is interested in real redress for the damage done him. This means, in practice, that his government, in order to negotiate an effective compensation arrangement, must also negotiate either: (a) a comprehensive trade agreement—as in the Swiss-Polish, British-Czech and British-Yugoslav agreements

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recently concluded; or (b) some other plan, collateral to th nationalization issue, for providing the necessary funds—as i the United States–Yugoslav Agreement of July 1948, unde which $46,800,000 of Yugoslav gold in the United States wa released to make possible the Yugoslav payment of $17,000, 000. Where, as in the case of United States claims against Po land, neither has a trade agreement been reached nor ar Polish funds impounded in the United States, the agreemen "in principle" to compensate American nationals remains un implemented.

II

United States policy with respect to expropriation or na tionalization of foreign holdings of Americans has been unmis takably clear. The United States Constitution guaranties "jus compensation" in this country when private property is taken for public purposes. The United States has likewise insisted that expropriation, nationalization, or other "taking" of property of American nationals by foreign countries should be accompanied by "just compensation." Since "just compensation" is variously defined, the United States has, in international discussions, asked for the principle of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation." This phrase emphasizes that payment for expropriated or nationalized property should not be unduly delayed; that the sum paid should fairly represent the value of the property or rights taken; and that the payment should be usable by and useful to the person whose property was taken. This latter requirement, in the period since exchange difficulties became commonplace and exchange control an ordinary rather than extraordinary governmental measure, has meant, in practice, that the United States wants payment in dollars on behalf of its claimants.

The legal rights of persons whose properties have been taken are fairly well defined. Clearly, a state has the right to expropriate or nationalize the property not only of its own citizens but also of foreign nationals. But this right is generally stated by writers on international law to be accompanied by the obli-

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ɾation to make prompt, adequate and effective compensation.[1] ɔecretary of State Hull's note to Mexico of April 3, 1940 sugɾested that the right to expropriate a property is "coupled vith *and conditional on* the obligation to make adequate, effecive and prompt compensation."[2] And an eminent authority, Dr. C. C. Hyde, has also suggested that the power to pay is a ondition of the right to take. Presumably, this refers to "effecive" payment, though it is not clear that international law vould condition a sovereign's right to expropriate on its having ɪ sufficient amount of dollars on hand to pay those whose ɔroperty is taken.

Other than legal factors, however, enter into the nationaliza-ion problem. The United States has, in recent years, been forced to re-examine—or at least to compromise—the thesis ɔf dollar compensation for the taking of property of American ɪationals. In the tentative agreement with Poland, not yet put into force, a compromise is found in the principle of dollar compensation only for that part of the property taken which represents a dollar investment. This is, clearly, a far from satisfactory solution for a property owner who has reinvested profits and has built up a local good will, though his problem may be somewhat mitigated if dollar investments are considered to include local earnings reinvested during a period when they were convertible. But even when the obligation to pay is modified to call for dollar compensation only for dollar investment, the principle that the right to take is *conditioned on* payment—particularly effective payment—finds few proponents other than the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and a few other countries. At the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held at Havana in 1947-48, for example, the great majority of nations present (the U.S.S.R. and the satellites being absent, but Poland and Czechoslovakia being present) insisted that (a) fair

[1] Although there is not a great deal on this point in the standard texts, it has been suggested that this absence of statement is attributable not to doubts on the subject but to the fact that the inviolability of the property of aliens in time of peace was generally recognized as being indisputable. (Bullington, "Problems of International Law in the Mexican Constitution of 1917," *American Journal of International Law,* XXI (1927), 685, 695.)

[2] Italics mine.

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treatment—equal with local nationals—would be given if properties belonging to foreign nationals were expropriated, but that (b) no international obligation could be accepted to refrain from any expropriation of foreign-owned properties in the absence of sufficient exchange resources to make "effective" payment in foreign currencies.[3] Even such like-minded countries as Canada insisted on the possibility—emphasizing that it was only a possibility—of expropriation accompanied by payment in blocked local currency. And the British insisted on the relevance to this problem of compensation of those provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund which permit, and may compel, exchange restrictions.

The United States has not regarded compensation for expropriated properties as a principle dependent on other issues. The rule has been considered to be clear and the solution self-contained. Despite some expressed fears of the business community that such may be the case, the official philosophy of the Department of State appears not to have changed from the doctrine enunciated by Secretary Hull. H.R. 7346, 81st Congress, 2d Session, a bill sponsored by the Administration, thus emphasizes the importance of "confidence on the part of investors, through intergovernmental agreements or otherwise, that they will not be deprived of their property without prompt, adequate and effective compensation . . ." But if the theory has not changed, its application has become more difficult: isolated expropriations have become mass nationalizations; the political and economic philosophy of the nationalizing countries is often founded on postulates other than those held by the United States; and the nationalizing countries are unwilling to alter programs which they assert to be matters of internal and sovereign policy because of lack of exchange resources to make "effective" payment. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the actions, if not the philoso-

[3] *The Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment* stated: "The extent to which transfers of . . . payment into other currencies are to be allowed is for determination by the Member government in accordance with its general foreign exchange policy maintained consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund."

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phy, of the United States have sometimes reflected an awareness of factors, necessarily if unfortunately relevant, other than those contained within the United States definition of the rule of international law.

III

The marks of this awareness are evident in both the fact and the technique of the United States–Yugoslav Agreement of July 19, 1948.

It is highly unlikely that, as of mid-1948, an agreement would have been reached at all had it not been for the presence in the United States of $46,800,000 of Yugoslav Government gold. This gold was blocked by the United States at the outbreak of hostilities between Yugoslavia and Germany. The blocking was originally protective in nature. It was intended to prevent a German-dominated Yugoslav Government from utilizing these funds. As of 1948, however, the Yugoslav gold remained blocked solely because of the existence of unsatisfied American claims, public and private, against Yugoslavia. There may have been some questions as to the propriety of continuing the blocking of the gold until a claims settlement was reached. But, these questions having been resolved in favor of continued blocking, it must have been clear to Yugoslavia that it had but two real alternatives: to work out a settlement with the United States; or to sue in an American court for release of the funds. Attack through the United Nations on the legality of the continued postwar blocking had already failed. The settlement approach obviously was the better: the American claims were demonstrably just; the United States was apparently determined; the United States was willing to appraise realistically the claims of its nationals and to bargain on the basis of real and not self-inflated estimates of value; and settlement meant a speedy release of the much needed blocked gold. Under these circumstances, the $17,000,000 settlement was concluded with, it would appear, mutual satisfaction. The satisfaction of the Yugoslavs may have been somewhat increased by reason of the fact that the gold was released to it for export from the United States, free and clear of any restrictions tying it to the United States price

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of $35. per ounce, at a time when the "free market" international price for gold was substantially in excess of that figure.

Whether an agreement on compensation for nationalized properties could have been worked out, absent the "extraneous" fact of the blocked gold, is a matter for conjecture. Where nationalization is not so integrally interwoven, as it is in the Eastern European cases, into the domestic and foreign policy, political as well as economic, of the nationalizing country, agreement may possibly be reached merely on the basis of the rules of international law. British nationalization, for example, while based on the current Socialist dogma of Great Britain, has not been also justified on the ground of foreign imperialism; and the principle of compensation is as firmly imbedded in British as in American law. Nevertheless, even in the British case, a large-scale compensation agreement calling for dollar payments would have had to refer to the question of the source of those dollars.

In the United States–Yugoslav case, the blocked gold was both an inducement for the agreement and a means of obtaining dollar funds for the lump sum payment. In other settlements, principally between Switzerland and Britain on the one side and the Eastern European countries on the other, trade and compensation agreements have been negotiated and framed together. The Swiss and British agreements with those countries provide for an over-all settlement of the claims of Swiss and British nationals. Both the Swiss and British and the United States governments have negotiated on the basis of an estimate of the total claims of their nationals, waiving all claims as a part of the settlement, and leaving to later internal measures the allocation of compensation among their claimant nationals. In the Swiss and British cases, the agreed amount is to be paid in annual installments. The United States, in the Yugoslav settlement, obtained the whole amount at once, the single payment being attainable under the circumstances of the blocked gold, and being in keeping with a traditional United States policy which has accepted deferred payments, as in connection with the Mexican expropriations, only reluctantly.

The significant aspect of the Swiss settlements is that the Swiss francs earned from the sales of goods or services by the

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nationalizing country to Switzerland are the important source of payment. The same principle holds true in the British-Czech settlements reported September 29, 1949. Compensation and trade agreements were negotiated and signed together. The United States, British and Swiss experience, thus, in the post–World War II settlements, makes clear that when there is discussion of effective compensation, particularly if the claimant country has a harder currency than the nationalizing country, the claimant country will find itself compelled to assist the debtor to earn or obtain the funds necessary for effective payment.

This is, of course, not absolutely true, partially because currencies are even yet not abolutely inconvertible into stronger currencies, partially because compensation may be acceptable even if not in a convertible or in a foreign currency. But it is sufficiently true so that it underlines the possibility for the putative debtor to extract trade or other concessions which would not otherwise be made, in order that payment may be made possible. Thus, the Polish Government has apparently obtained the promise of the Swiss to make "heirless assets"—property in Switzerland of Polish nationals who have died without heirs—available to the Polish Government. The commitment applies to amounts which may be large because of the wholesale extermination of Polish Jewry during the war. The Swiss commitment would seem to depart from a Swiss promise to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France made during their negotiations in 1946, to "examine sympathetically the question of seeking means whereby [the Swiss Government] might put at the disposal of the three Allied Governments, for the purposes of relief and rehabilitation, the proceeds of property found in Switzerland which belonged to victims of recent acts of violence of the late Government of Germany, who have died without heirs." The Swiss agreement with the Poles, moreover, has overtones of a sort which must sound ominously in the ears of a banking community which has cherished, lived and prospered by its reputation for yielding neither information about, nor the assets of, its clients. And, while the situation reflected in this agreement is extraordinary, and the clients are—presumably—no more, the agree-

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ment must have given the Swiss negotiators much pause. It illustrates the compulsion—in the circumstances of present day nationalizations—which rests upon the claimant nation to assist the debtor-nationalizing country to find resources with which the debt can be paid.

IV

In all of the settlements which have been mentioned, the claim of the individual who has lost his property is merged with the claims of his brethren, and the claims are negotiated together by his government. In none of these settlements does the nationalizing government undertake to pay compensation to the individual claimant. In all of them, the obligation is not only negotiated by but runs to the claimant government; and it is to his government that the individual claimant must look for eventual payment. Whether that payment will be a large or small percentage of his investment depends on how successful a negotiator his government has been. In the Yugoslav–United States case, the percentage, because of the presence of the gold in the United States, will be a large one. In other settlements where the negotiating position of the claimant government is not so strong, it will probably be smaller.

The recent compensation agreements, thus, involve a situation in which a government negotiates on behalf of a substantial number of its nationals; in which the claimant government finds itself discussing not only claims but also such other foreign policy matters as trade and payments agreements; and in which the nationalizing government is discussing not merely the value of a property for which payment should concededly be made, but an essential aspect of its foreign policy. On both sides, thus, governments are much more closely involved than was the case in those past situations in which a government negotiated merely as an agent for its nationals, and in which discussions did not go outside the scope of the claims put forward. The pattern is now that governmental actions and policies not directly related to nationalization and compensation are necessarily on the settlement agenda. In the United States–Yugoslav case, the policy question faced by the United States

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was the release of the Yugoslav gold. In other cases, the British and Swiss Governments have undertaken trade and financial obligations, or obligations to mobilize certain types of assets, as part of the settlement. Compensation affects trade and financial policy. Trade and financial policies, conversely, may affect solutions to the problems of nationalization and compensation.

To this important extent, then, it is clear that government has a role in the protection of private foreign investment other than that merely of spokesman for its claimant nationals. The protection of the investor may well lie not in the vigorousness or skill with which his government advances the rule of just compensation, but in the extent to which it is willing to implicate quite distinct governmental policies in the interest of a settlement. American claimants against Czechoslovakia probably have reason to believe that the United States–Czech negotiations, which have been at a standstill for over a year, have foundered on the reluctance of the United States to make concessions extraneous to the nationalization problem for the sake of a compensation agreement. The foreign investor may thus find himself in partnership with and dependent upon his government, and involved in its over-all foreign policies, to an extent the degree of which is not generally recognized.

In the field of nationalization and compensation, clearly, government plays a highly significant and important role, and not merely as a sponsor of its investors. It remains to examine the second aspect of our problem—the role of government in relation to the flow of private capital into foreign investments.

V

President Truman's inaugural message, in January 1949, established a "bold new program" of economic development abroad as a fundamental part of American foreign policy. In his message of June 24, 1949 to the Congress, he again referred to Point IV as "one of the major elements of our foreign policy." Despite some question as to whether the United States should not give first consideration to its own "undeveloped areas," as voiced for example by former Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, there appears to be general acceptance

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of the merit and the need for some sort of Point IV program. A Point IV bill, which is a compromise between Administration and certain Congressional and business views, was signed on June 5, 1950, as the Act for International Development (Title IV, P.L. 535, 81st Cong., 2d sess.) It had strong bipartisan support.

The United States has been careful, in stating its design for Point IV, to make clear that United States Government funds are not the appropriate principal medium for the program. A relatively small amount—some $35 millions—is requested for the provision of technical assistance for economic development. But it is hoped that much larger sums will become available as private capital moves to assist in the development program. President Truman's June 24, 1949 message called for "an experimental program for encouraging the outflow of private investment . . . " Under Secretary of State Webb, in his testimony before the House Banking and Currency Committee, in August 1949, declared: "Private American investors constitute the largest potential source of investment capital in the world. If this program succeeds in stimulating the flow in investments abroad up to the levels attained during the 1920's relative to our national income, we will be making net annual private investments abroad of at least 2.5 billion dollars." Consistent emphasis has been laid on the role of private investment in economic development. In his speech of September 19, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson underlined the importance of private as against public funds, and said:

> Loans of public funds . . . can only be supplementary to the efforts of private capital, both local and foreign. This country has been built by private initiative, and it remains a land of private initiative . . . In providing assistance for economic development, it would be contrary to our traditions to place our government's public funds in direct and wasteful competition with private funds. Therefore, it will be our policy, in general, not to extend loans of public funds for projects for which private capital is available.

The Administration Act on Point IV carries, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State Thorp, the Export-Import Bank principle that "they may make loans only in cases where pri-

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vate capital is not available" into the "somewhat broader framework" of the Point IV legislation.

The possibility of nationaliziation is, of course, relevant to the materialization of any substantial outward flow of capital. How large a relevance nationalization fears have is difficult to determine. Where there are coupled a rational fear of nationalization and a reasonable expectation that foreign exchange will not be available for compensation, private capital will, of course, not move. Thus, private capital would obviously not have financed a new steel mill in Yugoslavia, and there was no feeling of undue governmental competition when the Export-Import Bank extended its recent $20,000,000 credit. Also, where the nationalization problem is not so serious, but foreign exchange resources are so limited as to make future withdrawal of earnings or capital unlikely, private capital is loath to invest.

In general, the United States has indicated a policy of attack on these problems in two ways: by provision to United States investors of certain safeguards by the United States itself; and by provision of safeguards by the foreign country. To a considerable extent, but not entirely, the safeguards envisaged for these two channels overlap.

Guaranties

In both the Economic Cooperation Act and proposed legislation, the United States has itself taken measures to provide guaranties for American capital. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 limited the guaranty to one of transferability into dollars of income or capital from the sale of the investment, up to the amount of dollars invested; the recent amendments extend the guaranty to include, vis-à-vis approved investments in participating countries, compensation in dollars for loss resulting from confiscation or expropriation. Proposed legislation, however, goes further in suggesting amendment of the powers of the Export-Import Bank to include the guarantying of "United States private capital invested in productive enterprises abroad which contribute to economic development in foreign countries against risks peculiar to such investments."

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The versions of this legislation approved by both the Senate and the House Banking and Currency Committees are different and more guarded than the above-quoted language. The investor would get a convertability guaranty, and a guaranty against "loss resulting from expropriation, confiscation, or seizure by action of public authority." Essentially, the technique remains that of a United States Government guaranty designed to take certain of the risks out of private foreign investment, and to transfer those risks to the United States Government.

The guaranty program is a substantial departure from previous policy. Insofar as it is limited to a guaranty of convertability of income or of the proceeds of sale, it fits the Marshall Plan picture—an emergency measure based on an emergency situation. But the guaranties now proposed are not limited to Marshall Plan countries and are for the long haul, the Export-Import Bank Act being presumably permanent legislation. Moreover, the guaranty is not merely that dollars will be available to pay profits, but that expropriation will be followed by prompt, adequate, and effective payment. The provisions thus attempt to insure the United States investor not only against the unavoidable risks of lack of dollar exchange, but also against the risks of foreign governmental action. That a guaranty with respect to such action is considered necessary is itself not without implication for the private investor, particularly when he considers that it is in the areas of those governments against whose possible acts he is being guarantied that he is being encouraged to invest, and that an unfriendly governmental attitude can manifest itself in ways more subtle and no less effective than the outright taking of property.

The guaranty provisions encounter considerable opposition. Difficulties with respect to such problems as the fees to be charged for different types or places of investment, and the manner of passing governmental judgment on the desirability of the proposed investment also make guaranties a not easy or universally acceptable solution. Private industry, perhaps fearing governmental intervention, is divided on the merit of the guaranty proposals. It is argued that guaranties misplace the

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proper emphasis, and that the guaranties should come from the countries in which the capital is to be invested. In opposition to the Administration guaranty bill, Congressman Herter argued: "I think the country that is the recipient of that money ought to guaranty proper treatment of the investment . . ." And the National Foreign Trade Council has recommended against guaranties on the grounds that the necessary incentive to American private business can be provided without guaranties, and that guaranties "would tend either toward undue regulation by United States Government of American private enterprises operating abroad or toward undesirable involvement of the United States Government in business." It would also appear that investors already established might well feel that an unfair advantage would be given to new investment if the latter were uniquely eligible for guaranties. The "old" investor may well believe that limited foreign exchange resources will be utilized for service of guarantied investments, to the detriment of established, non-guarantied investments.

Treaties and agreements

The policy of the United States, clearly, is to try to obtain commitments from the "recipient" countries at the same time that it pursues the guaranty technique. Secretary Acheson, in his address of September 19, 1949, stated the hope of the United States that "the flow of private capital can be stimulated . . . by the negotiation of treaties to create an atmosphere favorable to increased private investment abroad." Under Secretary Webb has stated that the United States is "actively engaged in the negotiation of bilateral treaties with foreign governments [which will] provide that the property of investors will not be expropriated without prompt, adequate and effective compensation." There can be little doubt that the United States Government is strongly pushing forward on this line, and is trying both to obtain special provisions with respect to investments in the general treaties of commerce and friendship, and to obtain special investment treaties.

The scope and effect of the treaties is, however, a limited one. For several reasons, the results to be achieved via the

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treaty procedure are, unfortunately, not likely to be great. These reasons are the difficulties inherent in the treaty procedure itself and difficulties in the attainment of satisfactory treaties—that is, in the likely content of the treaties.

So far as the treaty procedure itself is concerned, it seems clear that the treaty is a long-range instrument of policy. Although some efforts have been made to negotiate special investment treaties, notably with certain of the Latin American countries, in most cases investment provisions have been incorporated in over-all treaties of commerce and friendship. The United States has such treaties with many foreign countries, but most of these treaties are old, dating back in some cases more than one hundred years. A program to bring these instruments up to date, and to incorporate in them provisions relevant to modern investment problems, has been under way for some time. Progress is rather slow. Treaties have, since the war, been negotiated with China (pre-Communist), with Italy, with Uruguay, and with Eire. Negotiations with a number of other countries are under way, and new agreements may be expected. Nevertheless, the negotiation of these treaties, and the subsequent submission to governments and ratification, is a time-consuming process, in which considerations of long-range policy enter. It is not likely that the negotiation of such treaties could have much impact on the short-range problem of American capital investment abroad over the next few years. The treaties could, and will, if they can be negotiated, have a very substantial effect on the long-range problem.

These remarks emphasize, however, merely the importance of a vigorous and prompt program of treaty negotiation. Nevertheless, limitations exist in what can feasibly be attained under the treaty program.

First, an obvious limitation on the treaty procedure must be noted. No treaty is negotiable at present with such governments as those in Eastern Europe. A treaty is negotiable only with governments more or less like-minded with the United States. A precondition to successful negotiation of investment provisions is a willingness on both sides to recognize the need for, and the just rights of, private investors. Since most of the world in which the United States takes a present interest

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n economic development recognizes, or professes to recognize, ›oth the need and the rights, this limitation need not be over-ɔmphasized.

The real problem is, however, what the United States can ɔbtain in treaty negotiations with *friendly* countries—with Western Europe or Latin America. It may reasonably be assumed that such American capital as may be invested in economic development in, say, Yugoslavia, will, at least for the reasonably near future, be governmental rather than private capital. But even vis-à-vis such areas as Latin America, India, and other non-Communist areas which are in need of the means to provide a higher and rising standard of living, it would be well not to put too much faith in the treaty technique.

The treaties which have been negotiated since the war—with China, Italy, Uruguay, Eire—all contain language which has been the source of expressed satisfaction from the business community in the United States. But all of these treaties contain caveats which should make the investor, anxious for clear and certain guaranties, look further. Protocols in all cases refer to exchange restrictions justifiable under the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, although, as in the Italian case, the right of a member of the Fund to limit capital withdrawals cannot be invoked to defeat the treaty provision that property will not be taken "without due process of law and without the prompt payment of just and effective compensation." The Italian treaty, like those with Uruguay and Eire, contains a protocol which permits the Italian Government, in case of foreign exchange difficulties, to limit the withdrawal of compensation. Whether other treaties, now under negotiation, will contain guaranties to American investors which are not hedged about with the restrictions permissible (in some cases, mandatory) under the Fund provisions or under normal exchange regulations, remains to be seen. There is no obvious reason, however, why it should be easier to obtain unconditional guaranties of the payment of prompt, effective, and adequate compensation in other cases—particularly since in several of these cases the negotiation of any treaty at all has, for political reasons, proved difficult.

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If satisfactory investment clauses could be obtained, the Bogota Conference of May 1948 would seem, a priori, to have presented an ideal opportunity. The American republics are, despite occasional spats, generally friendly neighbors. They profess a common belief in the necessity for and efficacy of private investment, both local and foreign. Any real basis for the old charges among the other American republics against the "Colossus of the North" has long since disappeared. In fact, the Bogota Economic Agreement itself does present the appearance of harmonious agreement on treatment of private foreign investment. Foreign capital is to receive "equitable treatment." "No unjustifiable restrictions" are to be imposed on the transfer of capital and earnings. No discriminatory action against foreign investments is to be taken. And, finally: "Any expropriation shall be accompanied by payment of a fair price in a prompt, adequate, and effective manner."

But these fair words are modified by reservations. The several reservations to the investment chapter of the Bogota Economic Agreement state that these principles are subordinated to "the constitutional laws of each country," or to the principle that all inhabitants, and all investments are "subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts." Exactly what these reservations mean, in terms of consequences, is difficult to say. They clearly imply that national courts will decide on the meaning of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, and that the interpretation given to local constitutions—and perhaps laws —will supersede treaty commitments. The latter point means also that treaty obligations cannot be found merely by reading the treaty, but that the mass of local constitutional laws must also be read.

The commitments of the Agreement are thus effectively nullified, unless the reservations can be eliminated. An effort has been made in the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to eliminate the reservations, but the effort has not until now been successful. Although something in the nature of a protocol will have to be negotiated to take the place of the reservations, United States business has considered as too vague and too dangerous the terms of the protocol which was negotiated in the Inter-American Economic and Social Council,

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while the Latin American governments have considered the same protocol to make too many concessions to the foreign investor. For what it is worth, the experience in negotiations of investment provisions in the Charter for the International Trade Organization leads to the same conclusion: agreement can be reached, at least in multilateral negotiations, only in general terms; if those terms are sharpened, agreement is lost.

It is not easy to assign fault for inability to reach sharply defined statements of the rights—and perhaps obligations—of investors. It may be that there is an inclination on the one side to ask for more, and on the other side to offer less, than is reasonable. The United States Constitution prescribes "just compensation" as defined in national courts to be the measure of a foreign investor's rights; the United States investor wants a sharper, clearer phrase, and is inclined not wholly to trust foreign justice. Unfortunately, the United States investor can cite chapter and verse in his documentation of the need for the sharper phrase, and perhaps for the international or arbitral rather than the national tribunal. But he is not inclined to give weight to the real factors on the other side: the practical impossibility for a foreign politician—or statesman—to proceed on the basis that justice will not be forthcoming in his national courts; the difficulty of overriding his constitutional provisions which specify equality—and no more—for the foreign and the domestic investor; and the political background of a history of alleged exploitation by foreign capital. Most of the charges of exploitation are not true, or are gross exaggerations. But it is largely irrelevant whether they are true or not: the belief in and suspicion of the foreign exploiter is a political fact of life which can be employed by the political opponents of the current government; and a politician in no part of the world is likely to flout outright the prevailing clichés of his country. The explicit statement that expropriations will be accompanied by, or preceded by, payment in foreign exchange, and that a nonnational authority should be conceded power to decide whether the measure of compensation is fair, are thus dangerous instruments for most foreign statesmen. They may open the way for foreign investment; they may also open the way for his removal from active political life. This is the more so since

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his countrymen are likely to think justified commitments that foreign capital will not exploit its position, rather than guaranties to such capital.[4]

This is not to say that expropriation, in such countries, will not be accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. It is to say that so to promise and, even more, to grant the right of a foreign government to question fulfillment of the promise, is not a small thing. The Latin American countries generally adhere to the Calvo principle: that an investor does not have the right of diplomatic intervention by his government in connection with his investment. The United States reserved its domestic affairs from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accepting the "optional clause" jurisdiction of the Court; the Latin Americans similarly feel that disputes between investors in their territories and themselves are domestic matters to be domestically settled. It may be argued that these attitudes are not helpful in developing a fruitful flow of investment in which these countries should be interested; but it is also argued that they do not wish investors distrustful of the good faith and integrity of the countries in which they make their investments.

It is not likely that guaranties which, for these and other reasons, cannot be attained in fair bargaining can be effectively attained by compulsion. A bill introduced by Congressman Herter in August 1949 was designed "to encourage the flow of investment capital . . . to those foreign countries expressing a desire and willingness to cooperate with the United States . . ."[5] Assistance by the United States, either under the bill or under the Export-Import Bank Act, was not to be granted to any country unless that country was a participant in the program of the bill. In effect, this would mean that each participating country must enter into a treaty which will "assure nationals of the United States" that they will get prompt, ade-

[4] It should be explicitly understood that the purpose of the preceding paragraph is not to justify, nor to judge, the attitude there described. It is intended rather to point out that this attitude is a fact, and a fact which must be reckoned with as much as certain regional prejudices in the United States are facts to be reckoned with in American politics.

[5] H.R. 6026, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Saltonstall: S. 2561, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.

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quate, and effective "just compensation" in the event of any of a series of possible eventualities. Such compensation was to be paid, not only if property was expropriated, but also if United States nationals were deprived of "normal control over their properties"; if "restrictions or charges," even though nondiscriminatory, were imposed on properties or business "to such extent as to deprive them of any substantial beneficial interest;" or if government competition "destroys or substantially impairs the enterprise, business or property of a national of the United States." If a country signed up, it got not United States aid but the *possibility* of United States aid. The Herter Bill did not propose that the strict banking standards of the Export-Import Bank, which have meant that repayment has been made in almost all cases, should be in any way relaxed.

The original Herter proposals have now, fortunately, been supplanted by a bill introduced by Congressman Herter after extensive consultations with members of the Congress, business groups, and government officials.[6] The original proposals offer an instructive study in how not to encourage foreign investment or development abroad through the use of American private capital. The aura of coercion hung like a pall over the original proposals. Although the argument was made that the bill merely attached conditions which a foreign country was free to accept or reject, depending on whether it wished American aid or not, there is little doubt that a threat existed in the suggestion that the only possible source of foreign assistance was prepared to withhold that assistance unless concurrence were given to a treaty the terms of which had been unilaterally determined. Much good will, laboriously built up over a long period, would have been lost by forcing a country whose treatment of American investors has been fair—Brazil, for example—to sign a treaty so drafted and under such circumstances. Little, on the other hand, would have been gained from such signatures of less cooperative countries as might in this way have been obtained. A government might sign a treaty,

[6] H.R. 6835, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. After consideration by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a modified version (H.R. 7346, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.) was introduced by Congressman Kee, and is substantially incorporated in the legislation which has now been enacted.

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but it would always be a subject for proper speculation whether the signature had been voluntary, or had been compelled by the need for American financial assistance. An American investor might be properly distrustful of the guaranties of friendly treatment so obtained on his behalf.

Moreover, the conditions stated in the original Herter proposals could hardly have been fulfilled by the United States itself. Whether the various Federal and State regulatory bodies —the SEC, NLRB, FTC, etc.—deprive certain American businesses of that "normal control over their properties" which they enjoyed prior to the legislation setting up these agencies may be debatable. Persons could undoubtedly be found to take the affirmative. The applicability of the provisions with regard to governmental competition to the United States would also provide an interesting field for speculation. Objective analysis indicates that only if the United States were to abolish a large body of current American law could it comply with the conditions proposed for these treaties. And only the most superficial consideration can surely have lain back of the justification sometimes heard—that since it was other countries that needed American capital, and not the United States which needed their funds, there was no reason why the proposed treaties should not be a one-way street. That way lies the debacle of the achievements of American foreign policy in bettering relations with other countries. And that way lies, also, a serious threat to the security of the American foreign investor. The declared purpose of the original Herter proposals was "to encourage the flow of investment capital" to cooperating countries, in order to raise standards of living and to strengthen these countries "in their struggle against communism and other forms of statism." But these proposals, if enacted, would more likely have had the effect of decreasing the number of countries cooperating with the United States, of providing a basis for the charges of American imperialism which are endemic in large parts of the world, and of strengthening the voices of the anti-American minorities which exist in most countries. In so doing, the proposals could hardly have increased the flow of American investment capital abroad or increased the safety of that capital already there.

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It is therefore gratifying that the new bill introduced by Congressman Herter, and the various modifications of it which have emerged in the process of enactment, reflect more mature thought and eliminate the coercive aspects of the previous bill. Under the new proposals, the necessity for "confidence of fair and reasonable treatment" is stated in the legislation. It is declared to be the policy of the United States to aid in foreign economic development by "encouraging . . . the flow of investment capital to countries which provide conditions under which such . . . capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of wealth . . ." Various techniques for carrying out a program of technical assistance are provided for or possible under the Act. Throughout the Act, and as emphasized by State Department witnesses during the hearings, the thesis is maintained that private capital, if available, should do the job. The approach contained in the Act is a reasoned and helpful one, and its program should assist in the solution of rather than in the creation of problems.

Meanwhile, it is the settled policy of the United States to negotiate new treaties containing investment provisions. Though treaties cannot be compelled, they may be negotiated. They will, however, almost inevitably reflect the problems of the day—shortages of foreign exchange, for example, which are bound to affect the assurances which can be obtained for foreign investors. Like guaranties supplied by the United States, they are not likely to result in an immediate and substantially increased outflow of private capital. The contribution of both the guaranties and the treaties to the making of foreign investments by American nationals is likely to be a long-range rather than a short-range effect.

VI

If this analysis is correct, measures other than the mere negotiation of satisfactory investment treaties or the granting of guaranties will be necessary to increase substantially and in the fairly near future the investment of American private capital abroad. These other measures may take a variety of forms.

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One of these forms, and one which has been consistently underemphasized, is the utilization of United States governmental assistance, both technical and financial, to help break the way for the necessary outflow of American private investment capital.

The philosophy of the original Herter proposals was that private investment capital can and will—absent hampering restriction and such perils as that of expropriation—do the development job abroad. The part of government is, in this scheme of things, considered to be a minor one. Governmental technical assistance is, in this view, tolerable, but government-to-government credits are regarded as undesirable. The National Foreign Trade Council has thus suggested that the Export-Import Bank cease making governmental loans. And the statements of government officials—such as the statement of Under Secretary Webb already mentioned—heavily stress the role of private capital and play down the function of governmental assistance. That governmental assistance has a role not only in the direct promotion of economic development abroad but also in paving the way for an outflow of private investment capital has not been emphasized and in fact, seems to be denied by such proposals as that of the National Foreign Trade Council.

Yet it is unlikely that, under present conditions, private foreign investment abroad can reach the figure of $2.5 billion mentioned by Mr. Webb, even with satisfactory treaties and guaranties. The figure of $2.5 billion is apparently an extrapolation of the relation in the 1920's between foreign investment and American national income. The fallacy of the extrapolation method of calculating what is possible or likely is indicated by a similar extrapolation of the relation between imports to the United States in the 1920's and national income. An extrapolated figure is thus reached which, if attained, would probably have eliminated the need for Marshall Plan assistance. The outflow of private American investment capital has not been great in recent years. Net new private investment abroad, in 1948, was less than one billion dollars, the bulk of which was concentrated in the petroleum industry. Such investment may well prove to have been a one-time operation;

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nd even so, the petroleum industry responded to special circumstances, such as the opening of new low-cost oil fields in he Middle East, and a Venezuelan law compelling the refining of 10 per cent of Venezuelan crude in that country. The igure for investment in 1948 contrasts with a 1928 figure of 1.3 billion pre-devaluation dollars.

The reasons for the drying up of private foreign investment are various, and not entirely related to the difficulties which would be cured or alleviated by treaties or guaranties. Department of Commerce data indicate that total earnings of American foreign investments abroad, after foreign taxes, were 17.1 per cent of investment abroad in 1948 (excluding Germany and Japan); the domestic rate of return in the same year was 13.8 per cent. The difference, in terms of the uncertainties and normal difficuties of doing business in a foreign country, is probably not great enough to induce a major outflow of American investment capital. Moreover, the figures do not entirely reveal the fact that, in many cases and situations, a real opportunity for private investment abroad does not now exist.

Private investment capital brings with it a number of advantages which government capital—particularly direct government-to-government loans—cannot supply: technical skill, patents, know-how, etc. But private investment capital is not available, in general, for many of the basic projects which must necessarily underlie economic development through private capital, but which are not dollar-earning projects. It is necessary, in many cases, to undertake educational, training, and health programs as a prelude to the opening of opportunities for private investment. Roads and harbors are necessary for the profitable operation of factories and mills. In some cases, the building of a steel mill may produce profits out of which the construction of a railroad may be financed. But this is not always the case; and the poor reputation which most foreign governmental securities now have in the United States makes it unlikely that the private capital market here can be tapped for such projects.

A large part of these projects should, of course, be financed from local savings. Some contribution will be made by the technical assistance program of the United States, though it is

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not certain that the $35 million to be newly invested in such assistance is a large enough sum to have major significance. But if foreign economic development is to proceed both soundly and rapidly—and the United States has a generally recognized interest in its so doing—the role of assistance from the United States cannot be minimized. Some funds, for some types of basic projects, are available. The resources of neither the Export-Import Bank nor the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have been strained. As pointed out by Assistant Secretary of State Thorp to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, this fact is at least partially "the result of a shortage of projects thought through to the point where they are ready for foreign financing." More funds may be necessary, and it has been indicated that additional lending authority for the Export-Import Bank will be sought. If suitable projects are presented, there would seem to be both the will and the means to promote certain types of sound developmental programs.

Whether some of the fundamental projects, in the field of sanitation, for example, will be so financed, and how broad the effects of the technical assistance program will be, remains to be seen. It seems clear that projects of this sort which reduce the overhead cost of doing business, financed locally or abroad, must be undertaken as a precondition to the hoped-for flow of private investment capital. To oppose government-to-government financial assistance even in this area, an attitude implicit in hostility to all Export-Import Bank governmental loans, is to be unrealistic as to what some of the real obstacles to private foreign investment are. Opposition to government-to-government loans stems from a variety of reasons, ranging from a fundamental isolationism to fears that service of government loans will or do get priority over service of private investment on short supplies of dollar exchange and to the hope that the cutting off of government loans will create a more favorable attitude toward and willingness to make concessions to foreign private investment. It is important to differentiate between the various situations in which government loans may be asked. It is important that foreign governments find it not so easy to obtain government-to-government loans that they will neglect

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he creation of a suitable and attractive climate for both foreign and domestic private capital investment. It is equally important not to neglect the considerable extent to which government-to-government assistance is a *sine qua non* to the creation of conditions under which private investment can assume its proper major role.

Confined to its proper sphere, governmental assistance by the United States to foreign governments does not contradict a program for the expansion of private foreign investment. Government should occupy a narrow role. It cannot and should not compete with or take the place of private capital. But, within its sphere, the discharge of its proper functions is essential in preparing the way for an outflow of private investment capital which will not result solely from the granting of guaranties or the negotiation of investment treaties.

VII

It is clear that an agreement to compensate an American national for nationalization of his property can, at present, be worked out privately only in isolated cases. Only in the case of the occasional, the non-programmatic expropriation, can government take its traditional role of a mere agent for its nationals. If private investment is to obtain a compensation agreement, in the situation of general nationalization, government as government must intervene, and governmental policies must be implicated. This is so whether the governmental policy is the release of blocked gold, the conclusion of a trade agreement, or the marshalling of foreign assets. More is involved than the rights of the expropriated investor.

Similarly, government must play a part in addition to that of the protector of private enterprise if the job of economic development which is an integral part of our foreign policy is to be done. Because so much more heat than light is generated in discussion of the role and function of government, it is important to stress the truth of the frequently made statement that economic development cannot be done if the reservoir of private capital is not tapped. Governmental resources, even if they were to be made available, are not sufficient for the

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major task. But it is almost equally essential under presen conditions, and if the program is to be one for our time, tha government assume a task in addition to that of protection— of the granting of guaranties and the negotiating of treaties. The creation of a favorable investment climate involves the creation of favorable investment opportunities—opportunities not merely to retain one's investment, but opportunities also to make profits.

The objective of United States policy should clearly be the creation of conditions under which private enterprise can oper ate—not only because a competitive enterprise system is har monious with our policies, but because such a system can and will produce results. The creation of these conditions is, how ever, more than has been acknowledged, a task to which gov ernment resources must be applied. Governmental trade or financial policies may make a nationalization settlement pos sible; governmental technical or financial assistance may oper the way for private investment. The function of governmen in these cases should be a temporary one. The objective should be the protection of private rights and the establishment of conditions under which private enterprise can do the develop mental job. So long as the objective is kept clearly in mind private enterprise need not fear governmental participation.

Government, in these matters, is a little like a catalytic agent It should make a result possible, without itself entering, ex cept temporarily, into the chemical process. While in the cases discussed herein, government must of necessity take an active part in the achievement of the result, it should emerge as a non-participant, or at most as a minor partner. The restora tion of private rights, and the fusion of private capital and know-how with foreign needs, are the desired ends. The role of government in the achievement of these ends, though essen tial, is a limited one. It is a role that should be recognized and accepted by private enterprise. Cooperation between busines and government is essential to realization of the identical aims of United States business and the United States Government

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THE FEBRUARY COUP IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

By IVO DUCHACEK

I

THE Stalinists consider parliaments to be only schools for extra-parliamentary means of struggle. Were the Czechoslovak democratic leaders aware of this attitude while cooperating with the Communists both in the Parliament and Government of Czechoslovakia after 1945? If they were, what countermeasures did they devise? Even if the daily political fight over party or local issues necessarily narrowed their horizon, responsible democratic leaders had a fairly accurate picture of the situation even in 1945, when the Communists, thanks to the presence of the Red Army, could have seized power. The democrats' awareness of danger and their decision as to countermeasures were, however, influenced by many hopes and illusions, some justifiable in view of the international situation at the end of the war.

First, their chief hope was based on Communist abstinence in 1945. The Communists did *not* take the country completely in their hands, though they could have. The survival of Czechoslovak democracy seemed much more dependent on the international situation than on internal issues. That this analysis led in some cases to a rather passive expectation that outside forces would save Czechoslovak democracy once again is beyond any doubt.

Second, the Red Army, the reason for the people's lack of courage, was not supposed to stay forever. With its withdrawal, the feeling of helplessness was supposed to go, too. When the Red Army finally withdrew in November and December of 1945, this supposition proved only partly right, for the Com-

* This is the second of two articles by Mr. Duchacek describing the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia; the first appeared in the April 1950 issue of *World Politics* and was entitled "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia, 1944-48."

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munists did not vacate the positions they had occupied during the presence of the Red Army.

Third, the system of People's Courts which dealt with war guilt trials was supposed to end in May 1947, when the two year Retribution Act expired. This was another source of ter ror which was supposed to go. Again, a supposition only partly right, since the two years of Communist-sponsored and Com munist-influenced People's Courts were sufficient to demoral ize many who preferred to become Communists rather thar face their war-guilt trials.

Fourth, in a favorable international situation, with the with drawal of the Red Army and expiration of the Retribution Act there was hope that democratic traditions might overcome a somewhat fatalistic submission complex which the Czech peo ple had developed during the six years of Nazi oppression.

Fifth, the Democrats were asking a hopeful question: Why would Soviet Russia prefer to have only the Communist mi nority on her side when she can gain the whole nation by friendly handling and understanding?[1]

Sixth, Communist participation in the government was con sidered a safeguard against Communist transfer of the issues in dispute from the coalition government to the streets. Within the framework of the Constitution the democrats considered themselves strong enough, but they knew how weak they would prove if the Communists chose extra-legal ways of settling the issues. Fear of this caused many democratic compromises and retreats.

Finally, great hope was put in free, unfettered elections in which the majority could assert itself, a majority which was obviously not only democratic but non-Marxist. It was sympto matic that some democratic analysts did not even wish for a crushing defeat of the Communists—"just a little" was their phrase to express the fear that the Communists (not yet edu cated in democratic fair play) would not gracefully accept a

[1] Prior to the Liberation, Soviet friendship seemed also *technically* essential if President Benes and his government were to operate. Since Czechoslovak territory had been liberated from the East and by the East, the way home from London to Prague had to be via Moscow. It was the Soviet's decision whether or not the Czech Government was to have a chance to start its activities on home territory and not only in the exile which had been the Polish Government's fate.

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pectacular defeat. They considered the revolutionary organization of Czech and Slovak Communists as a political party similar to their own, though much more radical in methods and aims and consequently more difficult to deal with.[2] This mistaken estimate led to another error. Instead of combining their efforts, the democratic parties competed among themselves just as they hoped to compete with the Communist Party. Their wranglings enabled the Communist Party to combine with the People's Party against the National Socialists and vice versa or with the Czech parties against the Slovak and vice versa. The democrats' disunity of aims and methods was in sharp contrast to the strict discipline and carefully planned strategy on the Communist side.

Some democratic leaders considered temporary close cooperation with the Communist Party as essential for achieving their aims, that is to secure some key positions in the administrative or industrial sphere and thus improve their positions for the political fight with communism. There was some point in their reasoning that superiority of democratic forces on a purely mathematical parliamentary basis was not of great value so long as the Communist Party held the majority of economic and other key positions. But tactics which aimed at the weakening of the Communist Party by close cooperation with them were very confusing to the democratic rank and file, which was supposed to fight the Communists bravely on the local level,

[2] The three important Czechoslovak non-Marxist parties were the following:
(1) The National-Socialist Party, whose leader was Petr Zenkl. It is a non-Marxist party which by its advocacy of social reformism combined with some anti-Catholic and very nationalistic trends would correspond to the French radicals. At the elections of 1946 it obtained 18.29 per cent of the votes.
(2) The People's Party led by Msgr. Jan Sramek. It is a Christian Democratic Party based on the Catholic social doctrine as inspired by the papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. It obtained 15.69 per cent of the votes.
(3) The Slovak Democratic Party, led by Josef Lettrich.

While the National Socialist and People's parties were born under the Hapsburgs fifty years ago, the Slovak Democratic Party was a child of the resistance and liberation period. The leading positions were occupied mostly by former Slovak Agrarian leaders, all of them Protestants, and the rank and file were Catholic, mostly former voters for the Catholic Slovak Party. This religiously heterogeneous group was held together by the common fight against Marxism. At the elections in 1946 it succeeded in obtaining 62 per cent of the votes in Slovakia against the Communists. Thus this Slovak Party became the fourth Party of Czechoslovakia (14.08 per cent) and therefore stronger than the Social Democratic Party which had obtained only 12.05 per cent.

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while democratic leaders almost seemed to be "honeymooning with them on the national level. The particular position of th Social Democratic Party made such plans even more fragile Furthermore, democratic leaders were prisoners of their owi experience with the revolutionary Marxist movement ii Czechoslovakia in 1919-20 when the powerful but most coop erative and constructive Marxist Social Democratic Party hac emerged from an apparently similar revolutionary atmospher following the first World War. The disbandment of the Com intern in 1943 and the subsequent adoption of the nationalistic line according to which "every country may follow its owi path to socialism" made many a democrat draw the automatic conclusion that the Communists might very well turn out to bc what the Social Democrats had been after 1920.

II

Although the exact moment of the Communist decision tc seize power in Czechoslovakia cannot be reliably established the reasons given for it and the order of events seem to place the decision somewhere in the period following the establishment of the Cominform (September 1947).

In January 1947, the Czechoslovak Communist Party still seemed persuaded that Czechoslovakia could be communized by democratic methods. Prime Minister Klement Gottwald in January 1947, and Secretary-General of the Party Rudolf Slansky six months later, declared that the Communist Party must and would obtain a 51 per cent majority in the coming election, scheduled for spring of 1948. For some Communists this was a goal; for others, only a part of a psychological warfare. Even if some Communists sincerely hoped to win, they could not exclude the possibility of defeat.

A foretaste of the results of really free and democratic elections was given to Communists and democrats alike, in autumn 1947, by the elections in students' associations in the universities and colleges at Prague and Brno. At these elections, which in Czechoslovakia had always been fought on political and not purely students' issues, the Communists and Social Democrats were reduced to 25 per cent of the total vote while the Chris-

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ian Democrats and National Socialists gained a crushing majority of 75 per cent. In December 1947, another confirmation of this evolution of the people's mood was given by the results of a Communist "Gallup poll," organized and executed by the Communist Ministry of Information. According to this poll the losses of the Communist Party in the coming elections were estimated at 10 to 15 per cent of their strength.

The outcome of Czechoslovak elections was of utmost importance in an international situation worsening with each successive conference. The subsequent developments seem to indicate that Moscow in the winter of 1947-48 must have viewed with grave concern the internal situation in the two most western bastions of the Russian security line, Stettin-Trieste. The coming elections and other internal developments seemed to threaten the Soviet position in Czechoslovakia. In the Adriatic, the "Wilsonian" Leninism of Tito represented another potential danger. At the time of the coup in Prague, the tension between Belgrade and Moscow was near its culminating point. The correspondence between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia shows that on March 18, three weeks after the February coup, the Soviet General Barskov informed Tito about Marshal Bulganin's order to withdraw all military advisers from Yugoslavia. A day later the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Armaninov notified Marshal Tito that the civilian experts had also been recalled to Moscow. In both cases the reason given was: "They are surrounded by hostility in Yugoslavia."[3]

With the coming crisis in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the Communists, who have never believed in the wisdom or value of a majority verdict were in 1947-48 less ready than ever to look passively on any change of power relationship in the heart of Europe through a simple mathematical procedure of counting the votes after free elections. Besides coming elections, however, other factors made the Czechoslovak People's Democracy appear highly unreliable in the eyes of Moscow. These factors, in the particular international atmosphere of 1947, made it imperative for the Czechoslovak Com-

[3] J. B. Tito to V. M. Molotov, letter dated March 20, 1948, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948.

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munists to abandon the soft "coalition" line and adopt the radi cal remedy.

First, the *international situation* had its immediate ef fects on the situation in Czechoslovakia. The democrats trie to avoid taking sides, while the Communists gave the Sovie Union their unconditional support.[4] Tension increased, espe cially when Czechoslovakia, who had hoped she would neve be driven to make the fatal choice between East and West, wa obliged to take sides with respect to the Marshall Plan. Or July 4, 1947 the Czechoslovak Government, including it Moscow-trained Communists, accepted unanimously the join British-French invitation to join the Preparatory Conferenc in Paris. Five days later a delegation of the Czechoslovak Government (composed of the Communist Prime Minister Klement Gottwald and two non-Communists, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Masaryk and Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina[5]) heard from Stalin and Molotov in the Kremlin that (1) The Marshall Plan was an anti-Russian scheme which could, under certain circumstances, involve the danger of an economic or shooting war against Russia with the help of re vived German industry. Consequently: (2) adherence to the Marshall Plan was incompatible with the Soviet-Czecho slovak Alliance of 1943. Faced with this dilemma—the Mar shall Plan (then still rather nebulous) or the Soviet Alliance (not nebulous at all in the geographical position of Czecho slovakia)—Prague reversed its decision of July 4 and refused to come to the Preparatory Conference in Paris. Though docile under duress, Czechoslovakia remained the only People's Democracy which failed to consult Russia before making a decision on such an important issue and which had to be

[4] The Communist Speaker of the Czech Parliament, Oldrich John, on February 22, 1949, at a session commemorating the February putsch, declared: ". . . [in summer, 1947] there was a series of attacks against the Ministry of Interior and the Security Corps. The reaction was most systematic and aggressive in agricultural questions. At this moment the National Socialists, Slovak Democrats, and People's Party have already formed a unified and concentrated phalanx. When Vice-Premier Zenkl calls, 'Not the East, but both East and West,' this slogan does not even try to hide a campaign against our foreign policy, against the U.S.S.R."

[5] After the February coup of 1948, Jan Masaryk and Prokop Drtina were found under the windows of their respective apartments—Masaryk, on March 10, dead; Drtina, on February 27, alive but crippled for life.

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brought back to "reason" by open pressure. It was not only a sign of the general unreliability of Czechoslovakia but a manifestation of somewhat nationalist deviation.

Second, President Benes' *Memoirs,* published in 1947, contained several critical remarks on the subject of Soviet foreign policy and its reflection on the Czechoslovak Communists during the Ribbentrop-Molotov period. Dr. Benes considered it necessary to insert some last minute reservations about Russian sincerity in general. For the Kremlin, even Benes—who had often been criticized for defending Russia to the West instead of the contrary—became a symptom of the general unreliability of Czechoslovakia.

Third, the Social-Democratic Party, which had shaken off Fierlinger and his fellow-traveling policy at the November Congress in Brno, caused Communist apprehension that the general awakening in Czechoslovakia might isolate the Czech Communists. A possible defeat at the polls could be followed by a coalition of non-Communist forces in the French pattern. Such a course of events would represent a dramatic shift in favor of the West.

III

The preparation of a Communist coup in a democratic country seems to take place on two levels. First, Communist machinery develops an attack against the democratic forces. This would usually include a campaign against one of the democratic groups, devised in such a way as to isolate it from the others. Furthermore, there would be an attempt to deprive democratic groups of their leaders or of their strength. Attempts on the lives of democratic leaders or attempts to corrupt or frighten them would fall into this category, just as would attempts to support or bribe ambitious second-fiddlers in the democratic parties. An attempt to link up the democratic parties with some *distant* foreign forces would be made, while the Communists presented themselves as national champions, certain of the support of a powerful friend close at hand.[6]

[6] Lenin wrote to Commissar of Justice D. I. Kursky on May 15, 1922: ". . . a formula must be found that would relate these activities [of the Mensheviks] to the international bourgeoisie and its struggle against us."

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Accusation of high treason would be made against democratic leaders.

Second, in the thus heated atmosphere, Communist Headquarters would try to revolutionize the labor unions, either by new far-reaching demands or by slogans defending their position against an imaginary enemy. Cells would be mobilized and Action Committees and workers' militia formed. Basic weapons would be distributed and a general order of readiness for action issued. The threat of street-fighting and barricades may have the same effect as the street-fighting itself on comfortably living democrats; such threats would be especially effective if the democrats felt internationally isolated, prisoners of their own democratic methods. Fair-play for instance, is hardly an adequate weapon against a scientific palace-revolution.

In Czechoslovakia the pre-putsch targets were well chosen. The first was the Slovak Democratic Party, which in May of 1946 succeeded in obtaining a 62 per cent majority against the Communists in the province of Slovakia. The Communist Party made a series of public accusations of high treason, especially of subversive activities in connection with those Slovaks abroad who favored the Hitler-created independent Slovak State and opposed therefore in 1945 the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia. The Communists hoped to isolate the Slovak Democratic Party from the other non-Communist Czech parties, which had never had great sympathy for the rather loose Slovak conception of state unity. Czech non-Communist leaders, however, saw through the Communist tactics and the sudden enthusiasm for unity of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The second target was the most popular non-Communist leadership: Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, Vice-Premier and Chairman of the National Socialist Party Petr Zenkl, and Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina. Petr Zenkl's personal courage and record of six years imprisonment in Buchenwald and his outspoken criticism of communism made him one of the most popular and important anti-Communist leaders in the government. Under Drtina's direction the Ministry of Justice proved a most valuable counterbalance to the Communist Ministry of

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nterior. Their struggle often resulted in curious occurrences. 'eople released by the Ministry of Interior were immediately ırrested by the Ministry of Justice, and vice versa. Although ess romantic, it reminded some observers of the fights between he King's musketeers and Richelieu's guards in Dumas' ıovels.

In the summer of 1947, three wooden cases containing in-'ernal machines were sent to these three leaders. The cases were intercepted, and judicial investigations established the following facts: the wooden cases had been ordered by Communist Headquarters at the town of Olomouc, Moravia; they were fabricated by a Communist cabinetmaker at Krcman, near Olomouc; Communist deputy Jura Sosnar placed the explosives in the boxes with his own hands. It was proved furthermore that the same deputy organized deposits of weapons and munitions in the Olomouc area. This exposé was a great triumph for the Ministry of Justice and for Secretary-General of the National Socialist Party Vladimir Krajina, who first traced the origin of the infernal machines to Communist Headquarters in Olomouc. It was a triumph full of political consequences. A Communist deputy lost his parliamentary immunity. Several Communists, including the cabinetmaker, were arrested. The public, accustomed to unlawful arrests by the Ministry of Interior, felt encouraged by this just application of the law. At the same time, the people realized what methods the Communist Party might use to achieve their aims. The tension and fear of the future were increased by this incident.

In retaliation, the Ministry of Interior later accused the National Socialists of having organized an espionage service for foreign powers, and made some spectacular and widely publicized arrests on that basis in the Duchcov area. But when the Ministry of Justice cross-examined the witnesses, they admitted that they had been forced or paid to act as *agents provocateurs* for the needs and purposes of the Ministry of Interior. Although the Ministry of Justice, and with it the democratic majority, seemed to be winning these duels, the Communists achieved their aims too. The atmosphere of the country became less and less breathable.

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The Communists' third target was the middle classes, backbone of the democratic majority. They were by then almost annihilated by the collectivist economy. What was left of them was supposed to receive the finishing blow by a new, severe taxation of property—the "millionaires' tax"—and further limitation of commerce.

These and other issues were debated in an atmosphere of rising temperature. Some dreaded a putsch, some ascribed the fever to pre-electoral turmoil. Some were convinced that the rhythm of Communist demands had quickened because the Communists feared defeat at the polls and therefore desired to settle the election issues beforehand and at the same time wanted to impress the voter with the continued success of Communist activities in the government and parliament, so that he would vote for the winners and not the "permanent losers," the democratic parties.

In the meantime, the second level of Communist pre-putsch operations became apparent. At the end of December, news about the distribution of weapons was becoming more and more public. In January, the Central Labor Union and the Peasants Union came out with extensive demands, going far beyond the agreed program of the government.[7] If these demands were granted, the non-Communist leaders felt that the election would be fought on dead issues. The Czechoslovak democracy, and its liberties, would already be communized from top to bottom. When the Ministry of Interior began a communization of the police under the banner of "police reform," the Czechoslovak democrats were at the point of using any issue possible to force the elections. The non-Communists' pathetic belief that "only free elections could be the passport to a brighter future" was based on the following reasoning: If

[7] In his speech of November 17, 1948, Gottwald discussed the countermeasures against the non-Communist groups: ". . . [we had to] make new claims for further nationalization and agricultural demands going beyond the framework of the governmental program. On this basis the Labor and Peasants Union called their convention. These demands became a signal for the reaction. They realized that it was really five of midnight. They reacted nervously; this speeded their coming into the open and thus they committed their mistake."

The speech was made at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Hradcany Castle. Copies were distributed by the Czechoslovak Press Agency in New York, December 29.

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Russia came to consider the Czech elections as internationally significant, everything would be lost anyway; if Russia is ready to consider the elections as a domestic affair, then everything can be gained by forcing free elections at the earliest possible moment.

IV

The Central Labor Union and the Peasant Union announced their mass conventions in Prague for February 22 and February 29 respectively. These conventions would bring a great number of Communist workers and peasants into Prague—overcrowding of the city was another prerequisite for the putsch.

The decision in January to convoke the labor and agricultural conventions on February 22 and 29 set the climax of the crisis in the last week of February 1948. One week before the labor convention, Communist leaders concentrated on revolutionizing the mind of the labor rank and file. Slogans defending the rights of labor against an imaginary foe—domestic and international reaction—were combined with a war cry denouncing parliamentary democracy as such. On Sunday, February 15, Antonin Zapotocky, the leader of the Central Labor Union, declared bluntly: "Away with the Parliament if it does not fulfill the program of the Labor Unions." The same day, another labor leader, Jungmann, said "If they [the democrats] do not like the slow road to socialism, we can take the quick one . . . the meeting next Sunday will decide which road to socialism we shall take." The tone of the Communist press left no doubt that the road to a complete collectivization of Czechoslovak economic life would be the quickest possible.

Meanwhile, the Communist Minister of Interior continued to carry out his police reform. On February 20, he refused outright to comply with the Government's decision which ordered him to suspend the nomination of eight new police inspectors, all Communists, in the district of Prague. The governmental decision was reached by a combination of the votes of all parties except the Communist Party. This time, the Social Democratic Party joined forces with the democratic parties. The Communist Party found itself isolated. In the opinion of Benes

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and other democratic leaders, police reform was the only issue on which the Social Democrats would surely side with the non-Marxist parties. There was little assurance that they would support the non-Communists in opposing the Marxist claims to be put forward at the approaching labor convention. The police reform thus seemed the only issue on which free elections could be forced.

With President Benes' approval, a governmental crisis which should have been followed by elections developed on Friday, February 20, two days before the labor convention. Twelve ministers belonging to the National Socialist, People's, and Slovak Democratic parties handed their resignations to President Benes. The three Social Democratic ministers put their portfolios at the disposal of their party executive without resigning from the Government. They left the decision to the party leaders. Even at that dramatic moment they remained middle-of-the-roaders. What were the hopes of these twelve unsuccessful apostles of democracy? They knew that they would be desperately helpless if the Soviet Union—rightly or wrongly—decided that the international situation made it imperative to take Czechoslovakia completely into Communist hands. Then no matter what path was chosen, they argued, Czechoslovak democracy would die. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union did not consider it necessary to interfere, early free elections were the only chance to save the Government from Communist control. For such elections a governmental crisis because of a dispute concerning civil rights in connection with the police reform seemed a better issue to base elections on than further nationalization and other labor issues which were to be raised by the conventions two days later.

This democratic faith in constitutional methods—the formal resignation of the government, free elections, and a new government—were in sharp contrast to the organized, extra-parliamentary, and anti-constitutional display of Communist strength.

Communist infiltration of labor, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Information proved to be of decisive value for the execution of the coup. As soon as the machinery of the

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coup was set in motion, it was the duty of the labor unions, which had already played an important part in preparing the revolutionary atmosphere, to create the impression that former ruling groups were absolutely helpless. This was achieved by three methods. First, workers' militia were rapidly formed; weapons, taken from the secret "depots d'armes" or from the reserves of the nationalized armament industry, were distributed. The appearance of men and women in plain clothes with rifles or submachine guns on their shoulders in Prague and other cities created an impression of lawlessness and made the population feel helpless. Second, workers were rapidly mobilized for various different public meetings and parades through the streets of Prague. These were supposed to add to the impression that an armed and organized mass cannot be defeated by a handful of democratic leaders, arguing over constitutional issues with an old, sick and hard-pressed president at their head. Finally, a one-hour general strike was called on the fourth day of the crisis, chiefly as a means of intimidation. It was to show that the courage and organization of labor could frustrate any retaliation from the democrats, should they decide to hit back. Although imposed on the workers with threats and actual force by Communist agitators, the strike was a success—especially since the democratic leaders did not dare to appeal to the workers themselves or to other mass organizations. The streets of Prague were thus well-nigh abandoned to the Communists, who were able to persuade the people that Prague had turned Communist overnight. Only the students dared to contest Communist mastery of the streets. Several thousand brave students tried to give courage to others by parading through the streets of Prague. Their readiness to fight for democracy by other than constitutional means proved them to be realists, keen political analysts, and heroes of Czech democracy.

The Ministry of Interior, which had already proved its value in the pre-putsch period, became with labor and Communist Party Headquarters one of the chief directing centers of the coup. The Minister of Interior ordered several police regiments to Prague. Before they reached the city, they had to take a new oath of allegiance to Prime Minister Gottwald.

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Their concentration in Prague increased the tension and made it obvious that the police, the most important arm of civil power, had become an illegal force on the side of the Communists. On Sunday, February 22, the labor meetings were broadcast and filled the air with revolutionary slogans, threats, and announcement of the general strike for Tuesday. A few hours later the police started the first wave of illegal arrests. No ministers or members of Parliament were arrested. Like the general strike, this first wave of arrests was to serve mainly as intimidation and proof of the Communists' limitless power.

In a country with a modern, democratic administration the actual engineers of a Communist coup are chiefly the "Action Committees." To a certain extent these correspond to the workers' and soldiers' councils of the Soviet revolution. They are formed secretly and have their tasks assigned long before the putsch. They are made up of trained Communists whose main duty in the preparatory period is to acquaint themselves with the machinery of the office, organization, or ministry which they are supposed to take over at a given signal. They must work there in whatever position they can obtain, as doorman, cleaner, typist, clerk, or something higher.

Their unmasking would usually take the following form: at a given moment a group of ten or fifteen men and women, armed with weapons or accompanied by workers' militia, would make their way to the office of a director, minister, or head of a department, order him out, take over the command and start an immediate purge of lower positions, pending further instructions from the Central Action Committee.

The Action Committees quickly replaced the duly elected or nominated direction of every administrative organization in Czechoslovakia. There were Action Committees in the National Opera House which started the purge among the singers, actors, and orchestra; there were Action Committees in every ministry, in the Central Office of the Fire Brigades, in the Conservatory of Music, in the Association of Writers and Journalists, and in Parliament, in hospitals, in the National Committees, in the cooperatives, in the publishing houses—everywhere. To the original members of the Action Commit-

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ees were added later many fellow travelers who hoped for a quick revolutionary career.

The Central Action Committee replaced the National Front, which had been the coalition of the five important political parties in Czechoslovakia. On the surface, the new "regenerated" National Front resembled its predecessor. Besides the Communists, there were a few Social Democrats, National Socialists, and Christian Democrats. The difference was that these non-Communist representatives were no longer chosen by the executive bodies of their parties, but by the Secretary-General of the Communist Party. He assumed the power of designating who, according to Communist standards, was a good National Socialist or Christian Democrat. The Communist choice, of course, fell on some who had formerly been excluded from their parties because of their too obvious "fellow travelership."

Action Committees were also formed within the non-Communist parties. They began a thorough purge by excluding from membership all former leaders, most members of Parliament, and above all, ministers who had resigned from the Government. For instance, the People's Party central organ, *Lidova Demokracie,* purged on February 25, announced on March 23: "The presidium of the Action Committee of the People's Party announces that it has excluded from the party the *chairman* of the party, Msgr. Dr. Jan Sramek, because of his attempt to leave the country secretly. For their former activities the following members of Parliament are excluded. . . ."

On the second day of the crisis the Action Committees of the nationalized paper mills announced that they would not deliver newsprint to newspapers which had not been approved by the Central Action Committee. The Action Committee of the railroads issued an order to stop delivery of papers which did not adhere to the program of the regenerated National Front. And three days later the Action Committees within the non-Communist parties took over all non-Communist newspapers with the help of the police and workers' militia. On the following days those papers appeared again without any noticeable change on the surface. But their contents were *ganz gleichgeschaltet.*

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The purge in the factories, directed by the Action Committees against the "enemies of the people," began so thoroughly that the leader of the Central Labor Union, Zapotocky, had to broadcast a warning against wholesale expulsion of skilled labor and engineers, usually non-Communists, as it was becoming a serious threat to production.

The effectiveness of the Action Committees again raises the question: What defense can a democratic government devise against such a thorough and secret undermining of its administration?

The Ministry of Information, and especially its broadcasting system, was another means of spreading the feeling of democratic helplessness and Communist power. Although the Ministry of Information ranked second or third as a key post during the infiltration period, for the putsch itself it was a first-rate strategic position. Thus, in a country where the Communists had not succeeded in getting control of the broadcasting system and other means of information, they would have to seize those means by force in the first hours of the upheaval. Immediately after the resignation of the twelve ministers, the broadcasting system became a channel for the Communist interpretation of events only. It was used to call public meetings, to issue orders, and especially to appeal for formation of Action Committees wherever they had not been formed in secret beforehand. The combined efforts of the Central Labor Union, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Information resulted in what might be called a *mobilization of the streets.*

The failure of the democrats to react strongly to the Communists' impressive display of power was certainly very important in Benes' decision to cede to the terror of the streets. His age, ill health, and pathetic faith in democratic methods of compromise were also instrumental in his acceptance of the new Communist regime.[8]

[8] A segment of the conversation between Benes and Gottwald on May 4, 1948 follows:
GOTTWALD: The President believes that the will of the people as expressed in the draft of the new Constitution could be transformed into a rule of the mob in the streets. I cannot find that in the Constitution . . . the people of course have the right to have their meetings and gatherings. This cannot be forbidden.
BENES: I have already faced the mob in the streets once. This is an argument for me. I do not want to be faced with street-rule for the second time. . . . I felt it as a humiliation for the President of the Republic and therefore I cannot forget it.

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There were also reports that Gottwald and the Minister of nterior presented Benes with a list of his political and per-onal friends whose safety could not be guaranteed if the 'resident made the impatient people of Prague wait any onger. These reports are not confirmed, nor is there reliable)roof that Gottwald assured Benes that Parliament could be .o well purged or terrorized by the time the Communists llowed it to meet as to ensure a vote of confidence for the iew Government.[9]

Whatever extra pressure was brought upon Dr. Benes, even he official communiqué issued by the Communist Ministry)f Information did not try to hide Benes' statement about his reluctant attitude to the new government: "It was not an easy decision for me to make; indeed it was very difficult for me. I have given long and earnest thought to the crisis and have come to the conclusion that your [that is, the Communist] proposal should be accepted."

This happened on February 25. The end of Czechoslovak democracy was certainly a depressing shock for the Western world. For the Eastern world and Communism in general, it had an encouraging effect. Since February 1948, not only Czech Communists but others too have never failed to underline the international significance of the "Czechoslovak February." At the parliamentary session commemorating the first anniversary of the coup, on February 22, 1949, Speaker of the House Oldrich John stressed this point:

> . . . a year ago the February events had just culminated . . . it was not a decision for a limited period of time, but forever; it was not a decision concerning only our country, but the *whole world*. At a decisive moment and at a decisive key-position in Europe we achieved a *critical shift* of the forces of the world. . . . The significance of February must be estimated against the background of the courageous fight of the Greek patriots and the liberating movements of the working class in *France and Italy,* in all of Europe, in the whole world. Our February has had an importance for other countries, too. It belongs therefore to the *working class of the whole world* which is expecting its February. *It will have it.*

9 On March 10—the day of Jan Masaryk's mysterious death—the Parliament met for the first time after the coup and gave the new Communist Government a vote of confidence by 230 votes out of 300.

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V

One of the most important means of making the democrats feel helpless and the Communists powerful was the sudden arrival of a high Soviet official, in Czechoslovakia or in other Eastern countries.

The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, V. A. Zorin arrived in Prague on February 19, a day before the democratic leaders made their decision to resign from the Government. The official reason for his unexpected visit was the Soviet Government's desire to supervise deliveries of Russian wheat to Czechoslovakia—a rather unusual job for a deputy foreign minister. Zorin remained in Prague exactly one week. The coup also lasted exactly one week. On the day that Minister of Justice Drtina tried to commit suicide by leaping out of a window, Zorin took a plane to Moscow.

The presence of a high Soviet official was of utmost importance for the Communists' execution of the coup: it gave them self-confidence; it helped create the impression that behind every illegal action of Communist Headquarters stood the powerful Soviet neighbor, her armies, her MVD, and her concentration camps; and it helped increase the democratic majority's feeling of international isolation. Zorin's presence gave visible confirmation to the Radio-Moscow, *Pravda,* and *Izvestia* line that "200 million Russians support the Communist fight against domestic and international reaction." It caused anxiety that Soviet armed intervention might occur either through an invasion by the Red Army or dispatch of International Partisan Brigades from Russia. This fear had a strong effect on Benes and his advisers, no matter what the Soviet's real intentions were. Although it might be difficult to trace Zorin's direct intervention in the *technicalities* of the coup, his sudden arrival represented a very important, psychological intervention in the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia. As Gottwald puts it in his analysis of the coup, "In 1918 the Soviet Union could not have given us *visible* support."[10]

[10] Speech of November 17.

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In contradiction to the publicity for domestic consumption about Zorin's presence, the Soviet and Czechoslovak propaganda abroad made feverish attempts to present the February coup as a mere change of government and not of the regime. When, for instance, immediately after the coup the new Communist Minister of Foreign Trade Antonin Gregor stated in Prague, "We must thank our Slav Allies and mainly the Soviet Union for the fact that we succeeded in defeating reaction," the official Czechoslovak Press Agency was ordered to issue a corrected version from which this passage was deleted.

This insistence on the *domestic* character of the Czech coup of 1948 sounds rather deviationist today when Tito and his followers are assured from Moscow that "no country can build socialism without the Soviet Union" and that it is a Titoist deviation to "overrate one's own strength in developing socialism."

According to a report which for security reasons cannot yet be revealed, the Soviet decision to push Czechoslovakia vigorously into line seems to have coincided with the Soviet fear that a showdown with the West was in 1948 more imminent than it really was. The insistence of the Soviets on the domestic character of the Czech coup would then appear as consistent with their apparent wish not to increase Western suspicion and irritation any further. Also the Politburo probably did not wish to suffer a diplomatic defeat at the Security Council where, in April-June 1948, Chile had accused the U.S.S.R. of interference in the internal affairs of a member of the United Nations.

VI

When Democracy confronts Communism on both national and international levels, four misjudgments usually give the advantage to the latter.

First, the sheer weight of the continental presence of Soviet power is often underestimated. The European mind was corrupted or frightened by the presence of the Red Army in areas east of Berlin in 1945—and the sweep of Soviet communism to the Oder, Bavaria, Vienna, and Trieste between 1944-1948—rather than seduced by the slogans of Marxism-Leni-

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nism. It is often overlooked that in no European country was the Communist Party able to gain a majority in free elections. Despite the prestige which Russia gained by her impressive victories over the German oppressor and despite the threatening presence of Soviet power, communism was still the religion of a minority. Even after the coup in Czechoslovakia the Communist Party did not dare face free elections but introduced the usual *Ja-oder-Nein* single ticket ballot. Before February 1948, the Communist rank and file were forbidden to attend other political meetings than their own, so great was the fear of contamination by democracy and nationalism.

It was therefore Soviet power on the one hand and the lack of an active Western policy and of cohesion among Western European nations on the other that were mainly responsible for the self-assurance of the Communist minority and for the feeling of helpless isolation on the democratic side. The sharp contrast between the active influence of the East and the hesitant policy of the West in Europe was not only the background but the chief cause of Communist success in Czechoslovakia, of the number of opportunist fellow travelers, and of the democratic defeats. The checkmating of Soviet power thus seems the first condition of an awakening of democratic courage and resistance in Europe.

Second, the democrats usually make the mistake of considering the Communist Party as just another political party, though more turbulent, disagreeable, and ambitious than others. But the Communist Party is not just another party; it is a political structure *sui generis*—a revolutionary, para-military, espionage organization. It developed its revolutionary and conspiratory methods in an underground fight against the Czarist police and uses them now in a fight which is not being waged within democracy but against it. It operates on the basis of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which is interpreted and applied to concrete situations by the Soviet Government only. When confronted with the Communist organization the democrats, prisoners of their own misconceptions and ideals, think in terms of the usual democratic means of political competition, such as free speech, open diplomacy, free elections, fair play, and tolerance. But the Communists think and plan their strat-

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egy in military terms or in terms of illegal methods, such as corruption, spying, storm troopers, Action Committees, and other weapons of modern revolution. On the democratic side there always seems to be great hesitation in viewing the fight between democracy and communism as the Communists do—realistically. The Communists rightly see it as a life-or-death struggle.

Third, it is just as dangerous to underestimate the political *theory* of the totalitarian adversaries of democracy. Although Leninism-Stalinism is limited in its appeal, the fact remains that the revolutionary theory has always been the guiding principle of any practical activity of communism. It would be as wrong to overlook Lenin's and Stalin's political theory[11] in 1948 as it was to forget the Nazi pattern for world domination in 1938. The democrats in Czechoslovakia had to learn the hard way about the difference between the Communist's never-changing final aims and their temporary, tactical line of nationalism, as expressed in the short-lived slogan of "a different path to socialism in each country." Almost everywhere in Europe the failure to distinguish between the tactics of the day and the Communist theory which remains the basis of long-run policy produced in 1945 cooperation with the Communists or coalition governments in which the Communist parties took part. The example of Czechoslovakia demonstrates especially the dangers of such a path. A coalition is one of the Communists' best springboards to seizure of power. With Soviet power in the background, the hope for democratic and nationalistic contamination of local Communist parties is unrealistic.

Finally, it is true that opportunism and fear creates great numbers of fellow travelers on whom the Communist minority must partially rely for persuasion or confusion of large portions of the population. But it is precisely the neutral, passive, or undecided millions, along with the confused socialists and

11 *In Foundations of Leninism,* Stalin himself bids us not to forget Lenin's theory: "We cannot forget the saying of Lenin's to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries *which is inevitable* but which may be delayed until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe" and that in the meantime "the basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in *admitting* the coexistence of two opposed systems." —Translated by Historicus, "Stalin on Revolution," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1949), p. 207.

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true idealists, which are susceptible to a democratic counter-offense. Not without an effective display of power but *not with power only* can a counteroffensive be successfully waged. It is up to the Western world to develop a courageous political and economic program, a daring program of social reform. This should not be confused with the often advocated use of Socialist parties in the fight against communism. To support daring and modern social reforms does not necessarily mean to support the aging Socialist parties and leaders in Europe. But it must be borne in mind that Communist seduction operates at its best when the obvious social injustice or lack of respect for basic human rights is met by a negative or faltering attitude.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FRENCH ARMY SINCE THE LIBERATION

By EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR.

IN a recent article in *Le Monde,* a military writer remarked that "A country has the army it merits."[1] The expression is an old one. For a hundred years at least, French politicians and French military personnel have been quoting one another to the effect that the army is but the reflection of the state. But in a democracy, the strength of an army is not so much a question of merit as one of desire, desire as expressed by the people through the votes of their representatives. Certainly, it has little or nothing to do with international necessity.

In France, as in other democracies, the military problem is basically political. What is important is not so much what the generals think should be done as what the politicians think they should do. But for a French *parlement* to come to a decision on a military question is far more difficult than in other countries, for in France all such problems are so deeply enmeshed in the conflicting traditions and principles of party struggle that they are almost impossible of solution.

In France since the double defeat of 1870—the defeat of the professional army of Louis Napoleon at Sedan, and that of the republican levies of Gambetta and De Freycinet in the months that followed—there has been no meeting of minds on any military subject. It is against this background and after another equally unexpected and even more disastrous defeat that the present generation of politicians, harassed by an inner sense of the futility of all military preparation, has faced the frustrating task of creating an army for a Fourth Republic.

Shortly after the war, André Malraux, then President de Gaulle's Minister of Information, quoted a Gallup poll to the effect that only 70 per cent of the citizens still wanted an army and these wanted it only "because of tradition and a

[1] *Le Monde,* Feb. 11, 1950.

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love of swagger."[2] Indeed, in 1945, the people in general seemed to feel that there was no other reason for an army. De Gaulle himself was working toward a large force of nineteen divisions[3] on the plea that these were necessary for the protection of the colonies, the occupation of Germany, and the contingent which France would send to the United Nations. But to the politicians this plan seemed nothing short of ridiculous. Reflecting the attitude of their constituents, they were primarily interested in cutting military appropriations.

In September 1945, the distinguished columnist Rémy Roure posed what many felt to be the central problem which the French had to face as to the future of their army: "Shall the army of the future be a professional army, small in number, powerful by virtue of its matériel, continually on the alert? . . . Or shall it be a large army with imposing reinforcements, but of lesser technical quality?"[4] He was restating the classic question. However, in 1945, such a question was one for the theorists, not for the politicians. The question of the moment was much more basic. It was simply this: Should the army be allowed to stay the size it was, or should it be made smaller? The question was raised by a Socialist, Jean Capdeville, in an amendment demanding a flat 20 per cent cut in army expenditures; it threw the military question into the political limelight because De Gaulle, in a stormy appearance late New Year's Eve 1945, made it an issue by demanding that it be made a matter of confidence.

[2] Quoted in *Journal Officiel, Débats, Assemblée nationale constituante,* Dec. 31, 1945, p. 704. (Hereinafter cited as *J. O., Déb., Ass. nat. const.,* and after 1945 as *J. O., Déb., Ass. nat.)*

[3] This was in accordance with the plan developed in May and adopted in June, 1945 by the National Defense Committee. For details see *Revue de Défense nationale,* January-June, 1946, p. 249. In 1946 there developed another stronger argument for an army: military writers and others emphasized that the industrial potential of Germany was greater than had been thought. See, for example, Louis F. Aubert, *Sécurité de l'occident—Ruhr, Rhin,* Paris, 1946; L. E. Magnin, "Aspects présents du problème militaire français," *Les Cahiers politiques,* May 1946; Edmond Delage, article in *Le Monde,* March 20, 1946, in which he takes for granted the necessity for an army. There was also, undoubtedly, a considerable body of opinion in France which felt that an army was "necessary to the general spiritual, moral, and material equilibrium of a nation." For a restatement of this long-prevalent belief, see Gen. Edgard de Larminat, *L'Armée dans la nation,* Paris, 1944, p. 1.

[4] Rémy Roure, *The French Army of Tomorrow,* Doc Série II, No. 2785E, The French Press and Information Service, Sept. 12, 1945.

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The debate touched off by this Capdeville amendment is important because it gave the parties a chance to read into the record not only what they thought about the issue at hand, but also, as is usually the case with political debates, everything they thought about the subject in general, or, more specifically, what they thought about the relationship between welfare and warfare, what they wished to spend on army matériel, and finally what sort of military structure they envisioned for the future.

Capdeville himself, with the immediate backing of André Philip speaking for the Socialist party, and joined by Jacques Duclos and the Communists, laid the ground work for his amendment by undertaking a generalized attack on the whole fabric of the army.[5]

One might have expected that so shortly after the Liberation the army would have been above reproach. Such was decidedly not the case. The attack was vicious. The army, Capdeville said, was wasteful and inefficient, particularly so on the administrative level. There had been scandals in gas and food rationing, and there were recruits without training and volunteers for the Far East idling away their time with guard duty. It is interesting to note furthermore that just as the double defeat of 1870 set off the perpetual struggle over military affairs in the Third Republic, so the double victory of 1945—the victory of the Free French of the interior on the one hand and that of the more professional army of De Gaulle on the other—became the cause of extreme bitterness in the Fourth. Capdeville claimed, for example, that the Vichy elements had not been cleaned out of the army, and that the officers of De Gaulle and those who had come over from Vichy late in the war held jobs which should have gone to those (for the most part, members of the extreme Left) who had fought so valiantly within France herself. But more significant than the criticisms themselves was the fact that there was no one in the Assembly, as there always had been in the Chamber of the Third Republic, to gainsay

[5] *J. O., Déb., Ass. nat. const.,* Jan. 31, 1945, pp. 695 ff. See also J. Leferreux, "Naissance et vicissitudes de l'armée nouvelle", *Esprit,* July 1945, p. 187. For an interesting contrast from the point of view of the military, see Gen. de Lattre, "L'Armée française de transition," *La Revue Hommes et Mondes,* November 1946, pp. 1 ff.

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his accusations. From an unformed, uncertain, and unpopular Right there was silence.

Partly because of the great importance of political tradition in French party life, partly because politicians are, more than other men, creatures of habit, Capdeville and the Socialists followed as their main thesis the well-worn doctrine about which the party had said so much in the 1920's and '30's. Basically they held that welfare should precede warfare as a budgetary principle, or, to put the idea in its baldest terms, that only an economically sound state is worth defending. It was an easily tenable and popular position in 1945, for in 1945 there was no enemy.

Therefore the problem of re-equipping the army and more particularly the air force could be, and was, passed off lightly. The government was cautioned against refurbishing the armed forces with matériel which might soon become out of date. It was urged to study the problem; that cost no money. Moreover, both the Socialists and their Communist associates felt that their program of nationalization was already doing much to gear the country for war. The concept of the nation-in-arms set down in 1910 as Socialist gospel by Jaurès in his *La Nouvelle Armée* had been extended after the First World War to include the organization not only of the nation's man power, but also of her industrial power for total war. Hence, the steps which were being taken to nationalize the sources of the nation's economic strength were a fulfillment of the Socialist credo for war as for peace.

Relatively little was said during the debates as to the form and structure which the Socialists and Communists would undertake to establish in the army of the Fourth Republic. Their basic tenets on this subject had already been formulated in November when the program of the *Délégation des Gauches* had been drawn up. The Communists had had a good deal to say on the subject, and Pierre Villon, who was to be their very capable advocate on such matters, had already had his program approved by the National Council of Resistance.[6]

[6] Reprinted in full in Gen. Germain Jousse, *Considérations sur l'armée de demain,* Paris, 1946. This book is the best statement of what the Communists say they want the army to be. But see the speech of Thorez at the Party Rally at Ivry, Jan. 21-23, 1946, as reported in *L'Humanité,* and that of François Billoux at Issy-les-Moulineaux as reported in *L'Humanité,* April 26, 1946, just before he resigned his position as

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The Socialists seem to have just tagged along, both parties considering themselves to be the joint trustees of the legacy of traditional republicanism. The army was to be democratic and hence popular, national and hence virtuous, conscripted and hence cheap. Indeed Villon, speaking in terms of an army which would enable France to hold her head high and also train the youth of the nation in civics and technology, sounds for all the world like Charles de Freycinet, Gambetta's military expert on the staff of *La République Française* in the early 1870's. World War II apparently had reaffirmed a popular front. Apparently too it had brought no change in the stream of left-wing military thought.

The third great party of the Liberation, the M.R.P. (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*), also unfurled its military ideology in the course of the debates. This likewise proved to be nothing more than the refurbished glad rags of traditional republicanism. Party members demanded short-term obligatory service (the actual length of time involved was left conveniently vague), the abolition of what still passes, for purposes of political propaganda, as an officer caste, and premilitary training. "Thus," explained one of them, "will the praetorian army which we do not want, and the militia which risks compromising the nation by its lack of technical training and the slowness with which it enters combat be avoided."[7] Their thought was traditional, and, in the light of World War II, banal.

What is more immediately interesting is that, despite their tie with De Gaulle at that time, they were careful to explain that they did not in principle oppose military budget cuts.[8]

But despite the complacency of the broad phalanx of the Left, a complacency which held sway over the three great parties of the Liberation, and the silence of the Right in 1945, there were certain problems as yet unheeded which were soon to be begging solutions, solutions which have not as yet been forthcoming. Unlike the three years following the French

Minister of National Defense.

[7] Pierre de Chévigné, *J. O., Déb., Ass. nat const.*, Jan. 31, 1945, p. 699.

[8] In addition to the debate cited above, see the party platform as quoted in André Siegfried, ed., *L'Année politique 1944-1945*, Paris, 1946, p. 383.

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defeat in 1870 which saw the passing of the laws reorganizing the army from top to bottom, and rebuilding it on a new, albeit none too solid, basis, five years of the Fourth Republic have accomplished nothing in this direction. Projects have been submitted, but the pressure of events and political strife have prevented any of them from reaching the floor of the Assembly.

Between 1945 and 1950 the whole tissue of military thought was submitted to the test of new social, economic and diplomatic strains.

That the French should reconsider the question of military security in the light of the constantly growing tension of United States–Russian relations is not surprising. But there were two specifically French problems, outgrowths of the greater international one, that brought the military problem if not into clearer focus at least into greater prominence in French political thought: one was the slowly burning war in Indo-China, and the other, less remarked upon but quite as dramatic an issue, the army as an element in the class struggle within France herself. What had saved the honor of the army in 1871 was its campaign—and it was considered as such—against the revolutionary Commune. In that the army had saved society then, society accorded it its support. Likewise today, the part played by the army in restoring order, or at least in attempting to do so, in the colonies and in France herself during the strikes of 1947 and the fall of 1948, gave it a body of defenders in the policy-making group. In short, the army found its backers when France found an enemy.

Of course it follows that when the army acts as the savior of one class, it becomes the enemy of another. As the breach between the classes widened in the years since the war, and a clear-cut Right, Center, and Left developed, the army became, as all Frenchmen were well aware, a bone of contention between them. Hence the political position of the army became at once more secure or more precarious depending on the predominant color scheme in the political spectrum.

Although the necessity for an army seemed to become more serious with each passing day, certain latent difficulties, embarrassing contradictions, and disturbing quandaries continued a passive drag on politico-military thought and effective ac-

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ion. Mutual distrust between political parties, between the army and the politicians, and, on the international level, between France and the other members of the Atlantic Pact is the key to the problem of French military security today.

Discord was caused primarily by the new positions assumed by the parties in 1947. In April, De Gaulle with the newly formed R.P.F. (*Rassemblement du Peuple Français*) became a threat on the Right. In May, the Communists resigned from the government and became its avowed enemies.[9]

Prior to that time the Communists had participated in the government as Ministers of Defense, Armaments, and the Air Force. Indeed when Ramadier had been questioned as to the advisability of harboring them within the body of the government, he had replied with the rhetorical question which has been bothering all Frenchmen ever since. "If we leave an important group of the people outside the body of the National Defense," he asked, "who then can say that we are assuring the defense of the country?"[10]

When the Communists ceased to be working partners within the government, they became enemies with a vengeance. And, unfortunately, such is the heritage of Talleyrand that they could continue to pose as patriotic in matters of national defense at the same moment that they were doing everything within their power to make that defense impossible. Their position was made clear in the course of military credit debates in the summer of 1948. They argued that the army had become the tool of French imperialism in Indo-China and the defender of French capitalism at home. They argued that it wasted the national wealth on expendable war matériel, and that it wasted precious lives that could be used to better advantage on production. On the international level the party claimed that the army had forsaken its national indentity in the Brussels Pact of April 1948 as it was later to maintain that the army had lost its independence with respect to armament in the arms standardization agreements under the Atlantic Pact.[11]

[9] There is still a considerable number led by Pierre Villon on the large, unwieldy Commission of National Defense of the Assembly.

[10] *J. O., Déb., Ass. nat.*, Jan. 28, 1947, p. 50.

[11] See, for example, the speech of Pierre Girardot, *J. O., Déb., Ass. nat.*, (2e séance, Aug. 6, 1948).

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Nor was the Communist attack left on the theoretical plane. Beginning in the squad room, as had the old revolutionary Auguste Blanqui in the 1880's, the Communists introduced literature which the army banned as "subversive to discipline."[12] They carried on by organizing mass meetings of the "Mothers" of those being "murdered" in Indo-China. And recently, of course, they have tried strikes against matérie being sent to Indo-China and being sent to France from America. In the Assembly, by introducing a continuous flow of amendments, they have made every discussion of military budgets virtually incomprehensible. Although the material damage has been slight, there is no doubt that psychologically the Communists have undermined the faith of the French in the possibility of ever solving their problem of military security. The experience of the last war has created in the French an acute awareness of the destructive potential of the fifth column.

Furthermore, it should be noted as an important parenthesis that extreme left-wing parties, such as the Unitary Socialist Party, which deny the tie of the Communists to Moscow, nonetheless follow the Communist line in military matters.[13]

If the actions of the Communists were a deterrent to positive legislation in the long run, their immediate effect was to spur other political groups to prepare legislation, if for no other reason than to prove to their constituents that they were not being remiss in matters of national interest.

When the Socialists and the M.R.P. got down to brass tacks, however, they found that there was a greater difference in their military ideologies than one would have supposed from what they had to say on the subject just after the war. Basically they were divided on the question of the length of service which should be required under a system of universal military training. The Socialists wanted such service to be limited to one year; the Popular Republicans demanded eighteen months. Only one who has made a study of the history of military

[12] The *Revue militaire d'information* usually carries a notation of the literature banned.

[13] Del Vayo, "Can the Left Make a Come-Back?" *Nation*, Jan. 21, 1950.

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legislation in France can have any concept of the importance of such a difference!

In the bill which they proposed in June 1948 the Socialists argued in favor of one-year service on the grounds that "after the last war no one will contest that the prerequisite of military power is its capacity for mass production" and hence military service limited to one year is necessary so as not to hinder the country's economic recovery.[14] Paul Coste-Floret, an M.R.P. spokesman on military affairs, at the time Minister of War, was no less dogmatic when he told the Superior Council of War in July 1947 that only with 240,000 men on eighteen-month service could France carry out what she would be called upon to do.[15] There was considerable friction between the parties on the subject during March 1948, friction which developed into a momentary threat to the Third Force. If ever a legislative bill for army reorganization reaches the floor of the Assembly this basic point of disagreement will emerge in an intensified form.

To date, the conservative Radical-Socialists have supported the M.R.P. proposals on army matters. The R.P.F. has kept aloof. De Gaulle, aside from an occasional remark as to the necessity for a strong army, has suggested no panacea for army reform. Should he ever return to office, he would presumably demand the same kind and the same size army that he advocated at the time of his resignation in January 1946. It goes without saying that his followers see no possibility for an adequate army without him.

Actually there is much support of De Gaulle's ideas among men of all parties except the Communist. There would be more outspoken support if it were not that his ideas are inevitably associated with him as a politician, and that such is the power of words, and such the traditional stigma attached to the very idea of a professional army that few politicians care to back the program of the author of *Toward a Professional Army*. But both De Gaulle's *Vers l'armée de métier* and Paul Rey-

[14] *Documents parlementaires, Assemblée nationale* (hereinafter referred to as *Docs. parls., Ass. nat.*), Session of 1948, Annexe no. 4377, June 1, p. 1083. In a series of excellent articles, "Les Socialistes et la Défense nationale," *Le Populaire*, Mar. 19-26, 1948, Pierre Métayer argued the Socialist position on the army.

[15] *Informations militaires*, July 1, 1947, p. 3.

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naud's *Le Problème militaire en France* (a book which shares many of the General's ideas) have been republished since the war, and have been read widely.[16] Since the war there has been a tacit agreement among the ministers that the ideas of both men be incorporated into any plan for the reorganization of the army. Both thought in terms of a small professional group of highly trained men ready to strike in case of emergency within or without. Furthermore, in suggesting short-term military training for all citizens, the latter, at least, paid lip service to republican ideology which holds that obligatory service, like primary education, is the *sine qua non* of a virtuous and well-integrated democratic society.

Since the war there has, therefore, been considerable discussion of so-called "corps d'intervention," or "task forces," usually thought of in connection with airborne troops, which would be used as a mobile striking force in case of war, and which would, in addition, provide the kind of defense in depth for which an air war would call. The army organization bill, presented by the government late in 1947, although it was criticized by Georges Marey in *Le Monde* as a compromise,[17] called for such task forces in addition to regional forces for instruction and the protection of given areas.[18] But it is one for the crystal ball to predict how much support such ideas would get from the Assembly were the project ever to come up for discussion. Party tradition aside, there is much fluidity of thought on the part of individuals within the parties. One Socialist, R. A. Guesdon, reporter for the finance committee, remarked recently that "one should not consider the professional army lightly and with prejudice." He went on to add that a mass army risks becoming "a colossus with feet of clay" whose collapse would be mathematically certain. It is therefore a fact that the bulk of the army and many of those in political circles agree that "If the country can not keep a Goliath as guardian, she must give her defender the sinewy

[16] Charles de Gaulle, *Vers l'armée de métier*, 2d ed., Paris, 1944; Paul Reynaud, *Le Problème militaire en France*, Paris, 1945. The influence of these two books may be seen in Gen. E. de Larminat, *op. cit.*, and Albert Vallet, *Le Problème militaire de la IVe République*, Lyon, 1947.

[17] *Le Monde*, Jan. 2, 1948.

[18] *Docs. parls., Ass. nat.* (Session de 1947, Annexe no. 2922, 2e séance, Dec. 18).

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strength of a David."[19] But that in turn implies money to be spent for armaments, a step which no party wants to be the first to implement because of the cost involved.

On the question of armaments, all the parties of the Center are in the painful position of being either knowingly and willfully unprepared or of spending sums which they know France cannot afford. The position of the Socialists is the most difficult of all, and has been since their split with the Communists in 1947. They are divided within themselves on the problem of the war in Indo-China. They consider themselves a working-class party, and yet it is their Minister of the Interior who sent troops against the miners in 1947 and in 1948 (although he did so to protect national property), and who did such a distinguished job of purging and reorganizing the forces of law and order.[20] In theory they demand that the economic welfare of the nation come before military preparedness and yet as a party they understand the Communist threat in Europe better than any other party, and therefore see with painful clarity the necessity for rearmament. When, as in the summer of 1948, one of them makes a budget cut a matter of principle, the rest follow along even when, as in the case of the Schuman Ministry, it means the overthrow of the government. But one cannot help feeling that they would prefer such issues never to be brought up. Inevitably their equivocal position has lost them much support.

In a similar position on the other side are the Radical Socialists and other conservative groups of the coalition of the Center. As a party the Radicals are proud of their tradition of "always having voted the military credits, before the war, during the war, and after the war,"[21] but at the same time representing, as they do, those who are hardest hit by taxes, they have not taken it upon themselves to propose any systematic rearmaments program. They have contented themselves, salved

[19] Jean Planchais in *Le Monde,* March 2, 1949.

[20] For a summary of these reforms see André Géraud, "Insurrection Fades in France," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (October 1949).

[21] Henri Queuille, *J. O. Déb., Ass. nat.* (2e séance, Aug. 6, 1948), p. 4849. Gen. Revers, in a bitter New Year's message in 1949, commented that despite "the absurd allegations of the press" the military budget, instead of increasing, had actually decreased since the war.—*Revue militaire d'information,* Jan. 1, 1949, p. 5.

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their consciences, and saved their pocketbooks by the happy expedient of criticizing expenditures made by others: the expenses of nationalized industry and of an oversized bureaucracy—money which they maintain could and should be used for defense. The M.R.P., perhaps because they are not just sure as to who their constitutents are, vote what they feel they must to keep the Center hobbling along, and let it go at that.

The problem of increasing the air force provides a good example of party attitudes towards rearmament. All parties, including that of the Communists, have declared that the percentage of the military budget allotted to the air force was and is too small. Despite the fact that, historically speaking, the French politician, like the French general, has spent more time discussing the problem of the soul and spirit than that of science and matériel, the war convinced all alike of the absolute necessity for a strong air arm. Yet nothing concrete has as yet been done to provide one. Noting the slow and steady weakening of the army of the air, the reporter for the air arm said in 1948: "If we continue along the road upon which we are at present, we should not be surprised to have, at the end of 1948, an army of some 700,000 rifles and only a rare airplane."[22] The problem was given a thorough airing in the Assembly during the summer of 1949. All parties joined in a general attack on this branch of the service, a branch in which apparently there is much to criticize in the way in which funds are administered, and so forth. The Assembly finally decided not to grant money for experiments with prototypes or construction of planes in series until a five-year plan was submitted. This plan was to be submitted by the Air Ministry prior to September 15 on pain of being denied appropriations. Despite the fact that the deadline was missed, appropriations were voted. The plan itself was not submitted until early in 1950.[23] It still remains to be seen whether or not any party will actually take the initiative in endorsing it, calling, as it does, for 1,100 fighting planes, including 850 jets, 1,200 transport planes, and all the necessary installations needed to maintain

[22] *Docs. parls., Ass. nat.,* (Session de 1948, Annexe no. 4719, 2e séance, June 25.). The quotation is from the interesting introduction to the air section of the budget.

[23] "Problèmes de l'aviation de transport française," *Le Monde,* Feb. 23, 1950.

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them.[24] American arms provide only a temporary answer to a question which has so far been systematically evaded rather than squarely faced. All parties are willing to criticize, but there is none which will take the lead in backing even the most necessary and most basic rearmament program.

Furthermore, the plan was submitted at the worst possible moment—at a time when a new budget had really shocked the Assembly, when prices seemed more out of line with incomes than they had been for several years, when scandal was enlarging the wide gap which has always tended to separate the politicians from the army, when the Communists were particularly active in their campaign against the long awaited American arms, when the colonies were voicing discontent more loudly than ever, and when the news of the hydrogen bomb seemed to preclude the necessity for any rearmament at all. Despite the final advent of concrete aid from across the Atlantic, hope for military security in the future seemed more remote than ever as the year 1950 began. Discord was rampant on all levels.

The scandal which shocked France was that involving the Chief-of-Staff, General Revers, and his colleague General Mast. Suspected of having released state secrets concerning Indo-China, the generals have confirmed the politicians in a distrust of army officers which has been chronic among them since the Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs and which was reanimated more recently by the 4,000-odd officers who took their revenge on the Republic by following Marshal Pétain. Furthermore, the scandal has favored the growth of the belief which lies at the root of all contemporary French military thought: that perhaps national defense is, after all, impractical, possibly even illogical, in present-day France.

Distrust among the politicians themselves and fear of fifth-column activity has likewise been a deterrent to the needed

[24] Since this article was written, the voting of the military budget for the year 1950 has come before the National Assembly, and the air force has again come out on the short end. Six and a half billions more than in 1949 have been allotted to it, but whether, in view of higher maintenance costs and higher prices in general, this represents a real increase is debatable. At any rate, Jean Moreau, reporter for the Commission of Finances on the air force budget, feels that this sum is totally inadequate for any true remaking of the French air force. *Le Monde,* May 11, 1950.

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military legislation. For example, fear of the R.P.F. on th one hand and of the Communists on the other is perhaps one o the several factors which has kept the Assembly from insistin upon any thoroughgoing unification of the services—unifica tion that, it is feared, might make it easier to take over th government in the event of a coup d'état.

Another cause for inaction is that in 1950 French colonie no longer appear the asset that they seemed at the time o the Liberation. At that time many in France believed tha the future of the country lay in the colonies both as a sourc of man power and from a strategic point of view But since then the French delegates from the depart ments across the sea have dampened the ardor of thos at home with vituperative demands that the traditional "ex ploitation" of the colonial soldier come to an end, that equality be established between the colonial officer and soldier and their comrades of Metropolitan France.[25]

Perhaps the final deterrent to effective action has been provided by the United States' decision to proceed with the building of the hydrogen bomb. French scientists have taken an even more dismal view than we of the possibility of defense against atomic warfare.[26] The United States' new decision seems to have confirmed a rational and gloomy nation in the belief that, when all is said and done, the United States is quite as likely to be the cause of the end of the world as the Soviet Union. "Over there," remarked *Le Monde* editorially, "they have always been tempted to sacrifice Europe in case of invasion."[27] Under the circumstances, it is not surprising

[25] See the bitter remarks made by M. Diori Hamani of the G.R.D.A. (*Groupe du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*), *J. O., Déb., Ass. Nat.,* June 10, 1949, p. 3281.

[26] See, for example, Théo Kahan and Claude Magnan, *L'énergie atomique et ses applications,* Paris, 1949, Chapter 12; and also Jean Thibaud, *Puissance de l'atom,* Paris, 1949.

[27] *Le Monde,* Feb. 10, 1950. This is, of course, one of the points which the Communists have been making, particularly by quoting U. S. Representative Cannon. See Alfred Malleret-Joinville, *J. O., Déb., Ass. nat.* (2e séance, June 9, 1949), p. 3239. The same argument, but from a different tack, is that of J.-J. S. Schreiber, "La Paix americaine, est-elle possible?" (*Le Monde,* Feb. 19, 20, 1950), in which he maintains that Americans seem to be in the grip of the "Munich" psychology.

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that much of French opinion prefers some kind of neutrality.[28]

One might hope that the key to the solution of the problem of military security for France lies in the Brussels Agreement and the Atlantic Pact. Perhaps it does. But it should be remembered that France is extremely distrustful of international arrangements which envision the possibility of including a rearmed Germany and Spain in the Atlantic Community.[29]

Perhaps it is superfluous to add that the effect of political machination has disastrously lowered French army morale. Many of the army's technicians left the service shortly after the war for better-paying civilian jobs. In 1948 only one student from the Ecole Polytechnique went into the army for which that school purportedly prepares its men. General Billotte recently resigned from one of the country's highest military posts because he felt the situation of France to be so dangerous that he wanted to be free to warn his countrymen.[30] Perhaps most significant of all, the backbone of the army, the noncommissioned officer, is not re-enlisting, and those few who do so are being sent to Indo-China with the result, so it is claimed, that the recruit at home is receiving very insufficient instruction in the much-vaunted *camps légers*.[31] Despite the extension of social security to cover military personnel, the situation of those in all ranks of the army is not a happy one. Because of the unpopularity of the war in Indo-China they have not even the traditional soldier's reward—to be a hero!

In summary then, the French army is now, as it has always been since the double defeat of 1870, the center of a mass of distrust, a sort of point of concentration of conflicting political, economic and military theories which are so ingrained in the temper of the French politicians that they will not easily be

[28] American newspapers made much of this stand taken by conservative, semi-official *Le Monde* during the last few weeks of the month of February 1950. The question was opened in 1949 by the Academician Etienne Gilson. Now as then the rebuttal is being led by Ramond Aron of *Figaro*, but unfortunately Aron, despite the high esteem in which he is held, has a reputation of standing alone.

[29] For example, when signing an economic accord with Germany in November 1949, the French Assembly, and, more particularly, the Council of the Republic, reaffirmed its position that the Germans should not be admitted to the Atlantic Community.

[30] See his lettter of resignation in *Le Monde*, Feb. 9, 1950. He is at present working on a book, *Le Temps du choix*, parts of which have appeared in *Le Monde*.

[31] XXX, "*Un cri d'alarme; où va l'armée française?*" *Le Monde*, (Feb. 11, 13, 1950), two typically dismal articles.

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invalidated. The disillusionment of the war and the increased bitterness of party strife, resulting from the international situation on the one hand and the impoverished condition of the country on the other, have added fuel to a classic struggle.

An army being, in the last analysis, a spiritual phenomenon, an improvement in French morale would probably, as in the period after 1905, show itself in a willingness on the part of the majority to agree to military reform. This might come, as on the occasion of the bill of 1913, with the appearance of a strong leader, such as Poincaré. It might come simply as a reaction against present-day lethargy. It will not come without economic rehabilitation—as urgent a plea as any for the continuance of economic advice and aid from the United States. As for the form such military reorganization would take, a practical basis might be found in a combination of the ideas of General de Gaulle and the traditional Republican ones. If ever it were generally admitted that the General no longer presented a political threat, his military theories might gain the support political considerations deny them at the moment. But as the situation stands at present, the problem of French security is politically serious, and seems to increase the necessity of the United States continuing a heavy military commitment vis-à-vis western Europe.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

ASPECTS OF POLITBURO BEHAVIOR

By NATHAN LEITES

James Burnham, *The Coming Defeat of Communism,* New York, John Day, 1950, 278 pp., $3.50.

MR. BURNHAM'S view of the means and ends of the Politburo is much more insightful than many other interpretations that have been given. His major theses are (1) that the United States has very great freedom of action during the next few years because the Soviet leadership is unwilling to accept war and almost certain defeat at this time, and (2) that great opportunities exist at present for weakening the Soviet system by subversion and thus avoiding at a future date otherwise almost certain war. It is not these theses or the book as a whole which I propose to discuss but rather a number of points concerning Politburo behavior which he makes and with which I am not in agreement. These points of disagreement I believe to be both intellectually and politically important.

1. Mr. Burnham says that "Communism uses ideas and ideals as it uses drugs and guns and airplanes, as instruments" for the attainment of world power. While this is true, there is no reason to assume that the Politburo has entirely lost what one might call its religious belief in the eventual transformation of the destiny of man on earth. Stalinism has radically deepened the Leninist belief that the traditional values of socialism will be profoundly violated before they are ultimately realized. Also, it is likely that to some degree (somewhat in the way that the Grand Inquisitor, in Dostoyevsky's parable, abandoned belief in certain teachings of Christ) the Stalinist Politburo no longer believes it possible to realize some of the anarchist aspects of Lenin's utopia, as he described them in 1917 in *State and Revolution.* But we have little reason to assume that "cynicism" has replaced moral conviction—though,

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as is apt to happen within an established elite getting on in age, the need for a moral justification of day-to-day actions may be less frequently emphasized.

2. Throughout his book Mr. Burnham presents the Politburo as having an entirely offensive orientation toward the outside world. However, one could argue that the Politburo fears an attack aiming at its annihilation as much as it strives for the world-wide expansion of its power. Under the peculiar code of policy by which it operates, any action is apt to have both a defensive and an offensive orientation: conditions designed to prevent annihilation and those making for victory are considered to be largely the same.

3. Mr. Burnham states that the weight of the continuous communist offensive "is sustained by the political phase of the movement, not by the military." Again, one might argue that the opposite has been increasingly true. Events and statements drawn from the last three decades give evidence of this.

a) After the Red Army had repelled the Polish thrust into the Soviet Union in the summer of 1920, the Politburo had to decide whether to undertake an offensive into Poland for the dual purpose of seizing power there and of stimulating revolution in Germany, which was accessible to the Red Army. A minority of Moscow policy-makers warned that this course would fail because it would reinforce anti-Soviet attitudes in Poland. They advised that Moscow should rely on the "revolutionary situation" which Pilsudsky's defeat would create in an uninvaded Poland. However, the military course was chosen.

b) In January 1925, at a plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin said:

> I assume that the forces of the revolutionary movement in the West may one day [sic] lead to the defeat of the bourgeoisie somewhere [sic]. That is so. But it will be very difficult for them to keep in power. This is clearly shown by the examples of the border regions, for example, Esthonia and Latvia. The question of our army, of its power, of its preparedness, will then necessarily rise among us as the most decisive question.[1]

[1] *Collected Works,* Vol. VII, pp. 13-14.

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c) The few reliable reporters of conversations among the Moscow top group during the 'twenties and 'thirties concur in attributing to Stalin and his entourage a low estimate of the role that the Comintern, by itself, might play in expanding the communist area. According to Walter Krivitsky, Stalin said in 1927: "Who are these Comintern people? They are nothing but hirelings on our Soviet payroll. In ninety years they will never make a revolution anywhere."

According to Lominadze, who was close to Stalin in the late twenties, Stalin said: "The Comintern represents nothing. It exists only because of our support."[2] Deutscher adds: "The writer heard the foremost . . . leaders of the Comintern in the early twenties . . . attributing to Stalin remarks in substance identical with those quoted by Lominadze . . ."[3] He also says: 'One Soviet tractor is worth more than ten good foreign Communists' was a characteristic remark heard from highly placed Bolsheviks in the days of the first five-year plan. The phrase reflected . . . intimate talk . . . in Stalin's entourage."[4]

A point to be added here might be that the ineffectiveness of the German Communist Party, which was traditionally regarded as the second most important Communist Party in the world, in domestic politics and in weakening the German war effort against the Soviet Union, must have reinforced Politburo contempt for foreign Communist Parties. The fierce anti-German propaganda within the Soviet Union during the war was, of course, mainly related to the Politburo view of morale exigencies. But it probably also reflected intense disappointment with the German Party and proletariat.

d) Between 1917 and 1944 only one area outside of the Soviet Union was added to the Communist sector of the world, namely, whatever area in the interior of China had been held by the Communist Party of China since the late 'twenties. This unique success was due (as was the later conquest of China) to (1) the vastness, (2) the "backwardness," (3) the "semi-colonial" (rather than "colonial") status of China, and hence could not be repeated in most parts of the world.

[2] *Bulleten Oppozitsii*, No. 33, quoted by I. Deutscher in *Stalin*, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1949, p. 392.

[3] Deutscher, *Stalin*, p. 392, n. 2.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 405, n. 2.

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(e) During 1944-45, the Communist sector of the wor expanded into *all* those areas—but *only* those areas—which h been occupied for a time by the Soviet Army. It is likely th (except for China) the Politburo regards every inch of lan that has been added to its domain since 1944 as territory whe the Soviet Army had been, or still is, stationed, and that coul not have been added had this not been so.

By 1948, it seems to have been an accepted point that for seizure of power by the Party in any area, the prior entry the Soviet army is apt to be a necessary condition. In a lett of May 4, 1948 the Soviet Central Committee stated, in answ to an earlier letter from the Yugoslav Central Committee:

> Tito and Kardelj . . . speak of the merits and successes of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. . . . It is necessary to emphasize that the services of the French and Italian Communist Parties to the revolution were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian . . . Parties have so far achieved less success than the CPY, this is . . . mainly because . . . the Soviet army . . . crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power. Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian Communist Parties.

It may also be likely (the Varga episode is an indication o this) that if a major depression in the "capitalist" area does nc come about, the Politburo will develop the point that the "lates phase of imperialism" includes certain economic stabilizatio devices. This will not change the fact that "history has put o the order of the day" the destruction of what remains o "world capitalism," but will further increase the direct role o the Soviet Union in this process.

Needless to say, such changes will not be expressed in pub lic "theory". It is useful not to change dogmas, not to shoc foreign Communists, and not to arouse apprehension in th Soviet population of a possibly aggressive policy of action Nevertheless, in a way characteristic of Stalinist taciturnity the newer beliefs might be expressed (within the Politburo) by, say, "concrete" assessment of the incapacity of the Com- munist Party of western Germany to seize power there witho the direct "assistance" of the Soviet army.

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4. Mr. Burnham inclines both to overestimate and underestimate the tendency of the Politburo to press for advances. On the one hand he says (without indicating the military context in which he makes this statement): "It is quite possible that the Red Army, far from mounting an offensive to the West in Europe, would, as its first major move, fall back to the East." What he says about the Politburo's appreciation of the value of "retreats" is true, but it is also true (as "X" pointed out in his article in *Foreign Affairs,* July 1947) that the Soviet operational code insists upon the necessity of advancing as far as possible in every situation. One of the aims of such an advance would be to create a glacis for retreat, if retreat should become necessary. It seems quite unlikely that the Soviet Army would refrain from occupying Western Europe, for no matter how temporary a period, if it could be done without prohibitive cost, since the wholesale destruction or removal of military-industrial installations and personnel could be effected in the time. In comparison with such a consideration, misgivings about the "grave logistical problem of maintaining large occupation and defensive forces in the West" would not be very strong—quite apart from the fact that the Soviet Army considers its "logistical problem" to be much less "grave" than that of the American Army. Also, it is hard to believe that in the foreseeable future the Politburo would regard their apparatuses in the satellite countries as too unreliable to be "astride their lines of communication" in the case of an advance to the West.

In their retrospective accounts of the Red Army offensive into Poland in 1920, Lenin and Stalin both indicated that the Army had bitten off more than it could chew. They had in mind a conventional military consideration. The temporary occupation of eastern Poland had not brought in a worthy amount of war booty, and the Red Army had been exposed to an effective counteroffensive. But, except when advance would result in such obviously self-defeating situations, it seems very probable (as "X" also pointed out in his article) that it is a rule of Politburo policy always to push ahead as far as possible, always being ready to retreat (as was the case in Azerbaijan in 1946, and in northern Greece).

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On the other hand, Mr. Burnham exaggerates when he says that the estimates made by Western negotiators of Soviet intentions have been false: "The Kremlin, they have known, wants as much as it can possibly get—but not, they have thought everything." Of course, ultimately the Kremlin "wants everything," but since it does not expect to get "everything" at once the estimates have not been altogether wrong. Mr. Burnham also regards as mistaken the assumption of Western negotiators that, "The Kremlin is at least agreed that peace, however hard to assure, is desirable." But this assumption has certainly always been correct. Similarly, it is an exaggeration to say that the West is mistaken in believing that while "the Kremlin strives for the most one-sided possible agreement in its favor," it "at least aims at some agreement, on some terms." It is true that the Politburo in certain situations wants no agreement whatever; but it is equally true (as Mr. Burnham himself says further on) that it finds agreement very convenient in other situations. The point of discovery would seem to be What do agreements mean in Soviet diplomacy? Are they steps supposed to lead toward ever farther-reaching integrative processes with the West, or does the Soviet Union view an "agreement" merely as a strategic means of obviating retreat and fostering advance? As Mr. Burnham points out, we can be fairly certain that the latter is the case.

5. In criticizing the United States policy of containment, Mr Burnham says: "A perpetual defensive is impossible in general, and it is particularly fantastic in relation to the struggle against world communism. The containment line is almost immeasurably vast . . . How could a front of that magnitude be held?" This would be true in the case of a shooting war. If one assumes, however, as Burnham does, that the Politburo does not want war (at least for the next two or three years), then a very extensive "front line" can indeed be held—provided that it is made quite clear that any advance beyond it would provoke war.

6. In fact, it is probable that even Soviet retreats could be induced by similar pressure. Mr. Burnham refers repeatedly and casually to the possibility of "perhaps" inducing the Politburo to evacuate certain border countries, such as Bulgaria or

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eastern Germany, short of an acute threat of war, that is, short of an ultimatum demanding evacuation. The probability of this would be exceedingly slight as it appears to be a central rule of Politburo behavior to resist an enemy offensive at the very beginning unless it is supported by overwhelming force (applied locally or against the Center itself), in which case the Politburo would retreat to whatever extent was necessary to prevent a showdown that might endanger its very existence.

7. As to the domestic position of the Politburo, Mr. Burnham says: "The inference to be drawn from the mass slave-labor camps, the purges, internal passports, prohibition of foreign travel, and suppression of opposition opinion . . . is too clear to be denied any longer by any but fanatics or deliberate liars." But he seems to be overlooking a major rationale of Bolshevik violence, i.e., not to react in specific and limited ways to nonconformist behavior but to strike with overwhelming force where the beginnings, or even the possibilities of beginnings, of serious discontent are held to be present. Therefore the massive use of violence which Burnham speaks about cannot always be taken as an indicator of actual discontent and its scope. Furthermore, Burnham does not consider that violence and other measures of control when applied in this "totalitarian" fashion are apt to be effective in reducing awareness of discontent as well as overt nonconformist actions.

8. "Throughout the party [presumably the Soviet party] the MVD can observe what members display any slight sympathy for Tito, or fail to sound convincing in denunciation; and the names of these members can be entered in the appropriate files." Nobody in the party who is not suicidal is going "to display any slight sympathy for Tito" or "fail to sound convincing in denunciation"—and it is rather easy to sound convincing when denunciations have become as extreme and as stereotyped as they are in the Soviet Union today. In the case of individuals who do not conform to the appropriate standard, more radical means are adopted than entering their names "in the appropriate files."

Burnham continues: "To give a chance for this maneuver is perhaps part of the explanation for the comparative mildness of Stalin's counter-Tito measures during the first year

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after the break." In view of the points just made, this seems implausible. The explanation of this Stalinist "mildness" may be, more conventionally, that the Politburo overestimated the subversive devices being used against Tito, and the effectiveness of its appeal to the Yugoslav Party against the Yugoslav leadership; also that the Politburo was apprehensive that a more general conflict might arise from military attack, covert or overt, against Tito.

9. "At the very beginning of communist state power, the communists confronted serious difficulties in both theory and practice over 'the national question.'" While there were, of course, "serious difficulties" in "practice," it is difficult to perceive such "difficulties" in "theory". What Burnham calls the "constitutional myth according to which the actually monolithic state was a free federation, freely dissolvable, of autonomous units" has always been generally accepted.

10. In discussing the history of Bolshevik theory, Mr. Burnham says: "The question . . . arose: What is to be the relation of the . . . foreign communists to the Soviet state? Combined theory and practice, though not without travail, produced an answer"—namely, that the Soviet Union is the "fatherland of all toilers." It is not clear what "travail" occurred in the elaboration of this formula, which is not, as Mr. Burnham seems to imply, the consequence of a complicated set of propositions. Rather, the whole "theory" referred to here consists solely of that formula. The same is true in other instances where Mr. Burnham speaks about Leninist-Stalinist "theory."

He also states the following contradiction in current Stalinist doctrine: "If . . . the Soviet Union and also the new nations are 'building toward communism' . . . why in the name of Dialectical Materialism is one to be preferred over the rest?" In theory, the Soviet Union is not so "preferred." There may be a difficulty here because of the contrast between theory and fact, but such contrasts have always been prominent in Stalinism. Their impact on communists may well be greater now then they have been at other times, but whether this is so cannot be ascertained from a mere inspection of the text of the theory.

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Mr. Burnham elaborates this point by saying that the Politburo is in a theoretical quandary vis-à-vis the satellites:

> The communists cannot openly say that the satellite nations are merely colonial dependencies . . . But to admit these nations to full equality would be to threaten the monolithic unity of the communist political structure . . . The communist theoreticians try to temporize with jerry-built theories, hoping that a revelation will soon be made manifest somehow.

Mr. Burnham seems to equate the "admission of these nations to full equality" in practice (which would indeed be inconvenient) and in words (which is so much easier). The theory of the "People's Democracy," whatever variations it has undergone since 1944, has always, at least by implication, admitted these nations to "full equality" with the Soviet Union, for example, by stressing their sovereignty. How impressive such official language is, and to whom, is another matter; but no "theoretical" difficulty seems to be involved.

Mr. Burnham further presents the following contradiction in current Stalinist doctrine concerning the satellite countries:

> The satellites properly aid the Soviet Union now because they were liberated by the blood and exertions of the Red Army and the Soviet Union . . . But communist doctrine teaches that there is no gratitude in politics.

Communist doctrine does teach this with reference to the relations between the Party and the rest of the world, but not with reference to relationships between communists. Not that "gratitude" is required in internal relations, but it is not opposed.

11. Mr. Burnham discusses another contradiction in Stalinist doctrine:

> . . . the theoreticians are beginning to declare that the Soviet Union . . . has now reached the stage of 'communism' . . . But communist doctrine teaches that under communism the state 'withers away', a process not yet very noticeable in the Soviet Union.

Stalinist doctrine is in fact full of unadmitted and unresolved contradictions, but the aspect touched upon here has always been one for which care has been taken to minimize contradictions. The "withering away of the state" has for a long time been predicted only for completed "communism"; and only its "early shoots" are supposed to be appearing in the

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Soviet Union. Second, in an interview with Alexander Werth Stalin added to his earlier theory of socialism in one countr the theory of the possibility of communism in one country. I follows that the state would continue to exist even under com plete communism, as long as a capitalist sector of the world i preserved.

12. As regards the situation that will be created by Stalin' death, Mr. Burnham says: "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism ha no satisfactory solution in theory" for "the mechanism of suc cession." He asks: "How, and upon what verbal grounds, wil X replace Stalin?" The simplest "theoretical solution"—th one adopted when Stalin succeeded Lenin—might be as fol lows. For a certain period of time popular attention would b concentrated on the deceased Stalin, and on the "Central Com mittee" as retaining supreme authority after his death. Fron a certain moment on, not merely the "Central Committee" but the "Central Committee under the leadership of X," o "the Party under the leadership of X," would be presente as the supreme authority. There would not be, as there wa not for Stalin, any explicit statement as to why X rather than Y had become the new "leader"; but there would be many statements implicitly justifying this position—his great ac complishments in the past, his correct prognoses in the past etc.

13. Finally, the delay in convening a Nineteenth Party Congress in Moscow is related to the existence of a "moral crisis." Mr. Burnham says that the Politburo members who gave up their ministry in 1949 "are no doubt trying to prepare for the convening of a Party Congress," which, he says, it would be "most awkward if not impossible" to hold before an "ideologically acceptable answer" has been elaborated "which can be unanimously voted." This misses certain major points of the situation in the Party. First, Stalinism has eliminated the criteria by which the ideological "acceptability" of an answer can be measured: any answer that the Central Committee would put before the Party Congress would, by that very fact, be an "ideologically acceptable" answer. Second, there are no "problems" that demand "answers" which have not yet been given *on the theoretical level*. Third, to imply that if an "un-

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acceptable" answer were proposed there might be a division of the vote at the Party Congress seems to be unrealistic.

While the points put forward in this paper are confirmable within degrees ranging from practical certainty to moderate plausibility, the relevant data are at present uncollected. Perhaps this will be remedied during the current decade.

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PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES

By JEROME S. BRUNER

Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1950, 269 pp., $3.75.

IN WRITING on public opinion and foreign policy, one is soon forced to make a choice. Two traditional alternatives offer themselves; each is premised upon a set of values the acceptance of which has been rendered the more seductive by generations of felicitous *parti pris.* One view is based upon the assumption that public opinion, the common man, *can be* and *must be* the final arbiter in matters of public policy—foreign policy included. Thus Sir Norman Angell: "His [the common man's] opinion is the final court of appeals in politics. . . . It was he who defeated Wilson in America. . . . John's common sense can often be a better guide than the expert's learning."[1] Such imperatives of aspiration spring from the optimism of our democratic tradition: man is perfectible, educable, responsible. One looks with alarm at the decisive intervention of "interests" in the formulation of foreign policy, is deeply troubled by the growth of a professional foreign-policy-making elite, and foresees the ultimate failure of any policy that does not have the "full support" of public opinion. "The conduct of modern war requires the enrollment of every citizen in the military effort. The conduct of foreign policy, if it is to assure peace and prosperity, requires the same kind of free cooperation."[2] The public can and must be made to see its own interest in the decisions of foreign policy. The public can and must be educated, can and must be given the facts. Barriers of ignorance and prejudice can and must be overcome.

But a recital of aspirations about the role of public opinion

[1] Sir Norman Angell, *Let the People Know,* New York, Viking, 1943, p. 15.

[2] Lester Markel, et al., *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* New York, Harper, 1949, p. 9.

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balanced against a marshalling of figures indicating a public lack of information and interest in foreign policy does not constitute an analysis of the interdependence of public opinion and foreign policy. However much we may agree with the assertion that more and better public information is required or that the State Department must tell the public what is crucial to the making of a wise decision on any given issue, acceptance of the aims of enlightenment does not advance us on the road toward achieving it. For what is too often lacking in optimistic analyses of public opinion is both a grasp of the deep-lying psychological forces nurturing the growth of "public opinions" and a sense of when and how public consensus makes a difference in the policy process.

If this view of public opinion be Apollonian, a second alternative is Dionysian. Unreason is the focus of its concern. Whether the argument proceeds from premises derived from a misread Freud, from Nietzsche, from the more Jeremiac semanticists, or from a tragic sense of history, the conclusion is a form of pessimism. Thomas Bailey, in writing on the subject of public opinion and foreign policy, adopts from Emerson the motto: "The Man in the Street cannot see the stars in the sky."[3] One concentrates upon man's helplessness and irrational propensities in the face of the vast complexity of world affairs and, in despair, turns to an analysis of international relations as an economic, military, or diplomatic chess, the players posited as would-be free agents hampered by the inertia and the fickleness of public opinion. Whether one looks on such a process of "public opinion" with regret, with proposals for "manipulating" public opinion, with cynicism toward egalitarian aspirations, or with the psychiatrist's zeal for curing is a matter which need not concern us. What is important is that the pessimism of the "tough minded realist" fails to grapple with the chain of events through which the opinions of the public affect the final product of foreign policy. For neither the optimism of the "tender minded" nor the pessimism of the tough minded are ways of knowing. They have been, perhaps, the major invisible barriers to an adequate analysis of the

[3] Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street,* New York, Macmillan, 1948.

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opinion-policy process, for each was an invitation to avoid the problem by solving it with an attitude.

Gabriel Almond's *The American People and Foreign Policy* can be reviewed on two levels. It is, foremost, a serious and important analytic assessment of various ways in which public opinion influences foreign policy. As such, it errs neither toward optimism nor pessimism, expressing neither disappointments nor great expectations about what public opinion now is or should some day be. On another level, the book is a provocative study in the psychological and sociological factors influencing American opinion on foreign policy. On both levels, the author brings to bear many of the newer tools of psychological, sociological, and anthropological analysis—many of which are new only in the sense of being so long absent from the battery of techniques customarily used by the political scientist.

Almond's point of departure is summarized best in his own words.

> There are inherent limitations in modern society on the capacity of the public to understand the issues and grasp the significance of the most important problems of public policy. This is particularly the case with foreign policy where the issues are especially complex and remote. The function of the public in a democratic policy-making process is to set certain policy criteria in the form of widely held values and expectations. . . . The policies themselves, however, are the products of leadership groups ("elites") who carry on the specific work of policy formulation and policy advocacy. The public share in policy decisions may be compared, with important qualifications, to a market. It buys or refuses to buy the "policy products" offered by competing elites. However, the policy market is not as simple as an economic market. There is, unfortunately, no simple policy currency in which the costs of alternative policies can be computed. The policy product cannot be felt, tasted, or weighed. They are predictions of consequences of action, hardly a tangible product with regard to which consumer preferences can easily be registered. [pp. 5-6]

Assuming this "market" conception of public opinion to be an adequate first approximation, the author then turns to his analysis of the processes involved in "public policy marketing." The first step "is to describe the environment in which Americans have to make their foreign policy decisions. What

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:re the peculiar difficulties and problems of decision-making n the era of the cold war?" Almond portrays our situation :s one in which the expanding thrust of Soviet Communism ıas come to be seen by the public as a threat to certain agreed- ıpon basic American values: "an open system in which free- lom, mass welfare, and peace can coexist." Recognition of hreat to these values creates support for active participation n world affairs. But five conditions are posited by the author ıs weakening or distorting what might be called an "unam- ›iguously rational American interventionism" based on a weighing of the adequacy of policy products in meeting :he threat of Communism. These conditions are thought of as "disincentives" to rational intervention. The first of them is the relative *risk* involved in various policies. The risk of highly destructive war is present and sensed in foreign policy alternatives designed for a world deprived of the cushioning effects of a pluralistic balance of power. The second condition is *tension* and *threat,* the fact that Communist methods, revolutionary in aim, must be countered by the more gradual, nonviolent methods characteristic of democratic foreign policy. Inevitably, the anxiety and tension of "containment" is a source of fatigue and stress. In addition to grave risk and permanent tension, American policy requires high cost and, therefore, *economic sacrifice.* Measures of economic cooperation, the technological development of vulnerable backward areas, military supplies ancillary to the North Atlantic Pact—all of these must inevitably be perceived in part as drains upon American economic resources. A fourth characteristic of the decision-making situation is *complexity.* To attend to the issues and events relevant to decision means exposure to complexities sufficiently ambiguous to be psychologically threatening. Finally, *rejection* and *hostility* are characteristic of the cold-war environment. Americans must, in order to participate, adapt to being disliked—especially by those whose very hostility toward us grows from a sense of dependence upon us. Insofar as risk, tension, sacrifice, complexity, and hostility are present, there is the risk of either withdrawal or an ineffective and capricious activism.

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The second step in Almond's analysis, after the "decision situation" has been delineated, is to "describe historic trends of culture and character in the United States." Such an analysis, he asserts, provides the understanding of values and character structure necessary for predicting responses to the stresses in the "decision" situation as well as providing a first step toward understanding "policy consensus." It is in this section of the book that Almond becomes the victim of circumstances. Impressionistic accounts of American character provided by historians and the intuitive insights of the "anthropologists of everyday life in America" who have attempted delineations of "American character" hardly provide the kinds of material necessary for predicting response, say, to the stresses of complexity or risk. With Almond, we lament the need to depend upon such intuitive sources as a means of filling in one crucial step in his analysis. For his material, the author examines shrewdly the observations of Bryce, De Tocqueville, Ostrogorski, Dickens, and other talented foreign observers of the American people during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. American anthropologists such as Mead, Gorer, and the Kluckhohns are likewise passed in review—and one cannot but be struck at how little the technique of observation has changed as one moves from the first group to the second.

Almond emerges from his review with a set of provisional "psycho-cultural hypotheses" about American character traits which, unfortunately, can be little better than the observations upon which they are based. Vacillation between public intervention and withdrawal into privacy in American life, possibly explicable in foreign affairs by an American tendency to overreact both to threat and the removal of threat, is one such hypothesized trait. Another American "trait" is mood simplification, our tendency to oversimplify issues and situations. One misses in this discussion a full appreciation of the universality of opinion simplification; there is no reference, for example, to the discussion of stereotyping by the younger Walter Lippmann (whose complete absence from the pages of this book is, in the reviewer's opinion, a costly omission). Nor does Almond dwell in sufficient detail upon the importance of mod-

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ern journalistic practices in abetting and forwarding the simplification or stereotyping process in public thinking.[4]

This section of Almond's book is delightful reading and the stuff of which good conversation is made. Psychologically, it is shallow. And perhaps needlessly so. If one seeks an answer to the question "How do Americans react to certain critical situations such as the present cold war?" there are considerable psychological data to be marshalled in essaying an answer. Consider, for example, the matter of tolerance for complexity and ambiguity so urgently needed at the present time. Almond speaks of an intrinsic "mood simplifying" trait in the American people. What does one learn thereby? The trait, once postulated, can only be used after the fact. The real question is: What increases and decreases tolerance for ambiguity? And there are a variety of studies by contemporary American psychologists directed at this problem. Frenkel-Brunswik, Rokeach, Sanford, and Luchins, to mention but a few, have reported on the effects of stress, emotional ambivalence developed in the family situation, education, age, and many other factors as influencing capacity to handle complex and ambiguous situations flexibly. These studies, I think, would be far better points of support in Almond's argument than the impressionistic data employed.

As his third task, Almond attempts to sketch the "mood" or mass opinion of the nation as inferred from the mass of public opinion studies of attitudes toward foreign policy. An impressive array of opinion poll data forms the background of his sketch of our popular policy consensus and the departure from the consensus amongst different age, sex, class, and regional groupings.

In the reviewer's opinion, this section of the book is as prudent a review of mass opinion on foreign policy as judged from the polls as he has seen. Perhaps the Yale Institute or some other institute should provide such interpretative summaries on a biennial basis.

[4] Other American traits include a tendency to swing erratically between optimism and pessimism; an instability in tolerance for cultural differences which stems from a replacement of stable values by slavishness to cultural fashions; a vacillation between over-and under-estimation of our own capacities and those of other peoples.

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The final task of the book is to spell out the nature of the American foreign policy consensus and to examine the operations of various elites in competing for the support of the "interested" and "mass" publics. The general foreign policy consensus in the broad American public is characterized as "resistance to Communist expansion by economic, diplomatic, propaganda, and, if necessary, military means, and the establishment of a peaceful and legal international order in which American material and security interests would be protected." But consensus is not rigid; there is, rather, a rational eclecticism, what Max Weber has called an instrumental rationality, acceptance of both ends and means being contingent rather than absolute.

From the vantage point of the presumed foreign policy consensus, the author passes in review the policy elites of various interest groups, assessing their place in American social structure and the degree to which they diverge from the consensus. From this review emerges a typology of competing foreign policies, each diverging either in ends or in means from the foreign policy consensus. The "ends" deviationists fall into two groups: radical appeasers who seek to maximize the welfare achievements of Communism and would minimize its terror, and reactionaries who have as sole aim the maintenance of economic freedom of the individual and who consequently abhor a socialist ally. Neither group finds it possible to accept the Western coalition. Three types of "means" deviants are distinguished: unilateral nationalists, pacificists, and outright internationalists.

In the final chapter of the book, Almond turns to the problem of consensus and the public opinion process in a period of crisis. Does the separation of policy elite and general public, involving as it does the professionalization of policy-making, lead to a sense of impotence in the individual citizen? Does such a sense of helplessness become readily converted into a sense of hatred and resentment against those who hold policy power? And finally, to what extent does the dissemination on a widespread basis of "the facts about foreign policy" create interest and clarity in the public and thereby increase the "interested public?"

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A convincing case against the mass information view of presenting foreign policy issues to the public grows out of Almond's view. Citing several studies to strengthen his point he concludes that "there is no mass market for detailed information on foreign affairs," that the general public looks for cues to guide its mood responses rather than for facts. Cues to crisis or calm will be sought and responded to accordingly with anxiety or complacency. Without a background of interest, the mass public can do little else. The bulk of effort in informing the public should, therefore, be directed to informing and extending the interested public and in training the policy elite cadres. The mass public has information available if it wishes it, but a minimum of effort will be spent on campaigns of promotion built on slogans of oversimplification designed to deepen "self-deception." The containment of mass mood changes is better accomplished by improved training and broader representation in the policy elites and by increasing the more solidly informed attentive publics. Containment may indeed have already occurred through the sobering effects of our immediately past history which has put a ceiling on the hopes and a floor beneath the disappointments between which the American public can fluctuate.

We have examined in considerable detail this impressive book—impressive for its thoughtfulness, its boldness of conception, and for the amalgam of intellectual backgrounds which it represents. It is, perhaps, the first comprehensive marshalling of hypotheses concerning the impact of the public—or publics—on foreign policy which brings to bear the thinking of modern social science. This is not said in faint praise, for between Lippmann's *Phantom Public,* Dewey's *The Public and its Problems,* or Lowell's *Public Opinion and Popular Government* and Almond's book there is a wide gap indeed. Between them is the period in which the works of such modern thinkers as Freud, Pareto, and Weber have come to be seen in perspective. In the interim, too, has occurred tremendous technical advance in the social sciences.

It is perhaps because of the virtues of the book that it is not without a goodly share of vices. Of some of these we have already spoken. Dependence upon highly subjective

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methods of assessing national values and national character, if not inexcusable, is hardly to be desired. One finds also a certain casual looseness involved in both the definition of and determination of "policy consensus." I do not know how Almond decided who championed the consensus and who were the deviationists amongst our competing policy elites. Is a consensus an average? If it is, what are its tolerable limits, and beyond what point is one read out of the prevailing group?

Nor is it clear to the reader how one moves from the generalizations of national character to the particularities of policy consensus. Granted, for example, that a fluctuation between intervention in public affairs and withdrawal into privatism is characteristic of the American character (and assuming too that it is a worthwhile abstraction to talk of such a character), what range of behaviors shall we predict from this trait? That the American businessman periodically gets fed up with his business and fluctuates violently toward public concern? That churches have a large turnover in their memberships? If not these two, then why that Americans intervene and withdraw in foreign affairs with careening speed? Reaction to threat and its removal? What is the life background of this threat? It is too characteristic of the concept of national character that it becomes a vehicle for causation when cause is not otherwise determinable.

There is also in the book an insufficient regard for the processes involved in "public understanding" of issues. It is characteristic of the processes of perceiving or otherwise absorbing information from the environment that new information is transformed in terms of the cognitive maps and expectancies which have been built up in the past history of the person. If new information does not fit the map or contradicts it, three things may happen. It will be rejected, it will be transformed to fit, or the map will be changed to conform with the new information. In any event, how new information will be understood will depend upon the present needs of the individual and his hypotheses about the world in which he lives. Disseminating information is not simply a question of getting the pill down the horse's throat or not getting it down. The problem is always *how does the individual perceive an event.*

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All of which is not to say that the public will inevitably be wishful in what it selects to understand and in how it understands issues. To put the matter in such terms is to misunderstand the issue. For to say that we understand in terms of our needs and our hypotheses about the world hardly implies that all our needs are simple wishes for gratification or that all of our beliefs and hypotheses are grossly out of keeping with reality.

If one would increase interested publics and aid in the containment of mass moods as well, our first question must be: "How will this issue be perceived by what segments of the public?" For it is this step which will, perhaps more than any other, determine how the public or the individual will react, how the issue or event will be handled subsequently in his thinking, how it will be remembered, if at all. Almond has failed to take sufficient account of what Thomas and Znaniecki called, more than a quarter century ago, "the definition of the situation."

A last theoretical point. Like many political scientists, Almond has a tendency to view the policy-maker in something of a vacuum—fabricating a policy product to be sold on the opinion market. The only constraint seems to be the interest public with which he identifies. Perhaps the conceptual scheme so fruitfully utilized in this book would be further enriched if in some later edition the author might include a more thorough discussion of the policy-maker and the external and intrapersonal forces which make him anything but a free agent. Complex modern society is structured in such a way that the policy-maker is placed in a certain role which carries with it certain legitimate expectations and obligations. What are the various role restrictions involved in various kinds of elites? The bureaucratic expert, for example, is expected to exercise a prudence bordering on caution in return for which he is given praise and status. Is there not something inherent in the role of professional policy-maker, then, which delimits the range of alternatives which he will consider as feasible instruments for the attainment of a policy objective? The policy adherent and formulator is also subject to his market: his product will reflect what he thinks he can obtain by way of

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support. Yet he also has sets of principles to which he must adhere if he is to receive his regular fees as a professional man and if he is to feel the full sense of his own dignity. How psychologically are these pressures resolved in the professional? For there can be little question that "the public" or various publics are at the elbow of the individual attempting to reach a policy decision. I am not impressed by Walter Lippmann's flip remark that the three Virginia Presidents showed no sign of interest in the equivalent of a Gallup poll in their correspondence on foreign policy.

We cannot know whether Gabriel Almond has presented a correct view of American public opinion as it affects the current course of our foreign policy. His analysis of the conditions of cold-war decision is admirable, as is his discussion of the state of the public's mood on foreign affairs. However casual its method of determination, the foreign policy consensus seems plausible to the student of American public opinion. The book is wise throughout. It will undoubtedly stimulate much needed research. It is the absence of basic research which makes it impossible to judge whether the hypotheses Almond has presented are demonstrated or not demonstrated. What is most important about the book is that it presents hypotheses about the impact of opinion on policy in a form amenable to testing.

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RESEARCH NOTES

THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF AREA RESEARCH*

By GEORGE PETER MURDOCK

I

FOR some time a tendency has been manifest seriously to exaggerate the scientific pretensions of area research. Unless such claims are pruned to realistic proportions, there is a danger that area programs may collapse in a welter of shattered hopes. It would seem that some searching critical analysis is called for.

When realistically viewed, area research cannot be expected to contribute *directly* to the advance of *pure* science in any of the disciplines concerned with human behavior. Like any scholarly activity, area research can contribute *indirectly* to the sciences dealing with man. And it can contribute directly to applied and other branches of science, even though not to pure science. But to promote area studies as a major channel to the much needed advance of fundamental social science is to promise something they cannot achieve, and to court grievous disappointment.

By "pure science" I mean, of course, a system of principles or "laws" that have been fully validated and are capable of being applied with precision and confidence. Basically a scientific principle or "law" is merely a statement of an invariable relationship between phenomena whereby one characteristic changes in a precisely defined manner as another or others are altered in an equally definite manner. It is a peculiarity of pure science that once such a relationship has been established, experimentally or otherwise, the scientist no longer has the slightest interest in the phenomena themselves, whether they

* This article is based on a paper read at the Second National Conference on the Study of World Areas, New York, May 5, 1950.

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be objects or events. The abstracted relationship is his only concern. This can be projected against other phenomena or data, either for further verification or for purposes of application. But the chemicals, the experimental animals, or the observational data by which the principle or relationship was validated are commonly discarded or forgotten.

Area research has no such interest in the discovery and validation of abstract principles, and certainly no such indifference to its data after they have been analyzed. On the contrary, it seeks to order its data into meaningful configurations, and afterwards to preserve them intact in their significant relationships with one another. Pure science objectives in anthropology, sociology, economics, geography, and psychology, of course, differ in no significant respect from those in the physical and biological sciences, as George Lundberg points out in his article "Alleged Obstacles to Social Science."[1] Area research is therefore not justified by some peculiar characteristic of the human or social sciences, as some followers of musty German philosophy are still wont to assert.

Another characteristic of pure science is that it carries its practitioners wherever its problems lead them—often to highly unexpected places. Mankind is interested in scientific knowledge of heredity for various practical purposes—notably to improve the economic productivity of his domesticated plants and animals—and substantial funds are made available to biological scientists in the applied fields of agriculture and animal husbandry. But do the pure scientists working in the same field —the geneticists—experiment with wheat or cattle? Decidedly not. Of all conceivable species, they concentrate on the lowly Drosophila or fruit fly. But the geneticist is not interested in the heredity of fruit flies. He studies them only because they offer him the maximum theoretical knowledge with the minimum of time, cost, and effort. Having abstracted his principles, he happily forgets all the specific data about his bar-eyed pets by which he established them, except perhaps to summarize them for his professional colleagues.

Social scientists do exactly the same thing. As an instance we may cite a case of pure research in cultural anthropology by

[1] *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. LXX, No. 5 (May 1950), pp. 299-305.

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Allan Holmberg of Cornell. He came to question the conclusion of Freud that unconscious personality manifestations stem necessarily from sexual frustration. He noted that this theory was based on studies of upper- and middle-class people in Vienna and elsewhere whose circumstances and means enabled them to satisfy fully every other basic need—for food, for clothing, for shelter, for all creature comforts. Sexual gratification alone encountered substantial difficulties. Holmberg therefore formulated the hypothesis that under different circumstances, where another basic drive was regularly frustrated, this drive might replace sex as the root of unconscious behavior. He therefore sought for a society in which the hunger drive is seriously and frequently frustrated in consequence of irregularity in the food supply and inadequate techniques for exploiting it. He found such a society in the Siriono of lowland Bolivia, lived and worked with them for an extended period, and fully confirmed his hypothesis by discovering that the content of dreams, myths, verbal aggression, and other manifestations of unconscious mental processes revolved exclusively about food and hunger and not about sex.

Area programs necessarily confine the field of the scientist. They might, for example, require the geneticist to work on the humped cattle of India, or Dr. Holmberg to find a research site in China. By their very nature they are not conducive to the utter freedom of research required by the pure scientist. We shall have reason to believe that area research is prompted by pure science objectives when, for example, there suddenly appear in our universities ten times as many area programs concerned with Madagascar or the Gran Chaco as with Russia or China.

II

An equally illusory claim for area research is that it is peculiarly conducive to interdisciplinary integration or the cultivation of the borderlines between traditional sciences. I know of few instances where fundamental scientific knowledge in such a transitional field has been advanced by a cooperating team of individuals with separate specialties. Genuine gains are normally made by scientists who personally master both

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or all of the adjacent fields. Biochemistry was developed by scientists proficient in both physiology and chemistry, physical chemistry by men competent in both physics and chemistry, and so on. The same is true of interdisciplinary research in the social and psychological sciences, as I can testify of an instance in which I have had a personal part. The Institute of Human Relations at Yale was originally set up on the assumption that by bringing specialists in various fields together in adjacent offices, with a common problem set for them, integration between disciplines would be accomplished by some mysterious process of osmosis. This attempt spectacularly failed. We ultimately achieved an important measure of integration and some significant advance in pure science theory, but these were accomplished, not by propinquity, cooperation, or even a common problem, but by a painful educational process through which the essential skills of each participant were transplanted into the skulls of all the rest.

Area research does bring men of different disciplines together. It does encourage them to cooperate. It does establish conditions under which they can learn from one another. But it does not assure that they will, and unless there is a transfer of basic knowledge from the inside of the skull of each to the inside of the skulls of the rest no genuine integration is possible. Even if integration occurs, it is not likely to result in fundamental new knowledge since by the very nature of area research it will rarely involve basic principles, that is to say pure science. Let us therefore not deceive ourselves that our interest in area research is justified as a direct highroad to interdisciplinary integration.

III

If area research offers no promise of substantial advance in either pure science or interdisciplinary integration, what can account for the present lively interest in the field, both by scholars outstanding in their respective disciplines for their contributions to pure science and by those known for their devotion to the objective of interdisciplinary integration? Here is an apparent paradox that demands resolution.

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The answer may lie in the fact that area studies fall into an important field of endeavor which is *related to,* though *distinct from,* pure science.

In this field, phenomena are not analyzed for the purpose of isolating abstract laws or principles, and then discarded. They are analyzed, rather, for the purpose of understanding them in their natural interrelationships with one another. When these have been tentatively determined, they serve as a sort of framework on which to organize or arrange the data in meaningful fashion. The data are not discarded or forgotten when this framework has been constructed, as they are after a law or principle of pure science has been validated, but are preserved in their entirety in an organic total configuration. In pure science, phenomena are merely the instruments or servants of a principle, but in the activity under discussion the framework is the instrument or servant of the phenomena. Instead of an abstracted relationship which can be used for the control or manipulation of any similar phenomena, we have an organizational structure which is meaningful for the particular group of phenomena under consideration, and for no others.

The terms commonly used for this field of endeavor have not been wholly satisfactory. To call it "descriptive science" is inadequate, for it involves much more than description. Indeed, interpretation is of its very essence. "Taxonomic science" is equally unsatisfactory, for it involves theory as well as classification. To be sure, taxonomic systems like the periodic table in chemistry, the Linnaean system of classifying forms of living organisms, and the grouping of primitive societies into culture areas represent excellent examples. It is clear that these systems cannot exist in the abstract, apart from the specific phenomena which they bring into meaningful order. They are, moreover, not verifiable in the sense that the principles of pure science are. The biologist will readily admit, for example, that whether two forms constitute distinct species or merely two varieties of the same species is a matter, not of experimental determination but of convenience and utility. Finally, the predictive power or practical applicability of even the most rigorous taxonomic system is exceedingly limited.

The essence of scholarly enterprises of this sort is not that

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they are descriptive or taxonomic but that they represent attempts at the systematic understanding of particular segments of reality, rather than at the isolation of principles of universal validity. In the study of human behavior, the attempt to understand particular events in their temporal and causal sequence yields history; the attempt to understand the activities of the members of a particular society in their synchronic relationships yields, for example, the so-called "functional" type of ethnography. Area research seems to be a strictly comparable effort to understand the behavior of members of various historically related societies occupying a common area in all their internal and external relationships. No one denies the value of history or of functional anthropology, and there is no obvious reason why area research cannot be defended upon exactly the same basis.

Certain of these intellectual enterprises are strongly permeated by a scientific interest, but it might be better to refrain entirely from applying the name "science" to them. After all, the same spirit of inquiry and quest for understanding underlie many other activities which we do not call scientific. Among them are philosophy, theology, and the fine arts. Indeed, it is difficult to see any fundamental distinction between the so-called sciences in this aspect of their activities and the fields of research that are called the humanities. Moreover, there are certain aspects of the humanities that seem to be practically indistinguishable from pure science. Such principles as those of perspective in art and harmony in music represent the same kinds of abstractions as scientific laws. They are equally divorced from specific bodies of data, equally susceptible of representation in equations or other symbolic forms, and equally capable of application with complete predictability of the results in a wide variety of concrete situations.

Perhaps, then, the sciences and the humanities are not so distinct. Perhaps they differ primarily only in degree, with the former laying greater emphasis upon the establishment of universally valid abstract principles, the latter upon the understanding of phenomena in the contexts in which they naturally occur. If there is such a genuine overlap and interpenetration, it may possibly seem less humiliating to recognize the essen-

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tially closer affiliation of area research with the humanities than with the sciences.

Actually the same intellectual interest extends to many fields that no one would class with either the sciences or the humanities. Man's curiosity leads to the pursuit of organized knowledge about every activity in which he engages. The amount of intellectual effort and research that has gone into the stamp collectors' hobby, philately, considerably exceeds that which many fields of science or humanistic study can claim, and the public press contains more statistics and analysis of baseball and horse racing in one day than it does of all the sciences and humanities in a month.

The fields which we dignify by the terms "science" and "humanities" seem, indeed, to be at bottom hobbies. They differ from philately and baseball primarily in the fact that our society rates them considerably higher in its cultural scale of values—sufficiently higher so that it offers them substantial support through the state or through foundations and other organizations of the elite, which it withholds from stamp collectors and sports writers. Most of the sciences and humanities first began, of course, as hobbies, and some activities which were once valued and supported, like astrology, have subsequently declined once more to the status of hobbies. As culture changes, in short, the values of different intellectual hobbies fluctuate.

It is perfectly understandable that our society today should be placing an increasing value on area research. As the world has grown smaller, we have been brought into close contact with regions that were once remote, and our intellectual curiosity about them has naturally increased. Our nation has become a world power of the first rank, and today we have a wide range of vital interests in areas where formerly we had few or none. Our very political destiny may even depend upon our knowledge of distant peoples. Area research has advanced so rapidly up our scale of intellectual values that it may well take rank very shortly among those at the very top. There is nothing disgraceful about recognizing or capitalizing upon this situation any more than there is in the fact that historians have taken advantage of the high rank which their hobby or interest

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has enjoyed for centuries. Nor need we make any more pretense than the historians have done that our joint interest is a pure science.

Indirectly, of course, area research may prove of immense advantage to the human sciences. It can, for example, facilitate the application of these sciences. Applied science always involves relating abstract principles to concrete situations, and thus requires an exact knowledge of the latter as well as of the former. Area research can help to supply this knowledge. Applied science, incidentally, is nearly always interdisciplinary, as witness, for example, public health, social work, or education. Area research, moreover, should suggest numerous hypotheses to be tested by pure science. If extended widely enough over the earth, area programs may even provide a large number of the human laboratories or field sites most appropriate for pure science research. Finally, practice in working together on common problems may lead to the diffusion of scientific knowledge across disciplinary boundaries to an extent that may prove genuinely fructifying to the pure sciences that deal with human behavior.

These indirect results, together with the unquestioned social utility of area research in the world we live in, seem a sufficient justification of the widespread current interest in the field. They require no bulwarking from dubious pretensions to pure science objectives or to interdisciplinary progress.

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INDEX TO VOLUME II

Action committees, 524
Air, A Chartered Libertine, The, by Sidney F. Giffin, 267
Air power and strategy. *See* Giffin
Almond, Gabriel A., Anthropology, Political Behavior, and International Relations, 277
Almond, Gabriel A., *The American People and Foreign Policy*. Reviewed by Jerome S. Bruner, 560
Alsace-Lorraine. *See* Hartshorne
America Goes to War, by Charles C. Tansill, 418–21
America's Trade Balance and the International Order, by Horst Mendershausen, 40
American Diplomacy during the World War, by Charles Seymour, 411–12
American People and Foreign Policy, The by Gabriel A. Almond. Reviewed by Jerome S. Bruner, 560
American Policy toward Russia, by Quincy Wright, 463
American Wartime Objectives in Latin America, by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., 373
Angell, Norman, 560
Anthropology, Political Behavior, and International Relations, by Gabriel A. Almond, 277
Area research. *See* Michael and Spector, Murdock, Wittfogel
Army and National Socialism 1933–1945: The Responsibility of the Generals, by Gordon A. Craig, 426
Asia. *See* Wittfogel
Aspects of Politburo Behavior, by Nathan Leites, 549
Atomic bomb, 269–72
Axis and Latin America, 380–83

Bailey, Thomas A., 561
Baker, Ray Stannard, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters,* 417–18
Barnes, Harry Elmer, *Genesis of the World War,* 408
Bausman, Frederick, *Facing Europe,* 409
Beard, Charles A., *The Devil Theory of War,* 415
Benedict, Ruth, 439–40
Blomberg, General von, 429–32
Bogota Economic Agreement, 500
Borchard, Edwin and W. P. Lage, *Neutrality for the United States,* 416–17
Brookings Institution Program of International Studies, The, by Leo Pasvolsky, 295
Bruner, Jerome S., Public Opinion and Policy-Making in the United States, 560
Bryson, Lyman, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, eds., *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Buret, Fernand, 324–26
Burnham, James, *The Coming Defeat of Communism.* Reviewed by Nathan Leites, 549

Capdeville, Jean, 534
Cheever, Daniel S., The Role of the United Nations in the Conduct of United States Foreign Policy, 390
China: Communist Party in, 551; relations between Nationalists and Communists, 456; Russian policy toward, 458
Chinese History Project, Modern. *See* Michael and Spector
Collaborationists in France, 313–17
Coming Defeat of Communism, The, by James Burnham. Reviewed by Nathan Leites, 549
Communist infiltration of Czechoslovakia: and administrative reform, 354–57; and arming of agents, 357–58; and Czechoslovakian Communists, 366–71; and democrats, position of, 346–49; and labor organizations, 361–65; and mass organizations, 358–61; and Ministry of Interior, 361–65
Communist movement, 22 ff., 168–72; in France, 539–40. *See also* China, Duchacek, Leites, Russia, Wright

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conceptual Basis of Area Research, The, by George P. Murdock, 571
Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture, ed. by Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Cooperative Area Research, by Franz Michael and Stanley Spector, 148
Corbett, Percy E., Old Wine—Soviet Bottles, 285
Craig, Gordon A., Army and National Socialism 1933–1945: The Responsibility of the Generals, 426
Czechoslovakia. *See* Duchacek

Democracy, strengthening of American, 470–72
Devil Theory of War, The, by Charles A. Beard, 415
Diplomaticheskiy Slovar (vol. I, Ogiz, 1948). Reviewed by Percy E. Corbett, 285
Duchacek, Ivo, The February Coup in Czechoslovakia, 511
Duchacek, Ivo, The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia, 1944–1948, 345
Dunn, Frederick S., The Present Course of International Relations Research, 80

Earle, Edward Mead, H. G. Wells, British Patriot in Search of a World State, 181
Embree, John F., Standardized Error and Japanese Character: A Note on Political Interpretation, 439
England, nationalism in World War I, 193–99
European Recovery Program, 63–65, 392–93
Export drives, 50–53
Expropriation and nationalization, 483–86

Facing Europe, by Frederick Bausman, 409
Father Land, by Bertram Schaffner. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
February Coup in Czechoslovakia, The, by Ivo Duchacek, 511
Fierlinger, Zdenek, 370–71
Finkelstein, Louis, Lyman Bryson and R. M. MacIver, eds., *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Foreign policy and the United Nations. *See* Cheever
Fox, William T. R., Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience, 67
France in Defeat: Causes and Consequences, by Saul K. Padover, 305
Franco-German Boundary of 1871, The, by Richard Hartshorne, 209
French Army and political parties. *See* Katzenbach
French Revolution, 164–68
Furniss, Edgar S., Jr., American Wartime Objectives in Latin America, 373

Genesis of the World War, by Harry Elmer Barnes, 408
German-French boundary of 1871. *See* Hartshorne
Germany: Communist Party in, 551; and Micronesia, 254–5; relations with Russia, 455–6. *See also* Nazi Germany
Giffin, Sidney F., The Air, A Chartered Libertine, 267
Good Neighbor policy, 374–77
Gorer, Geoffrey, 439–40
Grattan, C. Hartley, *Why We Fought,* 409-11
Great Britain. *See* England

H. G. Wells, British Patriot in Search of a World State, by Edward Mead Earle, 181
Halder, Franz, *Hitler als Feldherr.* Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig, 426
Hartshorne, Richard, The Franco-German Boundary of 1871, 209
Herter Bill, 502–6
Herz, John H., Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, 157
Histoire de la diplomatie, ed. by Vladimir Potiemkine. Reviewed by Alfred Vagts, 96
Hitler, 427–28, 433. *See also* Nazi Germany
Hitler als Feldherr, by Franz Halder. Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig, 426

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iolmberg, Allan, 573
Iossbach, Friedrich, *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934–1938.* Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig, 426
Iuman Relations in A Changing World, by Alexander H. Leighton. Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond, 277

Idealist internationalism. *See* Niebuhr
Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, by John H. Herz, 157
"Inevitable" War: A Problem in the Control of Long-Range Expectations, by Harold D. Lasswell, 1
Institute of Human Relations, 574
International relations research. *See* Dunn, Fox, Pasvolsky
Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience, by William T. R. Fox, 67
Investment, foreign, 53 ff. *See also* Rubin

Japan and Micronesia, 256–61
Japanese national character. *See* Embree

"K Voprosu o Ponyatii Diplomatii" (*Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo,* no. 9, Sept. 1948, pp. 14–28), by D. B. Levin. Reviewed by Percy E. Corbett, 285
Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr., Political Parties and the French Army since the Liberation, 533
Kluckhohn, Clyde, *Mirror for Man.* Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond, 277

Lage, W. P. and Edwin Borchard, *Neutrality for the United States,* 416–17
Lasswell, Harold D., "Inevitable" War: A Problem in the Control of Long-Range Expectations, 1
Lasswell, Harold D., *Power and Personality.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Latin America. *See* Bogota, Furniss
League of Nations, 199–200
Leighton, Alexander H., *Human Relations in A Changing World.* Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond, 277
Leites, Nathan, Aspects of Politburo Behavior, 549
Leopold, Richard W., The Problem of American Intervention, 1917: An Historical Retrospect, 405
Levin, D. B., "K Voprosu o Ponyatii Diplomatii" (*Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo,* no. 9, Sept. 1948, pp. 14–28). Reviewed by Percy E. Corbett, 285
Liberal tradition, 28 ff., 174–77

MacIver, R. M., Lyman Bryson and Louis Finkelstein, eds., *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 297 ff.
Markel, Lester, 560.
Mead, Margaret, 442
Mendershausen, Horst, America's Trade Balance and the International Order, 40
Metz, 217–21, 227–33
Michael, Franz and Stanley Spector, Cooperative Area Research, 148
Micronesia—A Changing Frontier, by Karl J. Pelzer, 251
Military strategy, 217–21, 256–58, 261–62, 307–11, 318–21, 383–86. *See also* Giffin, Rearmament
Millis, Walter, *Road to War: America, 1914–1917,* 412–13
Mirror for Man, by Clyde Kluckhohn. Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond, 277
Mohammedanism, 341–43
Murdock, George P., The Conceptual Basis of Area Research, 571

Nationalism: and H. G. Wells, 186–92; idealist, 160–64
Nationalization and Private Foreign Investment: The Role of Government, by Seymour J. Rubin, 482
Nazi Germany, 125, 128–29; and war crimes trials, 143–45. *See also* Axis, Craig, Hitler
Neumann, Franz, The War Crimes Trials, 135
Neutrality for the United States, by Edwin Borchard and W. P. Lage, 416–17

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Niebuhr, Reinhold, A Protest Against a Dilemma's Two Horns, 338

Old Wine—Soviet Bottles, by Percy E. Corbett, 285

Padover, Saul K., France in Defeat: Causes and Consequences, 305
Parties, French political. *See* Katzenbach
Pasvolsky, Leo, The Brookings Institution Program of International Studies, 295
Paxson, Frederic L., *Pre-War Years 1914–1917,* 417
Peace foundations, 68
Pelzer, Karl J., Micronesia—A Changing Frontier, 251
Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics, by Dinko Tomasic. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Point Four Program, 393–95, 493
Politburo behavior. *See* Leites
Political Parties and the French Army since the Liberation, by Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., 533
Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Who Gets Power and Why, 120
Possony, Stefan T., *Strategic Air Power: The Pattern of Dynamic Security.* Reviewed by Sidney S. Giffin, 267
Potiemkine, Vladimir, ed., *Histoire de la diplomatie.* Reviewed by Alfred Vagts, 96
Power drive of individuals and cultures. *See* Pool
Power and Personality, by Harold D. Lasswell. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Power position of the United States, 467–69
Present Course of International Relations Research, The, by Frederick S. Dunn, 80
Pre-War Years 1914–1917, by Frederic L. Paxson, 417
Problem of American Intervention, 1917: An Historical Retrospect, The, by Richard W. Leopold, 405
Protectionism, 51–53
Protest Against a Dilemma's Two Horns, A, by Reinhold Niebuhr, 338
Psycho-cultural approach. *See* Almond
Public Opinion and Policy-Making in the United States, by Jerome S. Brune 560

Raw materials, 209–10, 221–27, 250, 377–79
Realist internationalism. *See* Herz, Niebuhr
Research: focus of, 74–79, 80–85, 296 ff.; specialization, 85–91. *See also* Area; International relations
Revisionists, 408–11
Road to War: America, 1914–1917, by Walter Millis, 412–13
Role of the United Nations in the Conduct of United States Foreign Policy, The, by Daniel S. Cheever, 390
Rubin, Seymour J., Nationalization and Private Foreign Investment: The Role of Government, 482
Russia: conciliation with, 473–76; containment of, 476–81; and Red Army, 346 ff., 550–53; and satellites, 460, 557. *See also* Communist movement
Russia and Asia: Problems of Contemporary Area Studies and International Relations, by Karl A. Wittfogel, 445
Russia and the United States, expectations of war. *See* Lasswell, Niebuhr, Wright
Russian diplomacy, 10 ff. *See also* Corbett, Vagts
Russian Diplomatic History—N.S. or O.S.?, by Alfred Vagts, 96
Ruthenian coup, 353–54

Schaffner, Bertram, *Father Land.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Science and the humanities, 573–75
Security dilemma. *See* Herz, Niebuhr, Russia
Seymour, Charles, *American Diplomacy during the World War,* 411–12
Shall It Be Again?, by John Kenneth Turner, 408
Social Science Research Council, 71–73
Soviet Union. *See* Russia
Spain and Micronesia, 253–54
Spector, Stanley and Franz Michael, Cooperative Area Research, 148

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Standardized Error and Japanese Character: A Note on Political Interpretation, by John F. Embree, 439
Stefansson, Vilhjamur, 439
Strategic Air Power: The Pattern of Dynamic Security, by Stefan T. Possony. Reviewed by Sidney S. Giffin, 267
Strategic bombing, 273–74
Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia, 1944–1948, The, by Ivo Duchacek, 345
Switzerland, trade and compensation agreements, 490–91

Tansill, Charles C., *America Goes to War,* 418–21
Tomasic, Dinko, *Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Trade balance. *See* Mendershausen
Treaties and agreements, economic, bilateral, 497–505
Treaty of 1871, Preliminary, 213–36
Treaty of Frankfort, 1871, 236–45
Trust territory. *See* Pelzer
Turner, John Kenneth, *Shall It Be Again?,* 408

United Nations. *See* Cheever

Vagts, Alfred, Russian Diplomatic History—N.S. or O.S.?, 96
Value analysis, 91–94

War. *See* Military strategy
War Crimes Trials, The, by Franz Neumann, 135
War, expectations of. *See* Russia, Security dilemma
Wells, H. G. *See* Earle
Who Gets Power and Why, by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 120
Why We Fought, by C. Hartley Grattan, 409–11
Wittfogel, Karl A., Russia and Asia: Problems of Contemporary Area Studies and International Relations, 445
Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, by Ray Stannard Baker, 417–18
World government, 200–06, 398
World War I, American intervention in. *See* Leopold
Wright, Quincy, American Policy toward Russia, 463

Yugoslavia, 125–28, 130, 132–33, 552–56; agreement with United States, July 1948, 482–86

Zorin, V. A., 528
Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934–1938, by Friedrich Hossbach. Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig, 426

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